Small changes to refactored unit tests
Merge from Widevine repo of http://go/wvgerrit/169064 This CL should cleanup some minor issues that existed after the initial CLs refactoring the unit tests went in. The issues fixed should be: 1) duplicate decrypt tests 2) decrypt tests added to be run 3) removed unecessary header files 4) refactored some provisioning tests that I had previously overlooked Bug: 253779846 Merged from https://widevine-internal-review.googlesource.com/167537 Change-Id: Ic474fbcf69a08c0482b5e74d0c80be2cd16702d8
This commit is contained in:
Vicky Min
committed by
Fred Gylys-Colwell
Fred Gylys-Colwell
parent
ea3d319879
commit
54e6b3d45d
@@ -6,9 +6,6 @@
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#include "oemcrypto_provisioning_test.h"
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#include "log.h"
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#include "oemcrypto_basic_test.h"
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#include "oemcrypto_resource_test.h"
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#include "oemcrypto_session_tests_helper.h"
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#include "platform.h"
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namespace wvoec {
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@@ -623,5 +620,250 @@ TEST_F(OEMCryptoProv40Test, ProvisionDrmCert) {
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ASSERT_EQ(s.IsPublicKeySet(), true);
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}
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TEST_F(OEMCryptoLoadsCertificate, PrepAndSignLicenseRequestCounterAPI18) {
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(CreateWrappedDRMKey());
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Session s;
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.open());
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.LoadWrappedRsaDrmKey(wrapped_drm_key_));
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s.GenerateNonce();
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size_t core_message_length = 100;
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std::vector<uint8_t> message(128, 0);
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std::vector<uint8_t> signature(256, 0);
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size_t signature_length = signature.size();
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OEMCryptoResult result = OEMCrypto_PrepAndSignLicenseRequest(
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s.session_id(), message.data(), message.size(), &core_message_length,
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signature.data(), &signature_length);
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ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, result);
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}
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// This test verifies that we can create a wrapped RSA key, and then reload it.
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TEST_F(OEMCryptoLoadsCertificate, LoadRSASessionKey) {
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(CreateWrappedDRMKey());
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Session s;
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.open());
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.LoadWrappedRsaDrmKey(wrapped_drm_key_));
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}
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TEST_F(OEMCryptoLoadsCertificate, SignProvisioningRequest) {
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Session s;
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.open());
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if (global_features.provisioning_method == OEMCrypto_OEMCertificate) {
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s.LoadOEMCert(true);
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} else {
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EXPECT_EQ(global_features.provisioning_method, OEMCrypto_Keybox);
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s.GenerateDerivedKeysFromKeybox(keybox_);
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}
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ProvisioningRoundTrip provisioning_messages(&s, encoded_rsa_key_);
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.SignAndVerifyRequest());
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}
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// This tests a large message size. The size is larger than we required in v15.
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TEST_F(OEMCryptoLoadsCertificate, SignLargeProvisioningRequestAPI16) {
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Session s;
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.open());
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if (global_features.provisioning_method == OEMCrypto_OEMCertificate) {
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s.LoadOEMCert(true);
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} else {
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EXPECT_EQ(global_features.provisioning_method, OEMCrypto_Keybox);
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s.GenerateDerivedKeysFromKeybox(keybox_);
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}
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ProvisioningRoundTrip provisioning_messages(&s, encoded_rsa_key_);
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const size_t max_size = GetResourceValue(kLargeMessageSize);
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provisioning_messages.set_message_size(max_size);
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.SignAndVerifyRequest());
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}
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// This creates a wrapped RSA key, and then does the sanity check that the
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// unencrypted key is not found in the wrapped key. The wrapped key should be
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// encrypted.
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TEST_F(OEMCryptoLoadsCertificate, CertificateProvision) {
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Session s;
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ProvisioningRoundTrip provisioning_messages(&s, encoded_rsa_key_);
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provisioning_messages.PrepareSession(keybox_);
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.SignAndVerifyRequest());
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.CreateDefaultResponse());
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.EncryptAndSignResponse());
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ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, provisioning_messages.LoadResponse());
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// We should not be able to find the rsa key in the wrapped key. It should
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// be encrypted.
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EXPECT_EQ(nullptr, find(provisioning_messages.wrapped_rsa_key(),
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provisioning_messages.encoded_rsa_key()));
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}
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// Verify that RewrapDeviceRSAKey checks pointers are within the provisioning
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// message.
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TEST_F(OEMCryptoLoadsCertificate, CertificateProvisionBadRange1_API16) {
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Session s;
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ProvisioningRoundTrip provisioning_messages(&s, encoded_rsa_key_);
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provisioning_messages.PrepareSession(keybox_);
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.SignAndVerifyRequest());
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.CreateDefaultResponse());
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// Encrypt and sign once, so that we can use the size of the response.
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.EncryptAndSignResponse());
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provisioning_messages.core_response().enc_private_key.offset =
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provisioning_messages.encrypted_response_buffer().size() + 1;
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.EncryptAndSignResponse());
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ASSERT_NE(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, provisioning_messages.LoadResponse());
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provisioning_messages.VerifyLoadFailed();
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}
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// Verify that RewrapDeviceRSAKey checks pointers are within the provisioning
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// message.
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TEST_F(OEMCryptoLoadsCertificate, CertificateProvisionBadRange2_API16) {
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Session s;
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ProvisioningRoundTrip provisioning_messages(&s, encoded_rsa_key_);
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provisioning_messages.PrepareSession(keybox_);
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.SignAndVerifyRequest());
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.CreateDefaultResponse());
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// Encrypt and sign once, so that we can use the size of the response.
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.EncryptAndSignResponse());
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provisioning_messages.core_response().enc_private_key_iv.offset =
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provisioning_messages.encrypted_response_buffer().size() + 1;
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.EncryptAndSignResponse());
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ASSERT_NE(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, provisioning_messages.LoadResponse());
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provisioning_messages.VerifyLoadFailed();
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}
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// Verify that RewrapDeviceRSAKey checks pointers are within the provisioning
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// message.
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TEST_F(OEMCryptoLoadsCertificate, CertificateProvisionBadRange3_API16) {
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Session s;
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ProvisioningRoundTrip provisioning_messages(&s, encoded_rsa_key_);
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provisioning_messages.PrepareSession(keybox_);
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.SignAndVerifyRequest());
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.CreateDefaultResponse());
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// Encrypt and sign once, so that we can use the size of the response.
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.EncryptAndSignResponse());
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// If the offset is before the end, but the offset+length is bigger, then
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// the message should be rejected.
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provisioning_messages.core_response().enc_private_key.offset =
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provisioning_messages.encrypted_response_buffer().size() - 5;
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.EncryptAndSignResponse());
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ASSERT_NE(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, provisioning_messages.LoadResponse());
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provisioning_messages.VerifyLoadFailed();
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}
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// Verify that RewrapDeviceRSAKey checks pointers are within the provisioning
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// message.
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TEST_F(OEMCryptoLoadsCertificate, CertificateProvisionBadRange4_API16) {
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Session s;
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ProvisioningRoundTrip provisioning_messages(&s, encoded_rsa_key_);
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provisioning_messages.PrepareSession(keybox_);
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.SignAndVerifyRequest());
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.CreateDefaultResponse());
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// Encrypt and sign once, so that we can use the size of the response.
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.EncryptAndSignResponse());
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// If the offset is before the end, but the offset+length is bigger, then
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// the message should be rejected.
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provisioning_messages.core_response().enc_private_key_iv.offset =
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provisioning_messages.encrypted_response_buffer().size() - 5;
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.EncryptAndSignResponse());
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ASSERT_NE(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, provisioning_messages.LoadResponse());
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provisioning_messages.VerifyLoadFailed();
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}
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// Verify that RewrapDeviceRSAKey checks pointers are within the provisioning
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// message.
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TEST_F(OEMCryptoLoadsCertificate, CertificateProvisionBadRange5Prov30_API16) {
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Session s;
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ProvisioningRoundTrip provisioning_messages(&s, encoded_rsa_key_);
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provisioning_messages.PrepareSession(keybox_);
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.SignAndVerifyRequest());
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.CreateDefaultResponse());
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// Encrypt and sign once, so that we can use the size of the response.
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.EncryptAndSignResponse());
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// If the offset is before the end, but the offset+length is bigger, then
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// the message should be rejected.
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provisioning_messages.core_response().encrypted_message_key.offset =
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provisioning_messages.encrypted_response_buffer().size() + 1;
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.EncryptAndSignResponse());
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ASSERT_NE(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, provisioning_messages.LoadResponse());
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provisioning_messages.VerifyLoadFailed();
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}
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// Test that RewrapDeviceRSAKey verifies the message signature.
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// TODO(b/144186970): This test should also run on Prov 3.0 devices.
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TEST_F(OEMCryptoLoadsCertificate,
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CertificateProvisionBadSignatureKeyboxTestAPI16) {
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Session s;
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ProvisioningRoundTrip provisioning_messages(&s, encoded_rsa_key_);
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provisioning_messages.PrepareSession(keybox_);
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.SignAndVerifyRequest());
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.CreateDefaultResponse());
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.EncryptAndSignResponse());
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provisioning_messages.response_signature()[4] ^= 42; // bad signature.
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ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_ERROR_SIGNATURE_FAILURE,
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provisioning_messages.LoadResponse());
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provisioning_messages.VerifyLoadFailed();
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}
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// Test that RewrapDeviceRSAKey verifies the nonce is current.
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TEST_F(OEMCryptoLoadsCertificate, CertificateProvisionBadNonce_API16) {
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Session s;
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ProvisioningRoundTrip provisioning_messages(&s, encoded_rsa_key_);
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provisioning_messages.PrepareSession(keybox_);
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.SignAndVerifyRequest());
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provisioning_messages.core_request().nonce ^= 42; // bad nonce.
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.CreateDefaultResponse());
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.EncryptAndSignResponse());
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ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_NONCE,
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provisioning_messages.LoadResponse());
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provisioning_messages.VerifyLoadFailed();
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}
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// Test that RewrapDeviceRSAKey verifies the RSA key is valid.
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TEST_F(OEMCryptoLoadsCertificate, CertificateProvisionBadRSAKey) {
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Session s;
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ProvisioningRoundTrip provisioning_messages(&s, encoded_rsa_key_);
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provisioning_messages.PrepareSession(keybox_);
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.SignAndVerifyRequest());
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.CreateDefaultResponse());
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provisioning_messages.response_data().rsa_key[4] ^= 42; // bad key.
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.EncryptAndSignResponse());
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ASSERT_NE(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, provisioning_messages.LoadResponse());
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provisioning_messages.VerifyLoadFailed();
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}
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// Test that RewrapDeviceRSAKey verifies the RSA key is valid.
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// TODO(b/144186970): This test should also run on Prov 3.0 devices.
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TEST_F(OEMCryptoLoadsCertificate,
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CertificateProvisionBadRSAKeyKeyboxTestAPI16) {
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Session s;
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ProvisioningRoundTrip provisioning_messages(&s, encoded_rsa_key_);
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provisioning_messages.PrepareSession(keybox_);
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.SignAndVerifyRequest());
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.CreateDefaultResponse());
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.EncryptAndSignResponse());
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size_t rsa_offset =
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provisioning_messages.core_response().enc_private_key.offset;
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// Offsets are relative to the message body, after the core message.
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rsa_offset += provisioning_messages.serialized_core_message().size();
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rsa_offset += 4; // Change the middle of the key.
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provisioning_messages.encrypted_response_buffer()[rsa_offset] ^= 42;
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ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_ERROR_SIGNATURE_FAILURE,
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provisioning_messages.LoadResponse());
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provisioning_messages.VerifyLoadFailed();
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}
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// Test that RewrapDeviceRSAKey accepts the maximum message size.
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TEST_F(OEMCryptoLoadsCertificate, CertificateProvisionLargeBuffer) {
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Session s;
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ProvisioningRoundTrip provisioning_messages(&s, encoded_rsa_key_);
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const size_t max_size = GetResourceValue(kLargeMessageSize);
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provisioning_messages.set_message_size(max_size);
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provisioning_messages.PrepareSession(keybox_);
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.SignAndVerifyRequest());
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.CreateDefaultResponse());
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ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(provisioning_messages.EncryptAndSignResponse());
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ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, provisioning_messages.LoadResponse());
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// We should not be able to find the rsa key in the wrapped key. It should
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// be encrypted.
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EXPECT_EQ(nullptr, find(provisioning_messages.wrapped_rsa_key(),
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provisioning_messages.encoded_rsa_key()));
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}
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/// @}
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} // namespace wvoec
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