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Merges to android Pi release (part: 1)

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Below are a set of CLs being merged from the wv cdm repo to the android repo.

* Fix handling of OEM Cert public key.

  Author: Srujan Gaddam <srujzs@google.com>

  [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/27921 ]

  This is a potential fix for b/36656190. Set aside public
  key on first call to get the public key, and use it afterwards.
  This gets rid of extra calls to OEMCrypto_GetOEMPublicCertificate(),
  which has side-effect of staging the OEM private key.

  This also fixes a problem where the public cert string was
  not being trimmed to match the size returned by
  OEMCrypto_GetOEMPublicCertificate().

* Complete provisioning request/response for Provisioning 3.0

  Author: Gene Morgan <gmorgan@google.com>

  [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/27780 ]

  Fix bug on provisioning request path where GenerateDerivedKeys()
  was being called when preparing to generate the signature.

  Add message signature verification, and call correct OEMCrypto
  routine to rewrap the private key (OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey30).

* Implement Cdm::deleteAllUsageRecords()

  Author: Gene Morgan <gmorgan@google.com>

  [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/27780 ]

  Delete all usage records for current origin.  Removes usage
  records from file system and retains the PSTs.  The deletes
  any usage entries matching those PSTs held by OEMCrypto.

  BUG: 35319024

* Remove stringencoders library from third_party.

  Author: Jacob Trimble <modmaker@google.com>

  [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/27585 ]

  We have a fork of the stringencoders library that we use for base64
  encoding.  This reimplements base64 encoding to remove the extra
  dependency and to reduce the amount of code.

* Add Cdm::deleteUsageRecord() based on key_set_id.

  Author: Gene Morgan <gmorgan@google.com>

  [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/27605 ]

  Delete specified usage record from file system usage info and
  from OEMCrypto.

  BUG: 35319024

* Modifiable OEMCrypto

  Author: Fred Gylys-Colwell <fredgc@google.com>

  [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/24729 ]

  This CL adds a new variant of the OEMCrypto mock code that adjusts its
  behavior based on a configuration file.  This is intended for
  testing.

  For example, a tester can set current_hdcp to 2 in the options.txt
  file, push it to the device, and verify that a license is granted for
  HDCP 2.0.  Then the tester can edit the value of current_hdcp to 1 and
  push the file to the device.  Playback should stop because the license
  is no longer valid.

  This variant uses a real level 1 liboemcrypto.so to push data to a
  secure buffer.  That means we can test playback for a license that
  requires secure buffers on an Android device with real secure buffers.

  BUG: 35141278
  BUG: 37353534

BUG: 71650075
Test: Not currently passing. Will be addressed in a subsequent
      commit in the chain.

Change-Id: I58443c510919e992bb455192e70373490a00e2b6
This commit is contained in:
Rahul Frias
2018-01-05 17:05:18 -08:00
parent e34f83cdce
commit 0419b55222
120 changed files with 5402 additions and 6827 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

4
libwvdrmengine/oemcrypto/test/Android.mk
View File

@@ -6,10 +6,8 @@ LOCAL_MODULE:=oemcrypto_test
LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := tests
LOCAL_MODULE_OWNER := widevine
LOCAL_PROPRIETARY_MODULE := true
# When built, explicitly put it in the DATA/bin directory.
LOCAL_MODULE_PATH := $(TARGET_OUT_DATA)/bin
LOCAL_PROPRIETARY_MODULE := true
ifneq ($(TARGET_ENABLE_MEDIADRM_64), true)
LOCAL_MODULE_TARGET_ARCH := arm x86 mips

3
libwvdrmengine/oemcrypto/test/common.mk
View File

@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ LOCAL_C_INCLUDES += \
$(LOCAL_PATH)/../include \
$(LOCAL_PATH)/../mock/src \
vendor/widevine/libwvdrmengine/cdm/core/include \
vendor/widevine/libwvdrmengine/third_party/stringencoders/src \
LOCAL_STATIC_LIBRARIES := \
libcdm \
@@ -31,7 +30,7 @@ LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES := \
libcutils \
libdl \
liblog \
libmedia_omx \
libmedia \
libstagefright_foundation \
libutils \
libz \

2
libwvdrmengine/oemcrypto/test/oec_device_features.cpp
View File

@@ -218,6 +218,8 @@ const char* ProvisioningMethodName(OEMCrypto_ProvisioningMethod method) {
case OEMCrypto_OEMCertificate:
return "OEMCrypto_OEMCertificate";
}
// Not reachable
return "";
}
} // namespace wvoec

72
libwvdrmengine/oemcrypto/test/oec_session_util.cpp
View File

@@ -589,35 +589,45 @@ void Session::LoadOEMCert(bool verify_cert) {
openssl_ptr<BIO, BIO_vfree> bio(
BIO_new_mem_buf(&public_cert[0], public_cert_length));
ASSERT_TRUE(bio.NotNull());
openssl_ptr<X509, X509_free> cert(
PEM_read_bio_X509(bio.get(), NULL, 0, NULL));
openssl_ptr<PKCS7, PKCS7_free> cert(
d2i_PKCS7_bio(bio.get(), NULL));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert.NotNull());
openssl_ptr<EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_free> pubkey(X509_get_pubkey(cert.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(pubkey.NotNull());
public_rsa_ = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pubkey.get());
if (!public_rsa_) {
cout << "d2i_RSAPrivateKey failed.\n";
dump_openssl_error();
ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != public_rsa_);
}
if (verify_cert) {
vector<char> buffer(80);
X509_NAME* name = X509_get_subject_name(cert.get());
printf(" OEM Certificate Name: %s\n",
X509_NAME_oneline(name, &buffer[0], buffer.size()));
openssl_ptr<X509_STORE, X509_STORE_free> store(X509_STORE_new());
ASSERT_TRUE(store.NotNull());
openssl_ptr<X509_STORE_CTX, X509_STORE_CTX_free> store_ctx(
X509_STORE_CTX_new());
ASSERT_TRUE(store_ctx.NotNull());
X509_STORE_CTX_init(store_ctx.get(), store.get(), cert.get(), NULL);
// TODO(fredgc): Verify cert is signed by Google.
int result = X509_verify_cert(store_ctx.get());
ASSERT_GE(0, result) << " OEM Cert not valid. "
<< X509_verify_cert_error_string(store_ctx->error);
if (result == 0) {
printf("Cert not verified: %s.\n",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(store_ctx->error));
EXPECT_EQ(OBJ_obj2nid(cert->type), NID_pkcs7_signed);
STACK_OF(X509)* certs = cert->d.sign->cert;
for (int i = 0; certs && i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
X509* x509_cert = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
openssl_ptr<EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_free> pubkey(X509_get_pubkey(x509_cert));
ASSERT_TRUE(pubkey.NotNull());
if (i == 0) {
public_rsa_ = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pubkey.get());
if (!public_rsa_) {
cout << "d2i_RSAPrivateKey failed.\n";
dump_openssl_error();
ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != public_rsa_);
}
}
if (verify_cert) {
vector<char> buffer(80);
X509_NAME* name = X509_get_subject_name(x509_cert);
printf(" OEM Certificate Name: %s\n",
X509_NAME_oneline(name, &buffer[0], buffer.size()));
openssl_ptr<X509_STORE, X509_STORE_free> store(X509_STORE_new());
ASSERT_TRUE(store.NotNull());
openssl_ptr<X509_STORE_CTX, X509_STORE_CTX_free> store_ctx(
X509_STORE_CTX_new());
ASSERT_TRUE(store_ctx.NotNull());
X509_STORE_CTX_init(store_ctx.get(), store.get(), x509_cert, NULL);
// TODO(fredgc): Verify cert is signed by Google.
int result = X509_verify_cert(store_ctx.get());
ASSERT_GE(0, result) << " OEM Cert not valid. "
<< X509_verify_cert_error_string(store_ctx->error);
if (result == 0) {
printf("Cert not verified: %s.\n",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(store_ctx->error));
}
}
}
}
@@ -673,6 +683,7 @@ void Session::RewrapRSAKey(const struct RSAPrivateKeyMessage& encrypted,
wrapped_key->clear();
}
}
void Session::RewrapRSAKey30(const struct RSAPrivateKeyMessage& encrypted,
const std::vector<uint8_t>& encrypted_message_key,
vector<uint8_t>* wrapped_key, bool force) {
@@ -786,9 +797,11 @@ void Session::VerifyRSASignature(const vector<uint8_t>& message,
RSA_Padding_Scheme padding_scheme) {
EXPECT_TRUE(NULL != public_rsa_)
<< "No public RSA key loaded in test code.\n";
EXPECT_EQ(static_cast<size_t>(RSA_size(public_rsa_)), signature_length)
<< "Signature size is wrong. " << signature_length << ", should be "
<< RSA_size(public_rsa_) << "\n";
if (padding_scheme == kSign_RSASSA_PSS) {
openssl_ptr<EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_free> pkey(EVP_PKEY_new());
ASSERT_EQ(1, EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey.get(), public_rsa_));
@@ -927,9 +940,6 @@ void Session::GenerateReport(const std::string& pst,
EXPECT_GE(kHardwareSecureClock, pst_report().clock_security_level());
EXPECT_EQ(pst.length(), pst_report().pst_length());
EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(pst.c_str(), pst_report().pst(), pst.length()));
// Also, we the session to be able to sign the release message with the
// correct mac keys from the usage table entry.
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(VerifyClientSignature());
}
void Session::VerifyPST(const Test_PST_Report& expected) {

5
libwvdrmengine/oemcrypto/test/oec_session_util.h
View File

@@ -18,7 +18,9 @@ using namespace std;
// GTest requires PrintTo to be in the same namespace as the thing it prints,
// which is std::vector in this case.
namespace std {
void PrintTo(const vector<uint8_t>& value, ostream* os);
} // namespace std
namespace wvoec {
@@ -293,8 +295,7 @@ class Session {
wvcdm::Unpacked_PST_Report pst_report() {
return wvcdm::Unpacked_PST_Report(&pst_report_buffer_[0]);
}
// Verify the values in the PST report. The signature should have been
// verified in GenerateReport, above.
// Verify the PST report.
void VerifyPST(const Test_PST_Report& report);
// Generate and Verify the Usage Report. If any time is greater than 10
// minutes, it is assumed to be an absolute time, and time_since will be

33
libwvdrmengine/oemcrypto/test/oemcrypto_test.cpp
View File

@@ -590,7 +590,6 @@ TEST_F(OEMCryptoProv30Test, OEMCertSignatureLargeBuffer) {
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.LoadOEMCert());
OEMCryptoResult sts;
// Sign a Message
static size_t kMaxMessageSize = 8 * 1024;
vector<uint8_t> data(kMaxMessageSize);
RAND_pseudo_bytes(&data[0], data.size());
size_t signature_length = 0;
@@ -1198,7 +1197,7 @@ TEST_P(SessionTestAlternateVerification, LoadKeys) {
if (target_api_ > 8 && target_api_ < 100) {
snprintf(buffer, 5, "kc%02d", target_api_);
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < s.num_keys(); i++) {
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < s.num_keys(); i++) {
memcpy(s.license().keys[i].control.verification, buffer, 4);
}
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.EncryptAndSign());
@@ -1332,19 +1331,21 @@ TEST_F(OEMCryptoSessionTests, AntiRollbackHardwareRequired) {
TEST_F(OEMCryptoSessionTests, CheckMinimumPatchLevel) {
uint8_t patch_level = OEMCrypto_Security_Patch_Level();
printf(" Current Patch Level: %u.\n", patch_level);
Session s;
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.open());
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(InstallTestSessionKeys(&s));
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.FillSimpleMessage(
0, patch_level << wvoec_mock::kControlSecurityPatchLevelShift, 0));
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.EncryptAndSign());
ASSERT_EQ(
OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(s.session_id(), s.message_ptr(), s.message_size(),
&s.signature()[0], s.signature().size(),
s.encrypted_license().mac_key_iv,
s.encrypted_license().mac_keys, s.num_keys(),
s.key_array(), NULL, 0, NULL));
{
Session s;
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.open());
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(InstallTestSessionKeys(&s));
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.FillSimpleMessage(
0, patch_level << wvoec_mock::kControlSecurityPatchLevelShift, 0));
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.EncryptAndSign());
ASSERT_EQ(
OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(s.session_id(), s.message_ptr(), s.message_size(),
&s.signature()[0], s.signature().size(),
s.encrypted_license().mac_key_iv,
s.encrypted_license().mac_keys, s.num_keys(),
s.key_array(), NULL, 0, NULL));
}
if (patch_level < 0x3F) {
Session s;
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.open());
@@ -4373,7 +4374,7 @@ class GenericCryptoKeyIdLengthTest : public GenericCryptoTest {
}
}
void TestWithKey(unsigned int key_index) {
void TestWithKey(int key_index) {
ASSERT_LT(key_index, session_.num_keys());
EncryptAndLoadKeys();
vector<uint8_t> encrypted;