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Replace OEMCrypto_LoadDeviceRSAKey with OEMCrypto_LoadDRMPrivateKey am: 56b836bda3 am: bb42e9bd41 am: 6b56c1c5ec am: b3657d0a6e

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Change-Id: I0dc2f37ce34771592cdd0af4ce905a896a88fccd
This commit is contained in:
Fred Gylys-Colwell
2020-03-29 20:13:22 +00:00
committed by Automerger Merge Worker
parent f88d610570 b3657d0a6e
commit efb0452042
9 changed files with 77 additions and 46 deletions
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28
libwvdrmengine/oemcrypto/ref/src/oemcrypto_ref.cpp
View File

@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ static OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey30(
// For the reference implementation, the wrapped key and the encrypted
// key are the same size -- just encrypted with different keys.
// We add 32 bytes for a context, 32 for iv, and 32 bytes for a signature.
// Important: This layout must match OEMCrypto_LoadDeviceRSAKey below.
// Important: This layout must match OEMCrypto_LoadDRMPrivateKey below.
const size_t buffer_size = enc_rsa_key_length + sizeof(WrappedRSAKey);
if (wrapped_rsa_key == nullptr || *wrapped_rsa_key_length < buffer_size) {
@@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@ static OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey(
// For the reference implementation, the wrapped key and the encrypted
// key are the same size -- just encrypted with different keys.
// We add 32 bytes for a context, 32 for iv, and 32 bytes for a signature.
// Important: This layout must match OEMCrypto_LoadDeviceRSAKey below.
// Important: This layout must match OEMCrypto_LoadDRMPrivateKey below.
const size_t buffer_size = enc_rsa_key_length + sizeof(WrappedRSAKey);
if (wrapped_rsa_key == nullptr || *wrapped_rsa_key_length < buffer_size) {
@@ -1134,7 +1134,7 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_LoadProvisioning(
// For the reference implementation, the wrapped key and the encrypted
// key are the same size -- just encrypted with different keys.
// We add 32 bytes for a context, 32 for iv, and 32 bytes for a signature.
// Important: This layout must match OEMCrypto_LoadDeviceRSAKey below.
// Important: This layout must match OEMCrypto_LoadDRMPrivateKey below.
const size_t buffer_size =
parsed_response.enc_private_key.length + sizeof(WrappedRSAKey);
@@ -1170,24 +1170,28 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_LoadProvisioning(
}
}
OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_LoadDeviceRSAKey(
OEMCrypto_SESSION session, const uint8_t* wrapped_rsa_key,
size_t wrapped_rsa_key_length) {
OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_LoadDRMPrivateKey(
OEMCrypto_SESSION session, OEMCrypto_PrivateKeyType key_type,
const uint8_t* wrapped_rsa_key, size_t wrapped_rsa_key_length) {
if (wrapped_rsa_key == nullptr) {
LOGE("[OEMCrypto_LoadDeviceRSAKey(): OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT]");
LOGE("OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT nullptr");
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT;
}
if (crypto_engine == nullptr) {
LOGE("OEMCrypto_LoadDeviceRSAKey: OEMCrypto Not Initialized.");
LOGE("OEMCrypto Not Initialized.");
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
}
if (key_type != OEMCrypto_RSA_Private_Key) {
LOGE("ECC keys not yet supported in reference code.");
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
}
if (crypto_engine->config_provisioning_method() == OEMCrypto_DrmCertificate) {
// If we are using a baked in cert, the "wrapped RSA key" should actually be
// the magic value for baked-in certificates.
if (wrapped_rsa_key_length != sizeof(kBakedInCertificateMagicBytes) ||
memcmp(kBakedInCertificateMagicBytes, wrapped_rsa_key,
wrapped_rsa_key_length) != 0) {
LOGE("OEMCrypto_LoadDeviceRSAKey: Baked in Cert has wrong size.");
LOGE("Baked in Cert has wrong size.");
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_RSA_KEY;
} else {
return OEMCrypto_SUCCESS;
@@ -1196,13 +1200,13 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_LoadDeviceRSAKey(
const WrappedRSAKey* wrapped =
reinterpret_cast<const WrappedRSAKey*>(wrapped_rsa_key);
if (!crypto_engine->ValidRootOfTrust()) {
LOGE("[OEMCrypto_LoadDeviceRSAKey(): ERROR_KEYBOX_INVALID]");
LOGE("ERROR_KEYBOX_INVALID");
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_KEYBOX_INVALID;
}
SessionContext* session_ctx = crypto_engine->FindSession(session);
if (session_ctx == nullptr || !session_ctx->isValid()) {
LOGE("[OEMCrypto_LoadDeviceRSAKey(): ERROR_INVALID_SESSION]");
LOGE("ERROR_INVALID_SESSION");
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_SESSION;
}
const std::vector<uint8_t> context(
@@ -1216,7 +1220,7 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_LoadDeviceRSAKey(
if (!session_ctx->ValidateMessage(
wrapped->context, wrapped_rsa_key_length - sizeof(wrapped->signature),
wrapped->signature, sizeof(wrapped->signature))) {
LOGE("[LoadDeviceRSAKey(): Could not verify signature]");
LOGE("Could not verify signature");
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
}
// Decrypt RSA key.

5
libwvdrmengine/oemcrypto/test/oec_session_util.cpp
View File

@@ -1350,8 +1350,9 @@ bool Session::GenerateRSASessionKey(vector<uint8_t>* session_key,
void Session::InstallRSASessionTestKey(const vector<uint8_t>& wrapped_rsa_key) {
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
OEMCrypto_LoadDeviceRSAKey(session_id(), wrapped_rsa_key.data(),
wrapped_rsa_key.size()));
OEMCrypto_LoadDRMPrivateKey(session_id(), OEMCrypto_RSA_Private_Key,
wrapped_rsa_key.data(),
wrapped_rsa_key.size()));
}
void Session::CreateNewUsageEntry(OEMCryptoResult* status) {

40
libwvdrmengine/oemcrypto/test/oemcrypto_test.cpp
View File

@@ -2874,8 +2874,9 @@ TEST_F(OEMCryptoLoadsCertificate, LoadWrappedRSAKey) {
CreateWrappedRSAKey();
Session s;
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.open());
sts = OEMCrypto_LoadDeviceRSAKey(s.session_id(), wrapped_rsa_key_.data(),
wrapped_rsa_key_.size());
sts = OEMCrypto_LoadDRMPrivateKey(s.session_id(), OEMCrypto_RSA_Private_Key,
wrapped_rsa_key_.data(),
wrapped_rsa_key_.size());
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, sts);
}
@@ -2931,8 +2932,9 @@ TEST_F(OEMCryptoLoadsCertificate, TestMultipleRSAKeys) {
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(
s1.PreparePublicKey(encoded_rsa_key_.data(), encoded_rsa_key_.size()));
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
OEMCrypto_LoadDeviceRSAKey(s1.session_id(), wrapped_rsa_key_.data(),
wrapped_rsa_key_.size()));
OEMCrypto_LoadDRMPrivateKey(
s1.session_id(), OEMCrypto_RSA_Private_Key,
wrapped_rsa_key_.data(), wrapped_rsa_key_.size()));
Session s2; // Session s2 uses a different rsa key.
encoded_rsa_key_.assign(kTestRSAPKCS8PrivateKeyInfo4_2048,
@@ -3015,8 +3017,9 @@ TEST_F(OEMCryptoLoadsCertificate, RSAPerformance) {
while (clock.now() - start_time < kTestDuration) {
Session s;
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.open());
sts = OEMCrypto_LoadDeviceRSAKey(s.session_id(), wrapped_rsa_key_.data(),
wrapped_rsa_key_.size());
sts = OEMCrypto_LoadDRMPrivateKey(s.session_id(), OEMCrypto_RSA_Private_Key,
wrapped_rsa_key_.data(),
wrapped_rsa_key_.size());
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, sts);
const size_t size = 50;
vector<uint8_t> licenseRequest(size);
@@ -3042,8 +3045,9 @@ TEST_F(OEMCryptoLoadsCertificate, RSAPerformance) {
Session s;
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.open());
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
OEMCrypto_LoadDeviceRSAKey(s.session_id(), wrapped_rsa_key_.data(),
wrapped_rsa_key_.size()));
OEMCrypto_LoadDRMPrivateKey(
s.session_id(), OEMCrypto_RSA_Private_Key,
wrapped_rsa_key_.data(), wrapped_rsa_key_.size()));
vector<uint8_t> session_key;
vector<uint8_t> enc_session_key;
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(
@@ -3119,8 +3123,9 @@ class OEMCryptoLoadsCertificateAlternates : public OEMCryptoLoadsCertificate {
OEMCryptoResult sts;
Session s;
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.open());
sts = OEMCrypto_LoadDeviceRSAKey(s.session_id(), wrapped_rsa_key_.data(),
wrapped_rsa_key_.size());
sts = OEMCrypto_LoadDRMPrivateKey(s.session_id(), OEMCrypto_RSA_Private_Key,
wrapped_rsa_key_.data(),
wrapped_rsa_key_.size());
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, sts);
// Sign a Message
@@ -3151,8 +3156,9 @@ class OEMCryptoLoadsCertificateAlternates : public OEMCryptoLoadsCertificate {
OEMCryptoResult sts;
Session s;
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.open());
sts = OEMCrypto_LoadDeviceRSAKey(s.session_id(), wrapped_rsa_key_.data(),
wrapped_rsa_key_.size());
sts = OEMCrypto_LoadDRMPrivateKey(s.session_id(), OEMCrypto_RSA_Private_Key,
wrapped_rsa_key_.data(),
wrapped_rsa_key_.size());
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, sts);
vector<uint8_t> licenseRequest(size);
@@ -3183,8 +3189,9 @@ class OEMCryptoLoadsCertificateAlternates : public OEMCryptoLoadsCertificate {
OEMCryptoResult sts;
Session s;
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.open());
sts = OEMCrypto_LoadDeviceRSAKey(s.session_id(), wrapped_rsa_key_.data(),
wrapped_rsa_key_.size());
sts = OEMCrypto_LoadDRMPrivateKey(s.session_id(), OEMCrypto_RSA_Private_Key,
wrapped_rsa_key_.data(),
wrapped_rsa_key_.size());
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, sts);
s.GenerateNonce();
vector<uint8_t> session_key;
@@ -3418,8 +3425,9 @@ class OEMCryptoCastReceiverTest : public OEMCryptoLoadsCertificateAlternates {
OEMCryptoResult sts;
Session s;
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.open());
sts = OEMCrypto_LoadDeviceRSAKey(s.session_id(), wrapped_rsa_key_.data(),
wrapped_rsa_key_.size());
sts = OEMCrypto_LoadDRMPrivateKey(s.session_id(), OEMCrypto_RSA_Private_Key,
wrapped_rsa_key_.data(),
wrapped_rsa_key_.size());
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, sts);
// The application will compute the SHA-1 Hash of the message, so this