From 29becbc2bf7db3b032169b301bbe1131912d3bee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Fred Gylys-Colwell <fredgc@google.com>
Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 15:37:59 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Disable failures for LoadKeyWithSuspiciousIV and
 SelectKeyNotThereAPI15

Merge from Widevine repo of http://go/wvgerrit/78949

LoadKeyWithSuspiciousIV is a new test for OEMCrypto v15.2.  It is
being disabled since we do not require 15.2 for the Q release.

SelectKeyNotThereAPI15 was failing because the error code is
delayed. This is acceptable.

Bug: 132720732
Test: unit tests on taimen
Change-Id: Iea3fabfb3afd800065119ce812fb454be1e82644
---
 .../oemcrypto/test/oemcrypto_test.cpp         | 41 ++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/libwvdrmengine/oemcrypto/test/oemcrypto_test.cpp b/libwvdrmengine/oemcrypto/test/oemcrypto_test.cpp
index 3df68bf1..9d00454d 100644
--- a/libwvdrmengine/oemcrypto/test/oemcrypto_test.cpp
+++ b/libwvdrmengine/oemcrypto/test/oemcrypto_test.cpp
@@ -1217,7 +1217,10 @@ TEST_F(OEMCryptoSessionTests, LoadKeyWithBadRange7) {
 
 // The IV should not be identical to the data right before the encrypted mac
 // keys.
-TEST_F(OEMCryptoSessionTests, LoadKeyWithSuspiciousIV) {
+// This test is for OEMCrypto v15.2.  It is being disabled on the Android branch
+// the 15.2 updates to 15.2 were not available in time for the Q release. SOC
+// vendors who are able to pass this tests, should.
+TEST_F(OEMCryptoSessionTests, DISABLED_LoadKeyWithSuspiciousIV) {
   Session s;
   ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.open());
   ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(InstallTestSessionKeys(&s));
@@ -1540,10 +1543,38 @@ TEST_F(OEMCryptoSessionTests, SelectKeyNotThereAPI15) {
   ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.EncryptAndSign());
   ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.LoadTestKeys());
   const char* key_id = "no_key";
-  ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_ERROR_NO_CONTENT_KEY,
-            OEMCrypto_SelectKey(
-                s.session_id(), reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(key_id),
-                strlen(key_id), OEMCrypto_CipherMode_CTR));
+  OEMCryptoResult sts = OEMCrypto_SelectKey(
+      s.session_id(), reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(key_id), strlen(key_id),
+      OEMCrypto_CipherMode_CTR);
+  if (sts != OEMCrypto_SUCCESS) {
+    EXPECT_EQ(OEMCrypto_ERROR_NO_CONTENT_KEY, sts);
+  } else {
+    // Delayed error code.  If select key was a success, then we should
+    // eventually see the error when we decrypt.
+    vector<uint8_t> in_buffer(256);
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < in_buffer.size(); i++) in_buffer[i] = i % 256;
+    vector<uint8_t> encryptionIv(AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+    EXPECT_EQ(1, GetRandBytes(encryptionIv.data(), AES_BLOCK_SIZE));
+    // Describe the output
+    vector<uint8_t> out_buffer(in_buffer.size());
+    const bool is_encrypted = true;
+    OEMCrypto_DestBufferDesc destBuffer;
+    destBuffer.type = OEMCrypto_BufferType_Clear;
+    destBuffer.buffer.clear.address = out_buffer.data();
+    destBuffer.buffer.clear.max_length = out_buffer.size();
+    OEMCrypto_CENCEncryptPatternDesc pattern;
+    pattern.encrypt = 0;
+    pattern.skip = 0;
+    pattern.offset = 0;
+    // Decrypt the data
+    sts = OEMCrypto_DecryptCENC(
+        s.session_id(), in_buffer.data(), in_buffer.size(), is_encrypted,
+        encryptionIv.data(), 0, &destBuffer, &pattern,
+        OEMCrypto_FirstSubsample | OEMCrypto_LastSubsample);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(
+        (OEMCrypto_ERROR_NO_CONTENT_KEY == sts)       // Preferred return code.
+        || (OEMCrypto_KEY_NOT_LOADED == sts));        // Obsolete return code.
+  }
 }
 
 // After loading keys, we should be able to query the key control block.  If we