diff --git a/libwvdrmengine/oemcrypto/test/oemcrypto_test.cpp b/libwvdrmengine/oemcrypto/test/oemcrypto_test.cpp
index 84b4d5c0..c94eafce 100644
--- a/libwvdrmengine/oemcrypto/test/oemcrypto_test.cpp
+++ b/libwvdrmengine/oemcrypto/test/oemcrypto_test.cpp
@@ -1076,6 +1076,59 @@ TEST_F(OEMCryptoSessionTests, LoadKeyWithRepeatNonce) {
   ASSERT_NE(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, sts);
 }
 
+// This tests that a nonce cannot be used in new session.
+TEST_F(OEMCryptoSessionTests, LoadKeyNonceReopenSession) {
+  Session s;
+  ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.open());
+  ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(InstallTestSessionKeys(&s));
+  uint32_t nonce = s.get_nonce();
+  // Do not use the nonce now.  Close session and use it after re-opening.
+  ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.close());
+
+  // Actually, this isn't the same session.  OEMCrypto opens a new session, but
+  // we are guarding against the possiblity that it re-uses the session data
+  // and might not clear out the nonce table correctly.
+  ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.open());
+  ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(InstallTestSessionKeys(&s));
+  ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.FillSimpleMessage(0,
+                                              wvoec_mock::kControlNonceEnabled,
+                                              nonce));  // same old nonce
+  ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.EncryptAndSign());
+  OEMCryptoResult sts = OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(
+      s.session_id(), s.message_ptr(), s.message_size(), &s.signature()[0],
+      s.signature().size(), s.encrypted_license().mac_key_iv,
+      s.encrypted_license().mac_keys, s.num_keys(), s.key_array(), NULL, 0,
+      NULL, OEMCrypto_ContentLicense);
+
+  ASSERT_NE(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, sts);
+}
+
+// This tests that a nonce cannot be used in wrong session.
+TEST_F(OEMCryptoSessionTests, LoadKeyNonceWrongSession) {
+  Session s1;
+  ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s1.open());
+  ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(InstallTestSessionKeys(&s1));
+  uint32_t nonce = s1.get_nonce();
+  // Do not use the nonce.  Also, leave the session open.  We want to make sure
+  // that s and s1 do NOT share a nonce table.  This is different from the
+  // LoadKeyNonceReopenSession in that we do not close s1.
+
+  Session s2;
+  ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s2.open());
+  ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(InstallTestSessionKeys(&s2));
+  ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s2.FillSimpleMessage(0,
+                                              wvoec_mock::kControlNonceEnabled,
+                                              nonce));  // nonce from session s1
+  ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s2.EncryptAndSign());
+  OEMCryptoResult sts = OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(
+      s2.session_id(), s2.message_ptr(), s2.message_size(), &s2.signature()[0],
+      s2.signature().size(), s2.encrypted_license().mac_key_iv,
+      s2.encrypted_license().mac_keys, s2.num_keys(), s2.key_array(), NULL, 0,
+      NULL, OEMCrypto_ContentLicense);
+
+  ASSERT_NE(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, sts);
+}
+
 TEST_F(OEMCryptoSessionTests, LoadKeyWithBadVerification) {
   Session s;
   ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.open());