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Fix System ID problem for devices with no keybox

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Merge from Widevine repo of http://go/wvgerrit/139372
Revert workaround for falling back to L3
(Partially merged previously)

Merge from Widevine repo of http://go/wvgerrit/139498
Guard against double initialize
(Partially merged previously)

Merge from Widevine repo of http://go/wvgerrit/139343
Use a placeholder ID for devices missing a system ID

Merge from Widevine repo of http://go/wvgerrit/140934
Check security-level during OpenSession.

Merge from Widevine repo of https://go/wvgerrit/141469
Make OTAKeyboxSupported handle the short buffer return
code

Bug: 187646550
Bug: 206670307
Bug: 206570220
Bug: 205896558
Bug: 205041153
Test: Manual test on flame
Change-Id: I71f5faf6b611337b82d8b6179251f6b0224780e6
This commit is contained in:
Fred Gylys-Colwell
2021-12-07 03:51:11 +00:00
committed by Jeff Tinker
parent 8aabf20134
commit f6d682b182
5 changed files with 146 additions and 106 deletions
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115
libwvdrmengine/cdm/core/src/crypto_session.cpp
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@@ -90,6 +90,13 @@ static_assert(ArraySize(kMaxSubsampleRegionSizes) ==
constexpr size_t kDefaultMaxSubsampleRegionSize = kMaxSubsampleRegionSizes[0];
// Not a valid system ID. Used as a placeholder for systems without an ID.
// Will not be accepted for DRM provisioning requests or license requests.
constexpr uint32_t kNullSystemId =
static_cast<uint32_t>(std::numeric_limits<int>::max());
constexpr size_t kMaxExternalDeviceIdLength = 64;
// This maps a few common OEMCryptoResult to CdmResponseType. Many mappings
// are not universal but are OEMCrypto method specific. Those will be
// specified in the CryptoSession method rather than here.
@@ -477,7 +484,6 @@ bool CryptoSession::SetUpUsageTableHeader(
CdmResponseType CryptoSession::GetTokenFromKeybox(std::string* token) {
RETURN_IF_UNINITIALIZED(CRYPTO_SESSION_NOT_INITIALIZED);
RETURN_IF_NULL(token, PARAMETER_NULL);
std::string temp_buffer(KEYBOX_KEY_DATA_SIZE, '\0');
size_t buf_size = temp_buffer.size();
uint8_t* buf = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&temp_buffer[0]);
@@ -613,68 +619,72 @@ CdmResponseType CryptoSession::GetInternalDeviceUniqueId(
RETURN_IF_NULL(device_id, PARAMETER_NULL);
RETURN_IF_UNINITIALIZED(CRYPTO_SESSION_NOT_INITIALIZED);
std::vector<uint8_t> id;
size_t id_length = 32;
id.resize(id_length);
size_t device_id_length = 64;
device_id->assign(device_id_length, '\0');
OEMCryptoResult sts;
WithOecReadLock("GetInternalDeviceUniqueId Attempt 1", [&] {
sts = OEMCrypto_GetDeviceID(&id[0], &id_length, requested_security_level_);
});
// Increment the count of times this method was called.
OEMCryptoResult sts =
WithOecReadLock("GetInternalDeviceUniqueId Attempt 1", [&] {
return OEMCrypto_GetDeviceID(
reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&device_id->front()), &device_id_length,
requested_security_level_);
});
metrics_->oemcrypto_get_device_id_.Increment(sts);
if (sts == OEMCrypto_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER) {
id.resize(id_length);
WithOecReadLock("GetInternalDeviceUniqueId Attempt 2", [&] {
sts =
OEMCrypto_GetDeviceID(&id[0], &id_length, requested_security_level_);
device_id->resize(device_id_length, '\0');
sts = WithOecReadLock("GetInternalDeviceUniqueId Attempt 2", [&] {
return OEMCrypto_GetDeviceID(
reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&device_id->front()), &device_id_length,
requested_security_level_);
});
metrics_->oemcrypto_get_device_id_.Increment(sts);
}
// Either the authentication root is a keybox or the device has transitioned
// to using OEMCerts.
// OEMCryptos, like the Level 3, that transition from Provisioning 2.0 to
// 3.0 would have a new device ID, which would affect SPOID calculation.
// In order to resolve this, we use OEMCrypto_GetDeviceID if it is
// implemented, so the OEMCrypto can continue to report the same device ID.
if (sts == OEMCrypto_SUCCESS) {
device_id->resize(device_id_length);
return NO_ERROR;
}
device_id->clear();
if (sts == OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED &&
pre_provision_token_type_ == kClientTokenOemCert) {
return GetTokenFromOemCert(device_id);
} else {
// Either the authentication root is a keybox or the device has transitioned
// to using OEMCerts.
// OEMCryptos, like the Level 3, that transition from Provisioning 2.0 to
// 3.0 would have a new device ID, which would affect SPOID calculation.
// In order to resolve this, we use OEMCrypto_GetDeviceID if it is
// implemented, so the OEMCrypto can continue to report the same device ID.
if (sts == OEMCrypto_SUCCESS) {
device_id->assign(reinterpret_cast<char*>(&id[0]), id_length);
}
return MapOEMCryptoResult(sts, GET_DEVICE_ID_ERROR,
"GetInternalDeviceUniqueId");
}
const bool use_null_device_id = WithStaticFieldReadLock(
"GetInternalDeviceUniqueId() use_null_device_id", [&] {
if (requested_security_level_ != kLevelDefault) return false;
return sts == OEMCrypto_ERROR_KEYBOX_INVALID &&
needs_keybox_provisioning_;
});
if (use_null_device_id) {
LOGD("Using null device ID");
constexpr size_t kKeyboxDeviceIdLength = 32;
device_id->assign(kKeyboxDeviceIdLength, '\0');
return NO_ERROR;
}
return MapOEMCryptoResult(sts, GET_DEVICE_ID_ERROR,
"GetInternalDeviceUniqueId");
}
CdmResponseType CryptoSession::GetExternalDeviceUniqueId(
std::string* device_id) {
RETURN_IF_NULL(device_id, PARAMETER_NULL);
std::string temp;
CdmResponseType status = GetInternalDeviceUniqueId(&temp);
RETURN_IF_UNINITIALIZED(CRYPTO_SESSION_NOT_INITIALIZED);
const CdmResponseType status = GetInternalDeviceUniqueId(device_id);
if (status != NO_ERROR) return status;
size_t id_length = 0;
OEMCryptoResult sts;
WithOecReadLock("GetExternalDeviceUniqueId", [&] {
sts = OEMCrypto_GetDeviceID(nullptr, &id_length, requested_security_level_);
});
metrics_->oemcrypto_get_device_id_.Increment(sts);
if (sts == OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED &&
pre_provision_token_type_ == kClientTokenOemCert) {
if (device_id->size() > kMaxExternalDeviceIdLength) {
// To keep the size of the value passed back to the application down, hash
// the large OEM Public Cert to a smaller value.
temp = Sha256Hash(temp);
*device_id = Sha256Hash(*device_id);
}
*device_id = temp;
return NO_ERROR;
}
@@ -736,11 +746,22 @@ CdmResponseType CryptoSession::GetSystemIdInternal(uint32_t* system_id) {
RETURN_IF_NULL(system_id, PARAMETER_NULL);
if (pre_provision_token_type_ == kClientTokenKeybox) {
const bool use_null_system_id = WithStaticFieldReadLock(
"GetSystemIdInternal() use_null_system_id", [&] {
// Devices with an invalid L1 keybox which support OTA keybox
// provisioning require a placeholder system ID while waiting for
// keybox.
if (requested_security_level_ != kLevelDefault) return false;
return needs_keybox_provisioning_;
});
if (use_null_system_id) {
LOGD("Using null system ID");
*system_id = kNullSystemId;
return NO_ERROR;
}
std::string token;
CdmResponseType status = GetTokenFromKeybox(&token);
const CdmResponseType status = GetTokenFromKeybox(&token);
if (status != NO_ERROR) return status;
if (token.size() < 2 * sizeof(uint32_t)) {
LOGE("Keybox token size too small: token_size = %zu", token.size());
return KEYBOX_TOKEN_TOO_SHORT;
@@ -748,7 +769,7 @@ CdmResponseType CryptoSession::GetSystemIdInternal(uint32_t* system_id) {
// Decode 32-bit int encoded as network-byte-order byte array starting at
// index 4.
uint32_t* id = reinterpret_cast<uint32_t*>(&token[4]);
const uint32_t* id = reinterpret_cast<const uint32_t*>(&token[4]);
*system_id = ntohl(*id);
return NO_ERROR;
}