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Merges to android Pi release (part 12)

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These are a set of CLs merged from the wv cdm repo to the android repo.

* Correct error logging

  Author: Rahul Frias <rfrias@google.com>

  [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/40000 ]

  In tests, we set the cipher list to avoid using insecure
  ciphers when connecting to the provisioning/license service.
  The result of setting the cipher list was being incorrectly
  validated.

  Bug: 64847919

* Move mips cache headers to clear_cache_function.h

  Author: Srujan Gaddam <srujzs@google.com>

  [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/39700 ]

  Since the clear_cache function has been moved away from the dynamic
  adapter, we need these conditional includes to be migrated as well for
  MIPS.

* Comment out Level 3 debug call until merge

  Author: Srujan Gaddam <srujzs@google.com>

  [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/39761 ]

  This call was introduced in go/wvgerrit/34260/. Since the haystack tool
  in google3 still needs this merge, this should be commented out so the
  tool can still build until the merge has finished.

* Add logging for MAC keys to mock

  Author: Srujan Gaddam <srujzs@google.com>

  [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/39740 ]

  Bug: 70637842

* Move external interfaces into level3.h + refactor

  Author: Srujan Gaddam <srujzs@google.com>

  [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/39673 ]

  As part of b/70523618, this CL moves interfaces that partners are
  responsible for in Level 3 to level3.h so they can be visible as
  part of the CDM release process. It also cleans up some of the
  names of the files and adds documentation.

* Corrected close session logging level

  Author: Rahul Frias <rfrias@google.com>

  [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/39676 ]

  Bug: 69460963

* Remove Security Level Path Backward Compatibility Support

  Author: Rahul Frias <rfrias@google.com>

  [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/39505 ]

  From the android K release onwards certificates were stored in
  security level specific directories. If upgrading from
  previous releases persistent information needed to be moved
  to those directories.

  Since no device is likely to upgrade from J to Pi, comptibility
  support can be removed.

  Bug: 70160032

* Rename privacy_crypto_openssl To privacy_crypto_boringssl

  Author: John W. Bruce <juce@google.com>

  [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/37122 ]

  Now that we no longer support OpenSSL in the Shared Source CDM, the name
  of this file can be updated.

  Bug: 67907873
  Test: build.py x86-64
  Test: wv_ce_cdm_unittest
  Test: jenkins/linux_unit_tests

* Remove Conditional Compilation from OpenSSL/BoringSSL

  Author: John W. Bruce <juce@google.com>

  [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/39460 ]

  This change removes the usages of conditional compilation to support
  both BoringSSL and OpenSSL, as well as to support multiple versions of
  the OpenSSL API. All code is now compiled against one of the two
  versions of BoringSSL in third_party/.

  Note that in some cases, the kit/ and legacy_kit/ versions of BoringSSL
  had different APIs, so when removing the OpenSSL version compatibility
  conditional compilation, sometimes the older branch was kept and
  sometimes the newer branch was kept.

  Bug: 67907873
  Test: build.py x86-64
  Test: wv_ce_cdm_unittest
  Test: jenkins/linux_unit_tests

* Build CE & Jenkins CDMs With BoringSSL from third_party/

  Author: John W. Bruce <juce@google.com>

  [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/37120 ]

  Up until now, integrators have been responsible for providing a
  compatible crypto library for use by the CE CDM. (either OpenSSL or
  BoringSSL) After this change, this decision will no longer be in their
  hands. The CE CDM build will always use the copy of BoringSSL in
  third_party/, which will be statically linked with our library with
  hidden visibility. This allows us to better control what crypto library
  we use and will prevent continuing problems with trying to support both
  OpenSSL and BoringSSL.

  Unfortunately, BoringSSL began using C++11 in mid-2017, and we can't
  support C++11 right now. Until we can, we need to use a C++11-free
  version of BoringSSL for libssl. The CDM itself will continue to use a
  recent BoringSSL, as it only needs libcrypto. But the unit tests that
  need libssl have to use the legacy version.

  Bug: 67907873
  Test: build.py x86-64
  Test: wv_ce_cdm_unittest
  Test: jenkins/linux_unit_tests

* Modified RNG for Level3 to use more entropy

  Author: Srujan Gaddam <srujzs@google.com>

  [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/39220 ]

  Bug: 65165076

  Modified seed generation to use an xor of clock_gettime and
  client-implemented code to supply random seeds to the RNG. Modified the RNG
  as well to use xoroshiro128+ instead of xorshift, since it uses more
  than one seed/state (which are 64-bit) and has higher "statistical quality".
  The default implementations for the seed generation use /dev/urandom.

* Configure base path for Level3FileSystem

  Author: Srujan Gaddam <srujzs@google.com>

  [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/39506 ]

  This is in response to b/70354006. This change makes the
  Android Level3FileSystem use the existing properties method
  GetDevicesFilesBasePath for binderization. The same is done for the
  Linux implementation.

* Add legacy_kit/ to BoringSSL Directory

  Author: John W. Bruce <juce@google.com>

  [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/38861 ]

  This adds a second copy of BoringSSL to the third_party/boringssl/
  directory. This second copy is pinned to the last revision of BoringSSL
  not to require C++11 and is not updated by the UPDATE_BORINGSSL.sh
  script. This second copy will be used to provide libssl to the tests on
  devices that do not support C++11.

  Once we support C++11 in the CDM again, this weight should be removed
  and all targets should use the copy of BoringSSL in the kit/ directory.

  Bug: 67907873

* Use Shared Libraries for Unit Tests

  Author: John W. Bruce <juce@google.com>

  [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/38860 ]

  Some unit tests were using a statically-linked CDM instead of a
  dynamically-linked one. (Or, in one case, trying to link both ways into
  the same binary.) For now, we need to only link dynamically, so that the
  unit tests and the CDM can use different versions of BoringSSL.

  Long-term, we would like to test both kinds of linkage. (See b/69548115
  for that.)

  Some unit tests were also using a dynamicaly-linked CDM that was named
  such that it appeared to be statically-linked. This patch renames some
  targets to make the linkage clearer.

  Bug: 67907873

* Change CDM_Backwards_Compatiblity_Tests to dedicated brances

  Author: Fred Gylys-Colwell <fredgc@google.com>

  [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/39003 ]

  The build scripts used by CDM_Backwards_Compatiblity_Tests now pull
  old versions of oemcrypto from the dedicated branches oemcrypto-v*,
  which [will eventually] contain old oemcrypto versions, that build
  with the current build system with a current boringssl version.

  bug: 67907873

* Fix spacing on level3 header

  Author: Srujan Gaddam <srujzs@google.com>

  [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/38760 ]

* Correct Query status calls

  Author: Rahul Frias <rfrias@google.com>

  [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/38640 ]

  Bug: 70160032

* Refactoring to allow encryption of client ID

  Author: Rahul Frias <rfrias@google.com>

  [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/37460 ]

  The code has been restructured to allow encryption of client
  identification in provisioning requests. This will be enabled
  when server side changes have been made (b/69427217).

  * Additional information is included in the Client Identification
    portion of the provisioning request.
  * Client identification will be encrypted with a service
    certificate provided by the app/client. Platform changes
    to enable passing this to core are needed. If a service certificate
    is not provided, a default one associated with the production Keysmith
    will be used.
  * Switched APIs in CdmEngine to take a service certificate for
    provisioning rather than licensing. Service certificates for
    licensing are session based and passed as properties from platform
    code.

  Bug: 30737060

* Allow some CDM errors to be reported from multiple locations

  Author: Rahul Frias <rfrias@google.com>

  [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/38360 ]

  This creates some CdmResponseType errors which may be reused
  PARAMETER_NULL, NOT_INITIALIZED_ERROR, REINIT_ERROR.

  I have made changes to a few classes to report these errors.
  Will work on additional classes in a separate CL.

  Bug: 69864404

BUG: 71650075
Test: WV Unit/integration tests
Change-Id: Icc048770d424ac537d11ff327cda2cb142da802d
This commit is contained in:
Rahul Frias
2018-01-10 23:54:59 -08:00
parent 5d690be108
commit aac1439dea
79 changed files with 582991 additions and 3305 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

95
libwvdrmengine/oemcrypto/test/oec_session_util.cpp
View File

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
#include <iostream>
#include <memory>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
@@ -43,29 +44,20 @@ void PrintTo(const vector<uint8_t>& value, ostream* os) {
namespace {
int GetRandBytes(unsigned char* buf, int num) {
// returns 1 on success, -1 if not supported, or 0 if other failure.
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
return RAND_pseudo_bytes(buf, num);
#else
return RAND_bytes(buf, num);
#endif
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
void DeleteX509Stack(STACK_OF(X509)* stack) {
sk_X509_pop_free(stack, X509_free);
}
typedef size_t X509Count;
#else
typedef int X509Count;
#endif
} // namespace
namespace wvoec {
// Increment counter for AES-CTR. The CENC spec specifies we increment only
// the low 64 bits of the IV counter, and leave the high 64 bits alone. This
// is different from the OpenSSL implementation, so we implement the CTR loop
// is different from the BoringSSL implementation, so we implement the CTR loop
// ourselves.
void ctr128_inc64(int64_t increaseBy, uint8_t* iv) {
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<void*>(NULL), iv);
@@ -77,19 +69,19 @@ void ctr128_inc64(int64_t increaseBy, uint8_t* iv) {
// Some compilers don't like the macro htonl within an ASSERT_EQ.
uint32_t htonl_fnc(uint32_t x) { return htonl(x); }
void dump_openssl_error() {
void dump_boringssl_error() {
while (unsigned long err = ERR_get_error()) {
char buffer[120];
ERR_error_string_n(err, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
cout << "openssl error -- " << buffer << "\n";
cout << "BoringSSL Error -- " << buffer << "\n";
}
}
template <typename T, void (*func)(T*)>
class openssl_ptr {
class boringssl_ptr {
public:
explicit openssl_ptr(T* p = NULL) : ptr_(p) {}
~openssl_ptr() {
explicit boringssl_ptr(T* p = NULL) : ptr_(p) {}
~boringssl_ptr() {
if (ptr_) func(ptr_);
}
T& operator*() const { return *ptr_; }
@@ -99,7 +91,7 @@ class openssl_ptr {
private:
T* ptr_;
CORE_DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(openssl_ptr);
CORE_DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(boringssl_ptr);
};
Session::Session()
@@ -608,43 +600,30 @@ void Session::LoadOEMCert(bool verify_cert) {
OEMCrypto_GetOEMPublicCertificate(session_id(), &public_cert[0],
&public_cert_length));
// Load the certificate chain into an OpenSSL X509 Stack
#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
const openssl_ptr<STACK_OF(X509), DeleteX509Stack> x509_stack(
// Load the certificate chain into a BoringSSL X509 Stack
const boringssl_ptr<STACK_OF(X509), DeleteX509Stack> x509_stack(
sk_X509_new_null());
ASSERT_TRUE(x509_stack.NotNull()) << "Unable to allocate X509 stack.";
CBS pkcs7;
CBS_init(&pkcs7, public_cert.data(), public_cert.size());
if (!PKCS7_get_certificates(x509_stack.get(), &pkcs7)) {
dump_openssl_error();
dump_boringssl_error();
FAIL() << "Unable to deserialize certificate chain.";
}
STACK_OF(X509)* certs = x509_stack.get();
#else
// load the cert into rsa_key_.
openssl_ptr<BIO, BIO_vfree> bio(
BIO_new_mem_buf(&public_cert[0], public_cert_length));
ASSERT_TRUE(bio.NotNull());
openssl_ptr<PKCS7, PKCS7_free> cert(
d2i_PKCS7_bio(bio.get(), NULL));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert.NotNull());
EXPECT_EQ(OBJ_obj2nid(cert->type), NID_pkcs7_signed);
STACK_OF(X509)* certs = cert->d.sign->cert;
#endif
// Load the public cert's key into public_rsa_ and verify, if requested
for (X509Count i = 0; certs && i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
for (size_t i = 0; certs && i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
X509* x509_cert = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
openssl_ptr<EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_free> pubkey(X509_get_pubkey(x509_cert));
boringssl_ptr<EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_free> pubkey(X509_get_pubkey(x509_cert));
ASSERT_TRUE(pubkey.NotNull());
if (i == 0) {
public_rsa_ = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pubkey.get());
if (!public_rsa_) {
cout << "d2i_RSAPrivateKey failed.\n";
dump_openssl_error();
dump_boringssl_error();
ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != public_rsa_);
}
}
@@ -654,9 +633,9 @@ void Session::LoadOEMCert(bool verify_cert) {
X509_NAME* name = X509_get_subject_name(x509_cert);
printf(" OEM Certificate Name: %s\n",
X509_NAME_oneline(name, &buffer[0], buffer.size()));
openssl_ptr<X509_STORE, X509_STORE_free> store(X509_STORE_new());
boringssl_ptr<X509_STORE, X509_STORE_free> store(X509_STORE_new());
ASSERT_TRUE(store.NotNull());
openssl_ptr<X509_STORE_CTX, X509_STORE_CTX_free> store_ctx(
boringssl_ptr<X509_STORE_CTX, X509_STORE_CTX_free> store_ctx(
X509_STORE_CTX_new());
ASSERT_TRUE(store_ctx.NotNull());
@@ -665,23 +644,13 @@ void Session::LoadOEMCert(bool verify_cert) {
// TODO(fredgc): Verify cert is signed by Google.
int result = X509_verify_cert(store_ctx.get());
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
ASSERT_GE(0, result) << " OEM Cert not valid. " <<
X509_verify_cert_error_string(store_ctx->error);
#else
ASSERT_GE(0, result) << " OEM Cert not valid. " <<
X509_verify_cert_error_string(
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(store_ctx.get()));
#endif
if (result == 0) {
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
printf("Cert not verified: %s.\n",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(store_ctx->error));
#else
printf("Cert not verified: %s.\n",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(store_ctx.get())));
#endif
}
}
}
@@ -769,28 +738,28 @@ void Session::PreparePublicKey(const uint8_t* rsa_key, size_t rsa_key_length) {
rsa_key_length = sizeof(kTestRSAPKCS8PrivateKeyInfo2_2048);
}
uint8_t* p = const_cast<uint8_t*>(rsa_key);
openssl_ptr<BIO, BIO_vfree> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(p, rsa_key_length));
boringssl_ptr<BIO, BIO_vfree> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(p, rsa_key_length));
ASSERT_TRUE(bio.NotNull());
openssl_ptr<PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free> pkcs8_pki(
boringssl_ptr<PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free> pkcs8_pki(
d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(bio.get(), NULL));
ASSERT_TRUE(pkcs8_pki.NotNull());
openssl_ptr<EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_free> evp(EVP_PKCS82PKEY(pkcs8_pki.get()));
boringssl_ptr<EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_free> evp(EVP_PKCS82PKEY(pkcs8_pki.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(evp.NotNull());
if (public_rsa_) RSA_free(public_rsa_);
public_rsa_ = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(evp.get());
if (!public_rsa_) {
cout << "d2i_RSAPrivateKey failed. ";
dump_openssl_error();
dump_boringssl_error();
FAIL() << "Could not parse public RSA key.";
}
switch (RSA_check_key(public_rsa_)) {
case 1: // valid.
return;
case 0: // not valid.
dump_openssl_error();
dump_boringssl_error();
FAIL() << "[rsa key not valid] ";
default: // -1 == check failed.
dump_openssl_error();
dump_boringssl_error();
FAIL() << "[error checking rsa key] ";
}
}
@@ -799,13 +768,9 @@ bool Session::VerifyPSSSignature(EVP_PKEY* pkey, const uint8_t* message,
size_t message_length,
const uint8_t* signature,
size_t signature_length) {
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx_struct;
EVP_MD_CTX* md_ctx = &md_ctx_struct;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(md_ctx);
#else
EVP_MD_CTX* md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
#endif
EVP_PKEY_CTX* pkey_ctx = NULL;
if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pkey_ctx, EVP_sha1(), NULL /* no ENGINE */,
@@ -843,20 +808,12 @@ bool Session::VerifyPSSSignature(EVP_PKEY* pkey, const uint8_t* message,
goto err;
}
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(md_ctx);
#else
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
#endif
return true;
err:
dump_openssl_error();
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
dump_boringssl_error();
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(md_ctx);
#else
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
#endif
return false;
}
@@ -872,7 +829,7 @@ void Session::VerifyRSASignature(const vector<uint8_t>& message,
<< RSA_size(public_rsa_) << "\n";
if (padding_scheme == kSign_RSASSA_PSS) {
openssl_ptr<EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_free> pkey(EVP_PKEY_new());
boringssl_ptr<EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_free> pkey(EVP_PKEY_new());
ASSERT_EQ(1, EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey.get(), public_rsa_));
const bool ok = VerifyPSSSignature(pkey.get(), &message[0], message.size(),
@@ -907,7 +864,7 @@ bool Session::GenerateRSASessionKey(vector<uint8_t>* session_key,
int size = static_cast<int>(RSA_size(public_rsa_));
if (status != size) {
cout << "GenerateRSASessionKey error encrypting session key.\n";
dump_openssl_error();
dump_boringssl_error();
return false;
}
return true;
@@ -1039,7 +996,7 @@ void Session::VerifyPST(const Test_PST_Report& expected) {
pst_report_buffer_.size() - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
&signature[0], &md_len)) {
cout << "Error computing HMAC.\n";
dump_openssl_error();
dump_boringssl_error();
}
EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(computed.signature(), &signature[0],
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH));