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Merge recent doc changes for OEMCrypto

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This is a cherry pick of recent changes to OEMCrypto and ODK. Most of
these are part of the document migration to doxygen.

See http://go/wvgerrit/106005 and its parents for code reviews.

Bug: 144715340
Bug: 148232693
Bug: 167580674
Change-Id: I658f99c8117b974faed97322d61fac0f382283af
This commit is contained in:
Fred Gylys-Colwell
2020-09-11 13:30:58 -07:00
parent 28b13ef65e
commit 20bb84ffee
75 changed files with 5717 additions and 4488 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

65
libwvdrmengine/oemcrypto/ref/src/oemcrypto_ref.cpp
View File

@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@
namespace {
const uint8_t kBakedInCertificateMagicBytes[] = {0xDE, 0xAD, 0xBE, 0xEF};
// Maximum context key length used for performance reasons, not mandated by
// specification.
const size_t kMaxContextKeyLength = 1024 * 1024;
// Return uint32 referenced through a potentially unaligned pointer.
// If the pointer is nullptr, return 0.
@@ -109,6 +112,10 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_OpenSession(
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_TOO_MANY_SESSIONS;
}
SessionId sid = crypto_engine->OpenSession();
if (sid == 0) {
LOGE("OEMCrypto_OpenSession: invalid session id returned.");
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
}
*session = (OEMCrypto_SESSION)sid;
return OEMCrypto_SUCCESS;
}
@@ -141,6 +148,11 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_GenerateDerivedKeys(
LOGE("[OEMCrypto_GenerateDerivedKeys(): ERROR_KEYBOX_INVALID]");
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_KEYBOX_INVALID;
}
if (mac_key_context_length > kMaxContextKeyLength ||
enc_key_context_length > kMaxContextKeyLength) {
LOGE("[OEMCrypto_GenerateDerivedKeys(): ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE]");
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE;
}
SessionContext* session_ctx = crypto_engine->FindSession(session);
if (session_ctx == nullptr || !session_ctx->isValid()) {
@@ -723,8 +735,10 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_LoadTestKeybox(const uint8_t* buffer,
if (crypto_engine->config_provisioning_method() != OEMCrypto_Keybox) {
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
}
crypto_engine->UseTestKeybox(buffer, length);
return OEMCrypto_SUCCESS;
if (crypto_engine->UseTestKeybox(buffer, length)) {
return OEMCrypto_SUCCESS;
}
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
}
OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_IsKeyboxOrOEMCertValid(void) {
@@ -887,17 +901,6 @@ static OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey30(
LOGE("[OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey30(): OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT]");
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT;
}
// For the reference implementation, the wrapped key and the encrypted
// key are the same size -- just encrypted with different keys.
// We add 32 bytes for a context, 32 for iv, and 32 bytes for a signature.
// Important: This layout must match OEMCrypto_LoadDRMPrivateKey below.
const size_t buffer_size = enc_rsa_key_length + sizeof(WrappedRSAKey);
if (wrapped_rsa_key == nullptr || *wrapped_rsa_key_length < buffer_size) {
*wrapped_rsa_key_length = buffer_size;
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER;
}
*wrapped_rsa_key_length = buffer_size; // Tell caller how much space we used.
if (!crypto_engine->ValidRootOfTrust()) {
LOGE("[OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey30(): ERROR_KEYBOX_INVALID]");
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_KEYBOX_INVALID;
@@ -933,13 +936,7 @@ static OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey30(
enc_rsa_key_iv, &pkcs8_rsa_key[0])) {
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_RSA_KEY;
}
size_t padding = pkcs8_rsa_key[enc_rsa_key_length - 1];
if (padding > 16) {
// Do not return an error at this point, to avoid a padding oracle attack.
padding = 0;
}
size_t rsa_key_length = enc_rsa_key_length - padding;
if (!session_ctx->LoadRSAKey(&pkcs8_rsa_key[0], rsa_key_length)) {
if (!session_ctx->LoadRSAKey(&pkcs8_rsa_key[0], enc_rsa_key_length)) {
LOGE("[OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey30(): Failed to LoadRSAKey.");
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_RSA_KEY;
}
@@ -970,6 +967,7 @@ static OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey30(
LOGE("[_RewrapDeviceRSAKey30(): EncrypteRSAKey failed.");
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
}
const size_t buffer_size = enc_rsa_key_length + sizeof(WrappedRSAKey);
// The wrapped keybox must be signed with the same key we verify with. I'll
// pick the server key, so I don't have to modify LoadRSAKey.
unsigned int sig_length = sizeof(wrapped->signature);
@@ -1004,17 +1002,6 @@ static OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey(
LOGE("[OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey(): OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT]");
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT;
}
// For the reference implementation, the wrapped key and the encrypted
// key are the same size -- just encrypted with different keys.
// We add 32 bytes for a context, 32 for iv, and 32 bytes for a signature.
// Important: This layout must match OEMCrypto_LoadDRMPrivateKey below.
const size_t buffer_size = enc_rsa_key_length + sizeof(WrappedRSAKey);
if (wrapped_rsa_key == nullptr || *wrapped_rsa_key_length < buffer_size) {
*wrapped_rsa_key_length = buffer_size;
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER;
}
*wrapped_rsa_key_length = buffer_size; // Tell caller how much space we used.
if (!crypto_engine->ValidRootOfTrust()) {
LOGE("[OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey(): ERROR_KEYBOX_INVALID]");
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_KEYBOX_INVALID;
@@ -1051,14 +1038,7 @@ static OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey(
enc_rsa_key_iv, &pkcs8_rsa_key[0])) {
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_RSA_KEY;
}
size_t padding = pkcs8_rsa_key[enc_rsa_key_length - 1];
if (padding > 16) {
// Do not return an error at this point, to avoid a padding oracle attack.
padding = 0;
}
size_t rsa_key_length = enc_rsa_key_length - padding;
if (!session_ctx->LoadRSAKey(&pkcs8_rsa_key[0], rsa_key_length)) {
if (!session_ctx->LoadRSAKey(&pkcs8_rsa_key[0], enc_rsa_key_length)) {
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_RSA_KEY;
}
@@ -1084,6 +1064,7 @@ static OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey(
wrapped->iv, wrapped->enc_rsa_key)) {
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
}
const size_t buffer_size = enc_rsa_key_length + sizeof(WrappedRSAKey);
// The wrapped keybox must be signed with the same key we verify with. I'll
// pick the server key, so I don't have to modify LoadRSAKey.
unsigned int sig_length = sizeof(wrapped->signature);
@@ -1302,6 +1283,12 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_DeriveKeysFromSessionKey(
LOGE("[OEMCrypto_GenerateDerivedKeys(): ERROR_KEYBOX_INVALID]");
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_KEYBOX_INVALID;
}
if (mac_key_context_length > kMaxContextKeyLength ||
enc_key_context_length > kMaxContextKeyLength ||
enc_session_key_length > kMaxContextKeyLength) {
LOGE("[OEMCrypto_GenerateDerivedKeys(): ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE]");
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE;
}
SessionContext* session_ctx = crypto_engine->FindSession(session);
if (session_ctx == nullptr || !session_ctx->isValid()) {