Fix CastReceiver unit tests

Test: opk_ta, opk_ta_p40
Bug: 259454969

Merged from https://widevine-internal-review.googlesource.com/175370

Change-Id: I6cefe7fb85db539ecb066498b51525a04b8bbd51
This commit is contained in:
Matt Feddersen
2023-05-16 21:26:41 +00:00
committed by Robert Shih
parent 27421a9161
commit 4fa979b43d
3 changed files with 82 additions and 33 deletions

View File

@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ void Provisioning40CastRoundTrip::VerifyRequestSignature(
// Creates a prov2 response
void Provisioning40CastRoundTrip::CreateDefaultResponse() {
uint32_t algorithm_n = htonl(kSign_RSASSA_PSS);
uint32_t algorithm_n = htonl(allowed_schemes_);
memcpy(response_data_.rsa_key, "SIGN", 4);
memcpy(response_data_.rsa_key + 4, &algorithm_n, 4);
memcpy(response_data_.rsa_key + 8, encoded_rsa_key_.data(),

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@@ -391,6 +391,7 @@ class Provisioning40CastRoundTrip
// Returned
const std::vector<uint8_t>& wrapped_drm_key() { return wrapped_drm_key_; }
const std::vector<uint8_t>& wrapped_rsa_key() { return wrapped_rsa_key_; }
const std::vector<uint8_t>& drm_public_key() { return drm_public_key_; }
OEMCrypto_PrivateKeyType drm_key_type() { return drm_key_type_; }
void set_allowed_schemes(uint32_t allowed_schemes) {

View File

@@ -1916,26 +1916,70 @@ class OEMCryptoLoadsCertificateAlternates : public OEMCryptoLoadsCertificate {
// If force is true, we assert that the key loads successfully.
void LoadWithAllowedSchemes(uint32_t schemes, bool force) {
Session s;
ProvisioningRoundTrip provisioning_messages(&s, encoded_rsa_key_);
provisioning_messages.set_allowed_schemes(schemes);
provisioning_messages.PrepareSession(keybox_);
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.SignAndVerifyRequest());
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.CreateDefaultResponse());
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.EncryptAndSignResponse());
OEMCryptoResult sts = provisioning_messages.LoadResponse();
key_loaded_ = (OEMCrypto_SUCCESS == sts);
if (key_loaded_) {
uint8_t* ptr = provisioning_messages.response_data().rsa_key;
size_t len = provisioning_messages.response_data().rsa_key_length;
encoded_rsa_key_ = std::vector<uint8_t>(ptr, ptr + len);
wrapped_drm_key_ = provisioning_messages.wrapped_rsa_key();
drm_key_type_ = OEMCrypto_RSA_Private_Key;
EXPECT_GT(wrapped_drm_key_.size(), 0u);
EXPECT_EQ(nullptr, find(wrapped_drm_key_, encoded_rsa_key_));
}
if (force) {
EXPECT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, sts);
// prov 2 or prov 3
if (global_features.provisioning_method == OEMCrypto_Keybox ||
global_features.provisioning_method == OEMCrypto_OEMCertificate) {
Session s;
ProvisioningRoundTrip provisioning_messages(&s, encoded_rsa_key_);
provisioning_messages.set_allowed_schemes(schemes);
provisioning_messages.PrepareSession(keybox_);
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.SignAndVerifyRequest());
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.CreateDefaultResponse());
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.EncryptAndSignResponse());
OEMCryptoResult sts = provisioning_messages.LoadResponse();
key_loaded_ = (OEMCrypto_SUCCESS == sts);
if (key_loaded_) {
uint8_t* ptr = provisioning_messages.response_data().rsa_key;
size_t len = provisioning_messages.response_data().rsa_key_length;
encoded_rsa_key_ = std::vector<uint8_t>(ptr, ptr + len);
wrapped_drm_key_ = provisioning_messages.wrapped_rsa_key();
drm_key_type_ = OEMCrypto_RSA_Private_Key;
EXPECT_GT(wrapped_drm_key_.size(), 0u);
EXPECT_EQ(nullptr, find(wrapped_drm_key_, encoded_rsa_key_));
}
if (force) {
EXPECT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, sts);
}
} else if (global_features.provisioning_method ==
OEMCrypto_BootCertificateChain) {
Session s1;
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s1.open());
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(CreateProv4OEMKey(&s1));
Session s2;
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s2.open());
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_InstallOemPrivateKey(s2.session_id(), oem_key_type_,
wrapped_oem_key_.data(),
wrapped_oem_key_.size()),
OEMCrypto_SUCCESS);
Provisioning40CastRoundTrip prov_cast(&s2, encoded_rsa_key_);
prov_cast.set_allowed_schemes(schemes);
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(prov_cast.PrepareSession());
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(prov_cast.LoadDRMPrivateKey());
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s2.SetPublicKeyFromSubjectPublicKey(
prov_cast.drm_key_type(), prov_cast.drm_public_key().data(),
prov_cast.drm_public_key().size()));
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(prov_cast.SignAndVerifyRequest());
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s2.GenerateDerivedKeysFromSessionKey());
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(prov_cast.CreateDefaultResponse());
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(prov_cast.EncryptAndSignResponse());
OEMCryptoResult sts = prov_cast.LoadResponse();
key_loaded_ = (OEMCrypto_SUCCESS == sts);
if (key_loaded_) {
uint8_t* ptr = prov_cast.response_data().rsa_key;
size_t len = prov_cast.response_data().rsa_key_length;
encoded_rsa_key_ = std::vector<uint8_t>(ptr, ptr + len);
wrapped_drm_key_ = prov_cast.wrapped_rsa_key();
drm_key_type_ = OEMCrypto_RSA_Private_Key;
EXPECT_GT(wrapped_drm_key_.size(), 0u);
EXPECT_EQ(nullptr, find(wrapped_drm_key_, encoded_rsa_key_));
}
if (force) {
EXPECT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, sts);
}
} else {
FAIL() << "Unsupported provisioning method";
}
}
@@ -1945,7 +1989,8 @@ class OEMCryptoLoadsCertificateAlternates : public OEMCryptoLoadsCertificate {
// The alternate padding is only required for cast receivers, but all devices
// should forbid the alternate padding for regular certificates.
TEST_F(OEMCryptoLoadsCertificateAlternates, DisallowForbiddenPaddingAPI09) {
LoadWithAllowedSchemes(kSign_RSASSA_PSS, true); // Use default padding scheme
LoadWithAllowedSchemes(kSign_RSASSA_PSS,
true); // Use default padding scheme
DisallowForbiddenPadding(kSign_PKCS1_Block1, 50);
}
@@ -2103,9 +2148,11 @@ class OEMCryptoCastReceiverTest : public OEMCryptoLoadsCertificateAlternates {
// Header of rsa key is constant.
encoded_rsa_key_ = wvutil::a2b_hex(
// 0x02 0x01 0x00 == integer, size 1 byte, value = 0 (field=version)
// 0x02 0x01 0x00 == integer, size 1 byte, value = 0
// (field=version)
"020100"
// 0x30, sequence, size = d = 13 (field=pkeyalg) AlgorithmIdentifier
// 0x30, sequence, size = d = 13 (field=pkeyalg)
// AlgorithmIdentifier
"300d"
// 0x06 = object identifier. length = 9
// (this should be 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1) (field=algorithm)
@@ -2159,7 +2206,8 @@ class OEMCryptoCastReceiverTest : public OEMCryptoLoadsCertificateAlternates {
vector<uint8_t> digest = wvutil::a2b_hex("3021300906052b0e03021a05000414");
digest.insert(digest.end(), hash, hash + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
// OEMCrypto will apply the padding, and encrypt to generate the signature.
// OEMCrypto will apply the padding, and encrypt to generate the
// signature.
size_t signature_length = 0;
sts = OEMCrypto_GenerateRSASignature(s.session_id(), digest.data(),
digest.size(), nullptr,
@@ -2184,8 +2232,8 @@ class OEMCryptoCastReceiverTest : public OEMCryptoLoadsCertificateAlternates {
signature.resize(signature_length);
ASSERT_EQ(correct_signature, signature);
// Also verify that our verification algorithm agrees. This is not needed
// to test OEMCrypto, but it does verify that this test is valid.
// Also verify that our verification algorithm agrees. This is not
// needed to test OEMCrypto, but it does verify that this test is valid.
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.VerifyRsaSignature(digest, signature.data(),
signature_length, scheme));
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.VerifyRsaSignature(
@@ -3376,7 +3424,8 @@ class OEMCryptoGenericCryptoKeyIdLengthTest
.timer_limits.total_playback_duration_seconds = kDuration;
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(license_messages_.CreateDefaultResponse());
SetUniformKeyIdLength(16); // Start with all key ids being 16 bytes.
// But, we are testing that the key ids do not have to have the same length.
// But, we are testing that the key ids do not have to have the same
// length.
// 12 bytes (common key id length).
license_messages_.SetKeyId(0, "123456789012");
license_messages_.SetKeyId(1, "12345"); // short key id.
@@ -3402,11 +3451,10 @@ class OEMCryptoGenericCryptoKeyIdLengthTest
ASSERT_LT(key_index, license_messages_.num_keys());
EncryptAndLoadKeys();
vector<uint8_t> encrypted;
// To make sure OEMCrypto is not expecting the key_id to be zero padded, we
// will create a buffer that is padded with 'Z'.
// Then, we use fill the buffer with the longer of the three keys. If
// OEMCrypto is paying attention to the key id length, it should pick out
// the correct key.
// To make sure OEMCrypto is not expecting the key_id to be zero padded,
// we will create a buffer that is padded with 'Z'. Then, we use fill
// the buffer with the longer of the three keys. If OEMCrypto is paying
// attention to the key id length, it should pick out the correct key.
vector<uint8_t> key_id_buffer(
session_.license().keys[kLongKeyId].key_id_length + 5,
'Z'); // Fill a bigger buffer with letter 'Z'.