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27421a9161b1ba6ff53056f3dda62dfdbfd40d0c
android/libwvdrmengine/oemcrypto/test/oec_session_util.cpp
Matt Feddersen 27421a9161 Add OEMCrypto tests for Cast prov 4 flow 
Expected flow, which begins with a device that has already been
provisioned with Prov 4 stage 1:
1. OEMCrypto_InstallOEMPrivateKey()
2. OEMCrypto_GenerateCertificateKeyPair() -> wrapped_csr_priv
3. OEMCrypto_LoadDRMPrivateKey(wrapped_csr_priv)
4. OEMCrypto_PrepAndSignProvisioningRequest() to create a Prov 4
   provisioning request message type with a CAST request in the
   message body
5. Server sends a Prov 2 response. Server side derivation uses CSR keys
   to derive session key, mac keys, and encryption keys.
6. OEMCrypto_DeriveKeysFromSessionKey(), same derivation as server side
7. OEMCrypto_LoadProvisioning(), use derived keys to verify + decrypt

The OEMCrypto_LoadDRMPrivateKey() step can happen before or after the
PrepAndSignProvisioningRequest() call.

Test: tests fail
Bug: 259452440

Merged from https://widevine-internal-review.googlesource.com/172310

Change-Id: Id5e6737b187339ec93e3d0d03c28e2b379d60747
2024-02-01 13:40:50 -08:00

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// Copyright 2018 Google LLC. All Rights Reserved. This file and proprietary
// source code may only be used and distributed under the Widevine
// License Agreement.
//
// OEMCrypto unit tests
//
#include "oec_session_util.h"
#include <gmock/gmock.h>
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
#include <openssl/aes.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/cmac.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <algorithm>
#include <iostream>
#include <memory>
#include <mutex>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
#include "OEMCryptoCENC.h"
#include "clock.h"
#include "core_message_deserialize.h"
#include "core_message_serialize.h"
#include "disallow_copy_and_assign.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "odk_attributes.h"
#include "odk_structs.h"
#include "oec_device_features.h"
#include "oec_test_data.h"
#include "oemcrypto_corpus_generator_helper.h"
#include "oemcrypto_types.h"
#include "platform.h"
#include "string_conversions.h"
#include "test_sleep.h"
using namespace std;
using testing::AnyOf;
// GTest requires PrintTo to be in the same namespace as the thing it prints,
// which is std::vector in this case.
namespace std {
void PrintTo(const vector<uint8_t>& value, ostream* os) {
*os << wvutil::b2a_hex(value);
}
} // namespace std
namespace wvoec {
namespace {
using oemcrypto_core_message::features::CoreMessageFeatures;
constexpr size_t kTestSubsampleSectionSize = 256;
// Fill objects by consuming a source buffer of fuzzed data.
class FuzzedData {
public:
FuzzedData(const uint8_t* source, size_t source_size)
: source_(source), source_size_(source_size) {}
// Fill the destination buffer with fuzzed data.
void Fill(void* destination, size_t destination_size) {
if (source_ && destination) {
const size_t fill_size = std::min(source_size_, destination_size);
memcpy(destination, source_, fill_size);
source_ += fill_size;
source_size_ -= fill_size;
}
}
private:
const uint8_t* source_;
size_t source_size_;
};
// Encrypt a block of data using CTR mode.
void EncryptCTR(const vector<uint8_t>& in_buffer, const uint8_t* key,
const uint8_t* starting_iv, vector<uint8_t>* out_buffer) {
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, key);
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, starting_iv);
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, out_buffer);
AES_KEY aes_key;
AES_set_encrypt_key(key, AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8, &aes_key);
out_buffer->resize(in_buffer.size());
uint8_t iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; // Current iv.
memcpy(iv, &starting_iv[0], AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
size_t l = 0; // byte index into encrypted subsample.
while (l < in_buffer.size()) {
uint8_t aes_output[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
AES_encrypt(iv, aes_output, &aes_key);
for (size_t n = 0; n < AES_BLOCK_SIZE && l < in_buffer.size(); n++, l++) {
(*out_buffer)[l] = aes_output[n] ^ in_buffer[l];
}
ctr128_inc64(1, iv);
}
}
// Uses OEMCrypto to decrypt some random data in 'cenc' mode. This function
// assumes that the correct key is already selected in the session. It requires
// the plaintext of that key so that it can encrypt the test data. It resizes
// the provided vectors and fills them with the expected and actual decrypt
// results. Returns the result of OEMCrypto_DecryptCENC().
OEMCryptoResult DecryptCTR(const vector<uint8_t>& key_handle,
const uint8_t* key, vector<uint8_t>* expected_data,
vector<uint8_t>* actual_data) {
vector<uint8_t> encrypted_data(kTestSubsampleSectionSize);
expected_data->resize(encrypted_data.size());
actual_data->resize(encrypted_data.size());
// Create test sample description
OEMCrypto_SampleDescription sample_description;
OEMCrypto_SubSampleDescription subsample_description;
GenerateSimpleSampleDescription(encrypted_data, *actual_data,
&sample_description, &subsample_description);
// Generate test data
EXPECT_EQ(GetRandBytes(expected_data->data(), expected_data->size()), 1);
EncryptCTR(*expected_data, key, &sample_description.iv[0], &encrypted_data);
// Create the pattern description (always 0,0 for 'cenc')
OEMCrypto_CENCEncryptPatternDesc pattern = {0, 0};
// Decrypt the data
return OEMCrypto_DecryptCENC(key_handle.data(), key_handle.size(),
&sample_description, 1, &pattern);
}
} // namespace
int GetRandBytes(unsigned char* buf, size_t num) {
// returns 1 on success, -1 if not supported, or 0 if other failure.
return RAND_bytes(buf, static_cast<int>(num));
}
// Does the boilerplate to fill out sample and subsample descriptions for
// decrypting a single contiguous block of encrypted data to clear memory, which
// is a common operation for tests. Generates a random IV which can be used to
// encrypt the input buffer.
void GenerateSimpleSampleDescription(
const std::vector<uint8_t>& in, std::vector<uint8_t>& out,
OEMCrypto_SampleDescription* sample,
OEMCrypto_SubSampleDescription* subsample) {
// Generate test data
EXPECT_EQ(GetRandBytes(&sample->iv[0], KEY_IV_SIZE), 1);
// Describe the test data
sample->buffers.input_data = in.data();
sample->buffers.input_data_length = in.size();
subsample->num_bytes_clear = 0;
subsample->num_bytes_encrypted = sample->buffers.input_data_length;
subsample->subsample_flags =
OEMCrypto_FirstSubsample | OEMCrypto_LastSubsample;
subsample->block_offset = 0;
sample->subsamples = subsample;
sample->subsamples_length = 1;
// Describe the output
OEMCrypto_DestBufferDesc& out_buffer_descriptor =
sample->buffers.output_descriptor;
out_buffer_descriptor.type = OEMCrypto_BufferType_Clear;
out_buffer_descriptor.buffer.clear.clear_buffer = out.data();
out_buffer_descriptor.buffer.clear.clear_buffer_length = out.size();
}
// Increment counter for AES-CTR. The CENC spec specifies we increment only
// the low 64 bits of the IV counter, and leave the high 64 bits alone. This
// is different from the BoringSSL implementation, so we implement the CTR loop
// ourselves.
void ctr128_inc64(int64_t increaseBy, uint8_t* iv) {
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, iv);
uint64_t* counterBuffer = reinterpret_cast<uint64_t*>(&iv[8]);
(*counterBuffer) =
wvutil::htonll64(wvutil::ntohll64(*counterBuffer) + increaseBy);
}
// Some compilers don't like the macro htonl within an ASSERT_EQ.
uint32_t htonl_fnc(uint32_t x) { return htonl(x); }
void dump_boringssl_error() {
// BoringSSL and OpenSSL disagree about what the type of an error code is, so
// we must use "auto" here.
while (auto err = ERR_get_error()) {
char buffer[120];
ERR_error_string_n(err, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
cerr << "BoringSSL Error -- " << buffer << "\n";
}
}
// A smart pointer for BoringSSL objects. It uses the specified free function
// to release resources and free memory when the pointer is deleted.
template <typename T, void (*func)(T*)>
class boringssl_ptr {
public:
explicit boringssl_ptr(T* p = nullptr) : ptr_(p) {}
~boringssl_ptr() {
if (ptr_) func(ptr_);
}
T& operator*() const { return *ptr_; }
T* operator->() const { return ptr_; }
T* get() const { return ptr_; }
bool NotNull() const { return ptr_; }
private:
T* ptr_;
CORE_DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(boringssl_ptr);
};
Test_PST_Report::Test_PST_Report(const std::string& pst_in,
OEMCrypto_Usage_Entry_Status status_in)
: status(status_in), pst(pst_in) {
time_created = wvutil::Clock().GetCurrentTime();
}
template <class CoreRequest, PrepAndSignRequest_t PrepAndSignRequest,
class CoreResponse, class ResponseData>
OEMCryptoResult
RoundTrip<CoreRequest, PrepAndSignRequest, CoreResponse, ResponseData>::
SignAndCreateRequestWithCustomBufferLengths(bool verify_request) {
// In the real world, a message should be signed by the client and
// verified by the server. This simulates that.
size_t gen_signature_length = 0;
size_t core_message_length = 0;
constexpr size_t small_size = 42; // arbitrary.
if (RequestHasNonce()) {
session()->GenerateNonce();
}
uint32_t session_id = session()->session_id();
GetDefaultRequestSignatureAndCoreMessageLengths<PrepAndSignRequest>(
session_id, small_size, &gen_signature_length, &core_message_length);
// Used to test request APIs with varying lengths of core message.
core_message_length =
std::max(core_message_length, required_core_message_size_);
// Used to test request APIs with varying lengths of signature.
gen_signature_length =
std::max(gen_signature_length, required_request_signature_size_);
// Make the message buffer a little bigger than the core message, or the
// required size, whichever is larger.
size_t message_size =
std::max(required_message_size_, core_message_length + small_size);
vector<uint8_t> data(message_size);
for (size_t i = 0; i < data.size(); i++) data[i] = i & 0xFF;
if (ShouldGenerateCorpus()) {
WriteRequestApiCorpus<CoreRequest>(gen_signature_length,
core_message_length, data);
}
vector<uint8_t> gen_signature(gen_signature_length);
OEMCryptoResult result = PrepAndSignRequest(
session()->session_id(), data.data(), data.size(), &core_message_length,
gen_signature.data(), &gen_signature_length);
// We need to fill in core request and verify signature only for calls other
// than OEMCryptoMemory buffer overflow test. Any test other than buffer
// overflow will pass true.
if (result == OEMCrypto_SUCCESS) {
gen_signature.resize(gen_signature_length);
}
if (!verify_request || result != OEMCrypto_SUCCESS) return result;
std::string core_message(reinterpret_cast<char*>(data.data()),
core_message_length);
FillAndVerifyCoreRequest(core_message);
VerifyRequestSignature(data, gen_signature, core_message_length);
return result;
}
template <class CoreRequest, PrepAndSignRequest_t PrepAndSignRequest,
class CoreResponse, class ResponseData>
void RoundTrip<CoreRequest, PrepAndSignRequest, CoreResponse,
ResponseData>::SetEncryptAndSignResponseLengths() {
encrypted_response_length_ = encrypted_response_.size();
response_signature_length_ = response_signature_.size();
}
template <class CoreRequest, PrepAndSignRequest_t PrepAndSignRequest,
class CoreResponse, class ResponseData>
void RoundTrip<CoreRequest, PrepAndSignRequest, CoreResponse,
ResponseData>::VerifyEncryptAndSignResponseLengths() const {
EXPECT_NE(encrypted_response_length_, 0u);
EXPECT_EQ(encrypted_response_length_, encrypted_response_.size());
EXPECT_NE(response_signature_length_, 0u);
EXPECT_EQ(response_signature_length_, response_signature_.size());
}
template <PrepAndSignRequest_t PrepAndSignRequest>
void GetDefaultRequestSignatureAndCoreMessageLengths(
uint32_t& session_id, const size_t& small_size,
size_t* gen_signature_length, size_t* core_message_length) {
vector<uint8_t> data(small_size);
for (size_t i = 0; i < data.size(); i++) data[i] = i & 0xFF;
ASSERT_EQ(
PrepAndSignRequest(session_id, data.data(), data.size(),
core_message_length, nullptr, gen_signature_length),
OEMCrypto_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER);
}
template <class CoreRequest, PrepAndSignRequest_t PrepAndSignRequest,
class CoreResponse, class ResponseData>
void RoundTrip<CoreRequest, PrepAndSignRequest, CoreResponse,
ResponseData>::InjectFuzzedRequestData(uint8_t* data,
size_t size) {
OEMCrypto_Request_Fuzz fuzz_structure;
// Copy data into fuzz structure, cap signature length at 1mb as it will be
// used to initialize signature vector.
memcpy(&fuzz_structure, data, sizeof(fuzz_structure));
fuzz_structure.signature_length =
std::min(fuzz_structure.signature_length, MB);
vector<uint8_t> signature(fuzz_structure.signature_length);
// Interpret rest of data as actual message buffer to request APIs.
uint8_t* message_ptr = data + sizeof(fuzz_structure);
size_t message_size = size - sizeof(fuzz_structure);
PrepAndSignRequest(session()->session_id(), message_ptr, message_size,
&fuzz_structure.core_message_length, signature.data(),
&fuzz_structure.signature_length);
}
template <class CoreRequest, PrepAndSignRequest_t PrepAndSignRequest,
class CoreResponse, class ResponseData>
OEMCrypto_Substring RoundTrip<CoreRequest, PrepAndSignRequest, CoreResponse,
ResponseData>::FindSubstring(const void* pointer,
size_t length) {
OEMCrypto_Substring substring;
if (length == 0 || pointer == nullptr) {
substring.offset = 0;
substring.length = 0;
} else {
substring.offset = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(pointer) -
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&response_data_);
substring.length = length;
}
return substring;
}
void ProvisioningRoundTrip::PrepareSession(
const wvoec::WidevineKeybox& keybox) {
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(session_->open());
if (global_features.provisioning_method == OEMCrypto_Keybox) {
session_->GenerateDerivedKeysFromKeybox(keybox);
encryptor_ = session_->key_deriver();
} else if (global_features.provisioning_method ==
OEMCrypto_BootCertificateChain) {
// TODO(chelu): change this to CSR provisioning.
session_->LoadOEMCert(true);
session_->GenerateRsaSessionKey(&message_key_, &encrypted_message_key_);
encryptor_.set_enc_key(message_key_);
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(global_features.provisioning_method, OEMCrypto_OEMCertificate);
session_->LoadOEMCert(true);
session_->GenerateRsaSessionKey(&message_key_, &encrypted_message_key_);
encryptor_.set_enc_key(message_key_);
}
}
void ProvisioningRoundTrip::VerifyRequestSignature(
const vector<uint8_t>& data, const vector<uint8_t>& generated_signature,
size_t /* core_message_length */) {
if (global_features.provisioning_method == OEMCrypto_OEMCertificate) {
session()->VerifyRsaSignature(data, generated_signature.data(),
generated_signature.size(), kSign_RSASSA_PSS);
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(global_features.provisioning_method, OEMCrypto_Keybox);
ASSERT_EQ(HMAC_SHA256_SIGNATURE_SIZE, generated_signature.size());
std::vector<uint8_t> expected_signature;
session()->key_deriver().ClientSignBuffer(data, &expected_signature);
ASSERT_EQ(expected_signature, generated_signature);
}
}
void ProvisioningRoundTrip::FillAndVerifyCoreRequest(
const std::string& core_message_string) {
EXPECT_TRUE(
oemcrypto_core_message::deserialize::CoreProvisioningRequestFromMessage(
core_message_string, &core_request_));
EXPECT_EQ(global_features.api_version, core_request_.api_major_version);
EXPECT_EQ(session()->nonce(), core_request_.nonce);
EXPECT_EQ(session()->session_id(), core_request_.session_id);
}
void ProvisioningRoundTrip::CreateDefaultResponse() {
if (allowed_schemes_ != kSign_RSASSA_PSS) {
uint32_t algorithm_n = htonl(allowed_schemes_);
memcpy(response_data_.rsa_key, "SIGN", 4);
memcpy(response_data_.rsa_key + 4, &algorithm_n, 4);
memcpy(response_data_.rsa_key + 8, encoded_rsa_key_.data(),
encoded_rsa_key_.size());
response_data_.rsa_key_length = 8 + encoded_rsa_key_.size();
} else {
memcpy(response_data_.rsa_key, encoded_rsa_key_.data(),
encoded_rsa_key_.size());
response_data_.rsa_key_length = encoded_rsa_key_.size();
}
response_data_.nonce = session_->nonce();
if (encrypted_message_key_.size() > 0) {
ASSERT_LE(encrypted_message_key_.size(), kMaxTestRSAKeyLength);
memcpy(response_data_.enc_message_key, encrypted_message_key_.data(),
encrypted_message_key_.size());
response_data_.enc_message_key_length = encrypted_message_key_.size();
} else {
response_data_.enc_message_key_length = 0;
}
core_response_.key_type = OEMCrypto_RSA_Private_Key;
core_response_.enc_private_key =
FindSubstring(response_data_.rsa_key, response_data_.rsa_key_length);
core_response_.enc_private_key_iv = FindSubstring(
response_data_.rsa_key_iv, sizeof(response_data_.rsa_key_iv));
core_response_.encrypted_message_key = FindSubstring(
response_data_.enc_message_key, response_data_.enc_message_key_length);
}
void ProvisioningRoundTrip::EncryptAndSignResponse() {
encryptor_.PadAndEncryptProvisioningMessage(&response_data_,
&encrypted_response_data_);
core_response_.enc_private_key.length =
encrypted_response_data_.rsa_key_length;
SignResponse();
}
// We need this for provisioning response out of range tests where
// core response substring lengths are modified.
void ProvisioningRoundTrip::
EncryptAndSignResponseWithoutUpdatingEncPrivateKeyLength() {
encryptor_.PadAndEncryptProvisioningMessage(&response_data_,
&encrypted_response_data_);
SignResponse();
}
void ProvisioningRoundTrip::SignResponse() {
CoreMessageFeatures features =
CoreMessageFeatures::DefaultFeatures(ODK_MAJOR_VERSION);
ASSERT_TRUE(oemcrypto_core_message::serialize::CreateCoreProvisioningResponse(
features, core_response_, core_request_, &serialized_core_message_));
// Resizing for huge core message length unit tests.
serialized_core_message_.resize(
std::max(required_core_message_size_, serialized_core_message_.size()));
// Make the message buffer a just big enough, or the
// required size, whichever is larger.
const size_t message_size =
std::max(required_message_size_, serialized_core_message_.size() +
sizeof(encrypted_response_data_));
// Stripe the encrypted message.
encrypted_response_.resize(message_size);
for (size_t i = 0; i < encrypted_response_.size(); i++) {
encrypted_response_[i] = i & 0xFF;
}
ASSERT_GE(encrypted_response_.size(), serialized_core_message_.size());
memcpy(encrypted_response_.data(), serialized_core_message_.data(),
serialized_core_message_.size());
ASSERT_GE(encrypted_response_.size(),
serialized_core_message_.size() + sizeof(encrypted_response_data_));
memcpy(encrypted_response_.data() + serialized_core_message_.size(),
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&encrypted_response_data_),
sizeof(encrypted_response_data_));
if (global_features.provisioning_method == OEMCrypto_OEMCertificate) {
session()->GenerateDerivedKeysFromSessionKey();
}
session()->key_deriver().ServerSignBuffer(encrypted_response_.data(),
encrypted_response_.size(),
&response_signature_);
SetEncryptAndSignResponseLengths();
}
void ProvisioningRoundTrip::InjectFuzzedResponseData(const uint8_t* data,
size_t size) {
// Interpreting fuzz data as unencrypted core_response + message_data
FuzzedData fuzzed_data(data, size);
// Copy core_response from data and serialize.
fuzzed_data.Fill(&core_response_, sizeof(core_response_));
// Copy provisioning message data into response_data.
fuzzed_data.Fill(&response_data_, sizeof(response_data_));
// Set nonce to one from session to pass nonce checks.
response_data_.nonce = session()->nonce();
}
OEMCryptoResult ProvisioningRoundTrip::LoadResponse(Session* session) {
EXPECT_NE(session, nullptr);
// Write corpus for oemcrypto_load_provisioning_fuzz. Fuzz script expects
// unencrypted response from provisioning server as input corpus data.
// Data will be encrypted and signed again explicitly by fuzzer script after
// mutations.
if (ShouldGenerateCorpus()) {
const std::string file_name =
GetFileName("oemcrypto_load_provisioning_fuzz_seed_corpus");
// Corpus for license response fuzzer should be in the format:
// unencrypted (core_response + response_data).
AppendToFile(file_name, reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&core_response_),
sizeof(ODK_ParsedProvisioning));
AppendToFile(file_name, reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&response_data_),
sizeof(response_data_));
}
size_t wrapped_key_length = 0;
OEMCryptoResult sts = LoadResponseNoRetry(session, &wrapped_key_length);
if (sts != OEMCrypto_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER) return sts;
wrapped_rsa_key_.assign(wrapped_key_length, 0);
sts = LoadResponseNoRetry(session, &wrapped_key_length);
if (sts == OEMCrypto_SUCCESS) {
wrapped_rsa_key_.resize(wrapped_key_length);
}
return sts;
}
template <typename T>
const T* ProvisioningRoundTrip::RemapPointer(const T* response_pointer) const {
const uint8_t* original_pointer =
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(response_pointer);
size_t delta =
original_pointer - reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&response_data_);
// Base offset should be 0 if this is a v15 message, which is the only time
// this function is called.
size_t base_offset = serialized_core_message_.size();
const uint8_t* new_pointer = encrypted_response_.data() + delta + base_offset;
return reinterpret_cast<const T*>(new_pointer);
}
OEMCryptoResult ProvisioningRoundTrip::LoadResponseNoRetry(
Session* session, size_t* wrapped_key_length) {
EXPECT_NE(session, nullptr);
VerifyEncryptAndSignResponseLengths();
return OEMCrypto_LoadProvisioning(
session->session_id(), encrypted_response_.data(),
encrypted_response_.size(), serialized_core_message_.size(),
response_signature_.data(), response_signature_.size(),
wrapped_rsa_key_.data(), wrapped_key_length);
}
void ProvisioningRoundTrip::VerifyLoadFailed() {
if (wrapped_rsa_key_.size() == 0) return;
std::vector<uint8_t> zero(wrapped_rsa_key_.size(), 0);
ASSERT_EQ(zero, wrapped_rsa_key_);
}
void Provisioning40RoundTrip::PrepareSession(bool is_oem_key) {
const size_t buffer_size = 5000; // Make sure it is large enough.
std::vector<uint8_t> public_key(buffer_size);
size_t public_key_size = buffer_size;
std::vector<uint8_t> public_key_signature(buffer_size);
size_t public_key_signature_size = buffer_size;
std::vector<uint8_t> wrapped_private_key(buffer_size);
size_t wrapped_private_key_size = buffer_size;
OEMCrypto_PrivateKeyType key_type;
ASSERT_EQ(
OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
OEMCrypto_GenerateCertificateKeyPair(
session()->session_id(), public_key.data(), &public_key_size,
public_key_signature.data(), &public_key_signature_size,
wrapped_private_key.data(), &wrapped_private_key_size, &key_type));
wrapped_private_key.resize(wrapped_private_key_size);
public_key.resize(public_key_size);
if (is_oem_key) {
wrapped_oem_key_ = wrapped_private_key;
oem_public_key_ = public_key;
oem_key_type_ = key_type;
} else {
wrapped_drm_key_ = wrapped_private_key;
drm_public_key_ = public_key;
drm_key_type_ = key_type;
}
}
void Provisioning40RoundTrip::FillAndVerifyCoreRequest(
const std::string& core_message_string) {
EXPECT_TRUE(
oemcrypto_core_message::deserialize::CoreProvisioning40RequestFromMessage(
core_message_string, &core_request_));
EXPECT_EQ(global_features.api_version, core_request_.api_major_version);
EXPECT_EQ(session()->nonce(), core_request_.nonce);
EXPECT_EQ(session()->session_id(), core_request_.session_id);
}
void Provisioning40RoundTrip::VerifyRequestSignature(
const vector<uint8_t>& data, const vector<uint8_t>& generated_signature,
size_t /* core_message_length */) {
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(
session()->VerifySignature(data, generated_signature.data(),
generated_signature.size(), kSign_RSASSA_PSS));
}
OEMCryptoResult Provisioning40RoundTrip::LoadOEMCertResponse() {
EXPECT_GE(wrapped_oem_key_.size(), 0UL);
return OEMCrypto_InstallOemPrivateKey(
session()->session_id(), oem_key_type_,
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(wrapped_oem_key_.data()),
wrapped_oem_key_.size());
}
OEMCryptoResult Provisioning40RoundTrip::LoadDRMCertResponse() {
EXPECT_GE(wrapped_drm_key_.size(), 0UL);
return OEMCrypto_LoadDRMPrivateKey(session()->session_id(), drm_key_type_,
wrapped_drm_key_.data(),
wrapped_drm_key_.size());
}
void Provisioning40CastRoundTrip::PrepareSession() {
const size_t buffer_size = 5000; // Make sure it is large enough.
std::vector<uint8_t> public_key(buffer_size);
size_t public_key_size = buffer_size;
std::vector<uint8_t> public_key_signature(buffer_size);
size_t public_key_signature_size = buffer_size;
std::vector<uint8_t> wrapped_private_key(buffer_size);
size_t wrapped_private_key_size = buffer_size;
OEMCrypto_PrivateKeyType key_type;
ASSERT_EQ(
OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
OEMCrypto_GenerateCertificateKeyPair(
session()->session_id(), public_key.data(), &public_key_size,
public_key_signature.data(), &public_key_signature_size,
wrapped_private_key.data(), &wrapped_private_key_size, &key_type));
wrapped_private_key.resize(wrapped_private_key_size);
public_key.resize(public_key_size);
wrapped_drm_key_ = wrapped_private_key;
drm_public_key_ = public_key;
drm_key_type_ = key_type;
}
void Provisioning40CastRoundTrip::LoadDRMPrivateKey() {
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
OEMCrypto_LoadDRMPrivateKey(session()->session_id(), drm_key_type_,
wrapped_drm_key_.data(),
wrapped_drm_key_.size()));
}
void Provisioning40CastRoundTrip::FillAndVerifyCoreRequest(
const std::string& core_message_string) {
EXPECT_TRUE(
oemcrypto_core_message::deserialize::CoreProvisioning40RequestFromMessage(
core_message_string, &core_request_));
EXPECT_EQ(global_features.api_version, core_request_.api_major_version);
EXPECT_EQ(session()->nonce(), core_request_.nonce);
EXPECT_EQ(session()->session_id(), core_request_.session_id);
}
void Provisioning40CastRoundTrip::VerifyRequestSignature(
const vector<uint8_t>& data, const vector<uint8_t>& generated_signature,
size_t /* core_message_length */) {
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(
session()->VerifySignature(data, generated_signature.data(),
generated_signature.size(), kSign_RSASSA_PSS));
}
// Creates a prov2 response
void Provisioning40CastRoundTrip::CreateDefaultResponse() {
uint32_t algorithm_n = htonl(kSign_RSASSA_PSS);
memcpy(response_data_.rsa_key, "SIGN", 4);
memcpy(response_data_.rsa_key + 4, &algorithm_n, 4);
memcpy(response_data_.rsa_key + 8, encoded_rsa_key_.data(),
encoded_rsa_key_.size());
response_data_.rsa_key_length = 8 + encoded_rsa_key_.size();
response_data_.nonce = session_->nonce();
response_data_.enc_message_key_length = 0;
core_response_.key_type = OEMCrypto_RSA_Private_Key;
core_response_.enc_private_key =
FindSubstring(response_data_.rsa_key, response_data_.rsa_key_length);
core_response_.enc_private_key_iv = FindSubstring(
response_data_.rsa_key_iv, sizeof(response_data_.rsa_key_iv));
core_response_.encrypted_message_key = FindSubstring(
response_data_.enc_message_key, response_data_.enc_message_key_length);
}
void Provisioning40CastRoundTrip::EncryptAndSignResponse() {
session()->key_deriver().PadAndEncryptProvisioningMessage(&response_data_,
&encrypted_response_data_);
core_response_.enc_private_key.length =
encrypted_response_data_.rsa_key_length;
SignResponse();
}
void Provisioning40CastRoundTrip::SignResponse() {
CoreMessageFeatures features =
CoreMessageFeatures::DefaultFeatures(ODK_MAJOR_VERSION);
// Create prov 2 request struct from prov 4 request
oemcrypto_core_message::ODK_ProvisioningRequest core_request_prov2;
core_request_prov2.api_minor_version = core_request_.api_minor_version;
core_request_prov2.api_major_version = core_request_.api_major_version;
core_request_prov2.nonce = core_request_.nonce;
core_request_prov2.session_id = core_request_.session_id;
memcpy(&core_request_prov2.counter_info, &core_request_.counter_info,
sizeof(core_request_.counter_info));
ASSERT_TRUE(oemcrypto_core_message::serialize::CreateCoreProvisioningResponse(
features, core_response_, core_request_prov2, &serialized_core_message_));
// Resizing for huge core message length unit tests.
serialized_core_message_.resize(
std::max(required_core_message_size_, serialized_core_message_.size()));
// Make the message buffer a just big enough, or the
// required size, whichever is larger.
const size_t message_size =
std::max(required_message_size_, serialized_core_message_.size() +
sizeof(encrypted_response_data_));
// Stripe the encrypted message.
encrypted_response_.resize(message_size);
for (size_t i = 0; i < encrypted_response_.size(); i++) {
encrypted_response_[i] = i & 0xFF;
}
ASSERT_GE(encrypted_response_.size(), serialized_core_message_.size());
memcpy(encrypted_response_.data(), serialized_core_message_.data(),
serialized_core_message_.size());
ASSERT_GE(encrypted_response_.size(),
serialized_core_message_.size() + sizeof(encrypted_response_data_));
memcpy(encrypted_response_.data() + serialized_core_message_.size(),
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&encrypted_response_data_),
sizeof(encrypted_response_data_));
session()->key_deriver().ServerSignBuffer(encrypted_response_.data(),
encrypted_response_.size(),
&response_signature_);
SetEncryptAndSignResponseLengths();
}
OEMCryptoResult Provisioning40CastRoundTrip::LoadResponse(Session* session) {
EXPECT_NE(session, nullptr);
// Write corpus for oemcrypto_load_provisioning_fuzz. Fuzz script expects
// unencrypted response from provisioning server as input corpus data.
// Data will be encrypted and signed again explicitly by fuzzer script after
// mutations.
if (ShouldGenerateCorpus()) {
const std::string file_name =
GetFileName("oemcrypto_load_provisioning_fuzz_seed_corpus");
// Corpus for license response fuzzer should be in the format:
// unencrypted (core_response + response_data).
AppendToFile(file_name, reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&core_response_),
sizeof(ODK_ParsedProvisioning));
AppendToFile(file_name, reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&response_data_),
sizeof(response_data_));
}
size_t wrapped_key_length = 0;
OEMCryptoResult sts = LoadResponseNoRetry(session, &wrapped_key_length);
if (sts != OEMCrypto_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER) return sts;
wrapped_rsa_key_.assign(wrapped_key_length, 0);
sts = LoadResponseNoRetry(session, &wrapped_key_length);
if (sts == OEMCrypto_SUCCESS) {
wrapped_rsa_key_.resize(wrapped_key_length);
}
return sts;
}
OEMCryptoResult Provisioning40CastRoundTrip::LoadResponseNoRetry(
Session* session, size_t* wrapped_key_length) {
EXPECT_NE(session, nullptr);
VerifyEncryptAndSignResponseLengths();
return OEMCrypto_LoadProvisioning(
session->session_id(), encrypted_response_.data(),
encrypted_response_.size(), serialized_core_message_.size(),
response_signature_.data(), response_signature_.size(),
wrapped_rsa_key_.data(), wrapped_key_length);
}
void LicenseRoundTrip::VerifyRequestSignature(
const vector<uint8_t>& data, const vector<uint8_t>& generated_signature,
size_t core_message_length) {
// If the api version was not set by the test, then we record the api version
// from the request. Also, if the api was set to be higher than oemcrypto
// supports, then we lower it. This version will be used in the response.
if (api_version_ == 0) api_version_ = core_request_.api_major_version;
if (api_version_ > global_features.api_version)
api_version_ = global_features.api_version;
if (global_features.api_version < 17) {
const std::vector<uint8_t> subdata(data.begin() + core_message_length,
data.end());
session()->VerifyRsaSignature(subdata, generated_signature.data(),
generated_signature.size(), kSign_RSASSA_PSS);
SHA256(data.data(), core_message_length, request_hash_);
} else {
session()->VerifySignature(data, generated_signature.data(),
generated_signature.size(), kSign_RSASSA_PSS);
SHA256(data.data(), core_message_length, request_hash_);
}
}
void LicenseRoundTrip::FillAndVerifyCoreRequest(
const std::string& core_message_string) {
EXPECT_TRUE(
oemcrypto_core_message::deserialize::CoreLicenseRequestFromMessage(
core_message_string, &core_request_));
EXPECT_EQ(global_features.api_version, core_request_.api_major_version);
if (global_features.api_version == 16) {
// We support either 16.3-16.4 for OEMCrypto 16 public release, and v16.5
// for L3 release only.
EXPECT_LE(3, core_request_.api_minor_version);
EXPECT_GE(5, core_request_.api_minor_version);
} else if (global_features.api_version == ODK_MAJOR_VERSION) {
// We do not expect older tests to work with a newer OEMCrypto.
EXPECT_GE(ODK_MINOR_VERSION, core_request_.api_minor_version);
}
if (expect_request_has_correct_nonce_) {
EXPECT_EQ(session()->nonce(), core_request_.nonce);
}
EXPECT_EQ(session()->session_id(), core_request_.session_id);
}
void LicenseRoundTrip::CreateDefaultResponse() {
EXPECT_EQ(1, GetRandBytes(response_data_.mac_key_iv,
sizeof(response_data_.mac_key_iv)));
memset(response_data_.padding, 0, sizeof(response_data_.padding));
EXPECT_EQ(1, GetRandBytes(response_data_.mac_keys,
sizeof(response_data_.mac_keys)));
// For backwards compatibility, we use the largest limit in timer_limits for
// each key's duration.
uint32_t key_duration = static_cast<uint32_t>(
std::max({core_response_.timer_limits.rental_duration_seconds,
core_response_.timer_limits.total_playback_duration_seconds,
core_response_.timer_limits.initial_renewal_duration_seconds}));
// The key data for an entitlement license is an AES-256 key, otherwise the
// default is an AES_128 key.
uint32_t default_key_size =
(license_type_ == OEMCrypto_EntitlementLicense) ? KEY_SIZE * 2 : KEY_SIZE;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < num_keys_; i++) {
memset(response_data_.keys[i].key_id, 0, kTestKeyIdMaxLength);
response_data_.keys[i].key_id_length = kDefaultKeyIdLength;
memset(response_data_.keys[i].key_id, i,
response_data_.keys[i].key_id_length);
EXPECT_EQ(1, GetRandBytes(response_data_.keys[i].key_data,
sizeof(response_data_.keys[i].key_data)));
response_data_.keys[i].key_data_length = default_key_size;
EXPECT_EQ(1, GetRandBytes(response_data_.keys[i].key_iv,
sizeof(response_data_.keys[i].key_iv)));
EXPECT_EQ(1, GetRandBytes(response_data_.keys[i].control_iv,
sizeof(response_data_.keys[i].control_iv)));
std::string kcVersion = "kc" + std::to_string(api_version_);
memcpy(response_data_.keys[i].control.verification, kcVersion.c_str(), 4);
response_data_.keys[i].control.duration = htonl(key_duration);
response_data_.keys[i].control.nonce = htonl(session_->nonce());
response_data_.keys[i].control.control_bits = htonl(control_);
response_data_.keys[i].cipher_mode = OEMCrypto_CipherMode_CENC;
}
// Fill in the default core_response_ fields, except the substrings, which are
// filled in the next function.
core_response_.nonce_required =
(wvoec::kControlNonceEnabled | wvoec::kControlNonceOrEntry |
wvoec::kControlNonceRequired) &
control_;
core_response_.license_type = license_type_;
FillCoreResponseSubstrings();
}
void LicenseRoundTrip::ConvertDataToValidBools(ODK_Packing_ParsedLicense* t) {
t->nonce_required = ConvertByteToValidBoolean(&t->nonce_required);
t->timer_limits.soft_enforce_playback_duration = ConvertByteToValidBoolean(
&t->timer_limits.soft_enforce_playback_duration);
t->timer_limits.soft_enforce_rental_duration =
ConvertByteToValidBoolean(&t->timer_limits.soft_enforce_rental_duration);
}
void LicenseRoundTrip::InjectFuzzedTimerLimits(
OEMCrypto_Renewal_Response_Fuzz& fuzzed_data) {
// Interpreting fuzz data as timer limits.
// Copy timer limits from data.
memcpy(&core_response_.timer_limits, &fuzzed_data.timer_limits,
sizeof(fuzzed_data.timer_limits));
ConvertDataToValidBools(&core_response_);
}
void LicenseRoundTrip::InjectFuzzedResponseData(const uint8_t* data,
size_t size) {
// Interpreting fuzz data as unencrypted core_response + response_data +
// key_array
FuzzedData fuzzed_data(data, size);
// Copy core_response from data.
fuzzed_data.Fill(&core_response_, sizeof(core_response_));
// Copy response_data from data.
fuzzed_data.Fill(&response_data_, sizeof(response_data_));
// If key_array_length is more than kMaxNumKeys, we set it to kMaxNumKeys to
// prevent it from going out of bounds. For corpus, this value is already hard
// coded to 4.
if (core_response_.key_array_length > kMaxNumKeys) {
core_response_.key_array_length = kMaxNumKeys;
}
// For corpus data, this value gets set to 4, but we need to test other
// scenarios too, hence reading key_array_length value.
set_num_keys(core_response_.key_array_length);
// Copy key_array from data.
key_array_.resize(num_keys_);
core_response_.key_array = key_array_.data();
fuzzed_data.Fill(core_response_.key_array,
num_keys_ * sizeof(*core_response_.key_array));
ConvertDataToValidBools(&core_response_);
// TODO(b/157520981): Once assertion bug is fixed, for loop can be removed.
// Workaround for the above bug: key_data.length and key_id.length are being
// used in AES decryption process and are expected to be a multiple of 16. An
// assertion in AES decryption fails if this condition is not met which will
// crash fuzzer.
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < num_keys_; ++i) {
size_t key_data_length = core_response_.key_array[i].key_data.length;
size_t key_id_length = core_response_.key_array[i].key_id.length;
if (key_data_length % 16 != 0) {
core_response_.key_array[i].key_data.length =
key_data_length - (key_data_length % 16);
}
if (key_id_length % 16 != 0) {
core_response_.key_array[i].key_id.length =
key_id_length - (key_id_length % 16);
}
}
// Set nonce to match one in request to pass nonce validations.
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < num_keys_; ++i) {
response_data_.keys[i].control.nonce = htonl(session()->nonce());
}
}
void LicenseRoundTrip::CreateResponseWithGenericCryptoKeys() {
CreateDefaultResponse();
response_data_.keys[0].control.control_bits |=
htonl(wvoec::kControlAllowEncrypt);
response_data_.keys[1].control.control_bits |=
htonl(wvoec::kControlAllowDecrypt);
response_data_.keys[2].control.control_bits |=
htonl(wvoec::kControlAllowSign);
response_data_.keys[3].control.control_bits |=
htonl(wvoec::kControlAllowVerify);
response_data_.keys[2].key_data_length = wvoec::MAC_KEY_SIZE;
response_data_.keys[3].key_data_length = wvoec::MAC_KEY_SIZE;
FillCoreResponseSubstrings();
}
void LicenseRoundTrip::FillCoreResponseSubstrings() {
if (update_mac_keys_) {
core_response_.enc_mac_keys_iv = FindSubstring(
response_data_.mac_key_iv, sizeof(response_data_.mac_key_iv));
core_response_.enc_mac_keys =
FindSubstring(response_data_.mac_keys, sizeof(response_data_.mac_keys));
}
if (pst_.size() > 0) {
ASSERT_LE(pst_.size(), sizeof(response_data_.pst));
memcpy(response_data_.pst, pst_.c_str(),
min(sizeof(response_data_.pst), pst_.length()));
core_response_.pst = FindSubstring(response_data_.pst, pst_.size());
}
if (minimum_srm_version_ > 0) {
const std::string verification = "HDCPDATA";
ASSERT_EQ(verification.size(),
sizeof(response_data_.srm_restriction_data.verification));
memcpy(response_data_.srm_restriction_data.verification,
verification.c_str(), verification.size());
response_data_.srm_restriction_data.minimum_srm_version =
htonl(minimum_srm_version_);
core_response_.srm_restriction_data =
FindSubstring(&response_data_.srm_restriction_data,
sizeof(response_data_.srm_restriction_data));
}
core_response_.key_array_length = num_keys_;
key_array_.clear();
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < num_keys_; i++) {
OEMCrypto_KeyObject obj;
obj.key_id = FindSubstring(response_data_.keys[i].key_id,
response_data_.keys[i].key_id_length);
obj.key_data_iv = FindSubstring(response_data_.keys[i].key_iv,
sizeof(response_data_.keys[i].key_iv));
obj.key_data = FindSubstring(response_data_.keys[i].key_data,
response_data_.keys[i].key_data_length);
if (core_request().api_major_version < kClearControlBlockAPIMajor ||
(core_request().api_major_version == kClearControlBlockAPIMajor &&
core_request().api_minor_version < kClearControlBlockAPIMinor)) {
obj.key_control_iv =
FindSubstring(response_data_.keys[i].control_iv,
sizeof(response_data_.keys[i].control_iv));
} else {
obj.key_control_iv = FindSubstring(nullptr, 0);
}
obj.key_control = FindSubstring(&response_data_.keys[i].control,
sizeof(response_data_.keys[i].control));
key_array_.push_back(obj);
}
core_response_.key_array = key_array_.data();
core_response_.key_array_length = static_cast<uint32_t>(key_array_.size());
}
void LicenseRoundTrip::EncryptResponse(bool force_clear_kcb) {
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(session_->GenerateDerivedKeysFromSessionKey());
encrypted_response_data_ = response_data_;
uint8_t iv_buffer[KEY_IV_SIZE];
memcpy(iv_buffer, &response_data_.mac_key_iv[0], KEY_IV_SIZE);
session_->key_deriver().CBCEncrypt(
&response_data_.mac_keys[0], &encrypted_response_data_.mac_keys[0],
2 * MAC_KEY_SIZE, response_data_.mac_key_iv);
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < num_keys_; i++) {
// OEMCrypto Fuzzing skip encryption: key_data_length can be any number when
// called from fuzzer. We want to skip encryption if that happens and let
// LoadLicense be called with unencrypted data for that key. OEMCrypto
// Fuzzing skip encryption: key_data_length being a random value will
// encrypt data which is not expected to, there by leading to inefficient
// fuzzing.
if (!force_clear_kcb &&
response_data_.keys[i].key_data_length <=
sizeof(response_data_.keys[i].key_data) &&
response_data_.keys[i].key_data_length % 16 == 0) {
memcpy(iv_buffer, &response_data_.keys[i].control_iv[0], KEY_IV_SIZE);
if (core_request_.api_major_version < kClearControlBlockAPIMajor ||
(core_request_.api_major_version == kClearControlBlockAPIMajor &&
core_request_.api_minor_version < kClearControlBlockAPIMinor)) {
AES_KEY aes_key;
AES_set_encrypt_key(&response_data_.keys[i].key_data[0], 128, &aes_key);
AES_cbc_encrypt(
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&response_data_.keys[i].control),
reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(
&encrypted_response_data_.keys[i].control),
KEY_SIZE, &aes_key, iv_buffer, AES_ENCRYPT);
} else {
encrypted_response_data_.keys[i].control =
response_data_.keys[i].control;
}
session_->key_deriver().CBCEncrypt(
&response_data_.keys[i].key_data[0],
&encrypted_response_data_.keys[i].key_data[0],
response_data_.keys[i].key_data_length,
response_data_.keys[i].key_iv);
}
}
}
void LicenseRoundTrip::CreateCoreLicenseResponseWithFeatures(
const CoreMessageFeatures& features) {
if (core_request_.api_major_version == 0) {
// If we don't have a valid request, then we should at least set the
// version number of the request so that CreateCoreLicenseResponse can
// compute the version number of the response.
core_request_.api_major_version = ODK_MAJOR_VERSION;
core_request_.api_minor_version = ODK_MINOR_VERSION;
}
std::string request_hash_string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(request_hash_),
sizeof(request_hash_));
ASSERT_TRUE(oemcrypto_core_message::serialize::CreateCoreLicenseResponse(
features, core_response_, core_request_, request_hash_string,
&serialized_core_message_));
// Resize serialize core message to be just big enough or required core
// message size, whichever is larger.
serialized_core_message_.resize(
std::max(required_core_message_size_, serialized_core_message_.size()));
}
void LicenseRoundTrip::SignEncryptedResponse() {
// Make the message buffer a just big enough, or the
// required size, whichever is larger.
const size_t message_size =
std::max(required_message_size_, serialized_core_message_.size() +
sizeof(encrypted_response_data_));
// Stripe the encrypted message.
encrypted_response_.resize(message_size);
for (size_t i = 0; i < encrypted_response_.size(); i++) {
encrypted_response_[i] = i % 0x100;
}
ASSERT_GE(encrypted_response_.size(), serialized_core_message_.size());
memcpy(encrypted_response_.data(), serialized_core_message_.data(),
serialized_core_message_.size());
ASSERT_GE(encrypted_response_.size(),
serialized_core_message_.size() + sizeof(encrypted_response_data_));
memcpy(encrypted_response_.data() + serialized_core_message_.size(),
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&encrypted_response_data_),
sizeof(encrypted_response_data_));
session()->key_deriver().ServerSignBuffer(encrypted_response_.data(),
encrypted_response_.size(),
&response_signature_);
SetEncryptAndSignResponseLengths();
}
void LicenseRoundTrip::EncryptAndSignResponse() {
EncryptResponse();
// We might try to test a future api_version_, but we can only make a core
// message with at most the current ODK version. This is only done to verify
// that OEMCrypto does not attempt to load a future version.
CoreMessageFeatures features = CoreMessageFeatures::DefaultFeatures(
std::min(api_version_, static_cast<uint32_t>(ODK_MAJOR_VERSION)));
CreateCoreLicenseResponseWithFeatures(features);
SignEncryptedResponse();
}
void LicenseRoundTrip::EncryptAndSignResponseWithCoreMessageFeatures(
const CoreMessageFeatures& features, bool force_clear_kcb) {
EncryptResponse(force_clear_kcb);
CreateCoreLicenseResponseWithFeatures(features);
SignEncryptedResponse();
}
OEMCryptoResult LicenseRoundTrip::LoadResponse(Session* session) {
return LoadResponse(session, true);
}
OEMCryptoResult LicenseRoundTrip::LoadResponse(Session* session,
bool verify_keys) {
EXPECT_NE(session, nullptr);
// Write corpus for oemcrypto_load_license_fuzz. Fuzz script expects
// unecnrypted response from license server as input corpus data.
// Data will be encrypted and signed again explicitly by fuzzer script
// after mutations.
if (ShouldGenerateCorpus()) {
const std::string file_name =
GetFileName("oemcrypto_load_license_fuzz_seed_corpus");
// Corpus for license response fuzzer should be in the format:
// core_response + response_data + key_array.
AppendToFile(file_name, reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&core_response_),
sizeof(core_response_));
AppendToFile(file_name, reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&response_data_),
sizeof(response_data_));
AppendToFile(
file_name, reinterpret_cast<const char*>(core_response_.key_array),
core_response_.key_array_length * sizeof(*core_response_.key_array));
}
// Some tests adjust the offset to be beyond the length of the message. Here,
// we create a duplicate of the main message buffer so that these offsets do
// not point to garbage data. The goal is to make sure OEMCrypto is verifying
// that the offset points outside of the message -- we don't want OEMCrypto to
// look at what offset points to and return an error if the data is
// garbage. Since the memory after the message buffer is an exact copy of the
// message, we can increment the offset by the message size and get valid
// data.
VerifyEncryptAndSignResponseLengths();
std::vector<uint8_t> double_message = encrypted_response_;
double_message.insert(
double_message.end(),
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&encrypted_response_data_),
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&encrypted_response_data_) +
sizeof(encrypted_response_data_));
OEMCryptoResult result = OEMCrypto_LoadLicense(
session->session_id(), double_message.data(), encrypted_response_.size(),
serialized_core_message_.size(), response_signature_.data(),
response_signature_.size());
if (verify_keys && result == OEMCrypto_SUCCESS) {
// Give the session object a copy of the license truth data so that it can
// call GetKeyHandle, use key control information, and so that it has key
// data to verify decrypt operations.
session->set_license(response_data_);
// Also, if the license has new mac keys, then install them now.
if (core_response_.enc_mac_keys.length > 0) {
session->set_mac_keys(response_data_.mac_keys);
}
// Note: we verify content licenses here. For entitlement license, we verify
// the key control blocks after loading entitled content keys.
if (license_type_ == OEMCrypto_ContentLicense) VerifyTestKeys(session);
}
return result;
}
OEMCryptoResult LicenseRoundTrip::ReloadResponse(Session* session) {
session->GenerateDerivedKeysFromSessionKey();
return LoadResponse(session);
}
// This function verifies that the key control block reported by OEMCrypto agree
// with the truth key control block. Failures in this function probably
// indicate the OEMCrypto_LoadLicense did not correctly process the key
// control block.
void LicenseRoundTrip::VerifyTestKeys(Session* session) {
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < num_keys_; i++) {
KeyControlBlock block;
size_t size = sizeof(block);
OEMCryptoResult sts = OEMCrypto_QueryKeyControl(
session->session_id(), response_data_.keys[i].key_id,
response_data_.keys[i].key_id_length,
reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&block), &size);
if (sts != OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED) {
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, sts);
ASSERT_EQ(sizeof(block), size);
// Note: we do not assume that duration is stored with each key after v16.
// control bits stored in network byte order. For printing
// we change to host byte order.
ASSERT_EQ(htonl_fnc(response_data_.keys[i].control.control_bits),
htonl_fnc(block.control_bits))
<< "For key " << i;
}
}
}
void LicenseRoundTrip::SetKeyId(size_t index, const string& key_id) {
ASSERT_LT(index, num_keys_);
MessageKeyData& key = response_data_.keys[index];
key.key_id_length = key_id.length();
ASSERT_LE(key.key_id_length, kTestKeyIdMaxLength);
memcpy(key.key_id, key_id.data(), key.key_id_length);
}
void EntitledMessage::FillKeyArray() {
for (size_t i = 0; i < license_messages_->num_keys(); ++i) {
MakeOneKey(i);
}
}
void EntitledMessage::MakeOneKey(size_t entitlement_key_index) {
ASSERT_LT(entitlement_key_index, kMaxNumKeys);
ASSERT_LT(num_keys_, kMaxNumKeys);
EntitledContentKeyData* key_data = &entitled_key_data_[num_keys_];
MessageKeyData* entitlement_key =
&license_messages_->response_data().keys[entitlement_key_index];
OEMCrypto_EntitledContentKeyObject* offsets = &entitled_key_array_[num_keys_];
num_keys_++;
key_data->key_index = entitlement_key_index;
ASSERT_LE(entitlement_key->key_id_length, kTestKeyIdMaxLength);
memcpy(key_data->entitlement_key_id, entitlement_key->key_id,
entitlement_key->key_id_length);
key_data->entitlement_key_id_length = entitlement_key->key_id_length;
offsets->entitlement_key_id = FindSubstring(key_data->entitlement_key_id,
entitlement_key->key_id_length);
key_data->content_key_id_length = kDefaultKeyIdLength;
// Fill the key ID as CnCnCnCn... so it's easy to see in debug logs.
memset(key_data->content_key_id, 0xC0 + num_keys_,
key_data->content_key_id_length);
offsets->content_key_id =
FindSubstring(key_data->content_key_id, key_data->content_key_id_length);
EXPECT_EQ(1, GetRandBytes(key_data->content_key_data,
sizeof(key_data->content_key_data)));
// Note: we give the encrypted content key to OEMCrypto, not the clear
// content key.
offsets->content_key_data =
FindSubstring(key_data->encrypted_content_key_data,
sizeof(key_data->encrypted_content_key_data));
EXPECT_EQ(1, GetRandBytes(key_data->content_key_data_iv,
sizeof(key_data->content_key_data_iv)));
offsets->content_key_data_iv = FindSubstring(
key_data->content_key_data_iv, sizeof(key_data->content_key_data_iv));
}
OEMCrypto_EntitledContentKeyObject* EntitledMessage::entitled_key_array() {
return entitled_key_array_;
}
EntitledContentKeyData* EntitledMessage::entitled_key_data() {
return entitled_key_data_;
}
size_t EntitledMessage::entitled_key_data_size() {
return sizeof(entitled_key_data_);
}
void EntitledMessage::SetEntitlementKeyId(unsigned int index,
const std::string& key_id) {
ASSERT_LT(index, num_keys_);
ASSERT_LE(key_id.size(), kTestKeyIdMaxLength);
entitled_key_data_[index].entitlement_key_id_length = key_id.size();
memcpy(entitled_key_data_[index].entitlement_key_id,
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(key_id.c_str()), key_id.length());
entitled_key_array_[index].entitlement_key_id = FindSubstring(
entitled_key_data_[index].entitlement_key_id, key_id.length());
}
void EntitledMessage::SetContentKeyId(unsigned int index,
const std::string& key_id) {
ASSERT_LT(index, num_keys_);
ASSERT_LE(key_id.size(), kTestKeyIdMaxLength);
entitled_key_data_[index].content_key_id_length = key_id.size();
memcpy(entitled_key_data_[index].content_key_id,
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(key_id.c_str()), key_id.length());
entitled_key_array_[index].content_key_id =
FindSubstring(entitled_key_data_[index].content_key_id, key_id.length());
}
OEMCrypto_Substring EntitledMessage::FindSubstring(const void* ptr,
size_t size) {
OEMCrypto_Substring substring{0, 0};
if (ptr != nullptr) {
substring.offset = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(ptr) -
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(entitled_key_data_);
substring.length = size;
}
return substring;
}
void EntitledMessage::LoadKeys(bool expected_success) {
EncryptContentKey();
if (expected_success) {
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
OEMCrypto_LoadEntitledContentKeys(
entitled_key_session_,
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(entitled_key_data_),
sizeof(entitled_key_data_), num_keys_, entitled_key_array_));
} else {
ASSERT_NE(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
OEMCrypto_LoadEntitledContentKeys(
entitled_key_session_,
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(entitled_key_data_),
sizeof(entitled_key_data_), num_keys_, entitled_key_array_));
return;
}
VerifyKCBs();
VerifyDecrypt();
}
OEMCryptoResult EntitledMessage::LoadKeys(const vector<uint8_t>& message) {
return OEMCrypto_LoadEntitledContentKeys(entitled_key_session_,
message.data(), message.size(),
num_keys_, entitled_key_array_);
}
OEMCryptoResult EntitledMessage::LoadKeys() {
return OEMCrypto_LoadEntitledContentKeys(
entitled_key_session_,
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(entitled_key_data_),
sizeof(entitled_key_data_), num_keys_, entitled_key_array_);
}
void EntitledMessage::EncryptContentKey() {
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_keys_; ++i) {
EntitledContentKeyData* key_data = &entitled_key_data_[i];
const size_t entitlement_key_index = key_data->key_index;
MessageKeyData* entitlement_key =
&license_messages_->response_data().keys[entitlement_key_index];
// Load the entitlement key from |key_array_|.
AES_KEY aes_key;
AES_set_encrypt_key(entitlement_key->key_data, 256, &aes_key);
// Encrypt the content key with the entitlement key.
uint8_t iv[16];
memcpy(&iv[0], key_data->content_key_data_iv, KEY_IV_SIZE);
AES_cbc_encrypt(key_data->content_key_data,
key_data->encrypted_content_key_data, KEY_SIZE, &aes_key,
iv, AES_ENCRYPT);
}
if (ShouldGenerateCorpus()) {
const std::string file_name =
GetFileName("oemcrypto_load_entitled_content_keys_fuzz_seed_corpus");
// Corpus for load entitled keys fuzzer should be in the format:
// message buffer to be verified | entitled content key object array.
AppendToFile(file_name, reinterpret_cast<const char*>(entitled_key_data_),
num_keys_ * sizeof(EntitledContentKeyData));
AppendSeparator(file_name);
AppendToFile(file_name, reinterpret_cast<const char*>(entitled_key_array_),
num_keys_ * sizeof(OEMCrypto_EntitledContentKeyObject));
}
}
void EntitledMessage::LoadCasKeys(bool load_even, bool load_odd,
OEMCryptoResult expected_sts) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_keys_; ++i) {
EntitledContentKeyData* key_data = &entitled_key_data_[i];
const size_t entitlement_key_index = key_data->key_index;
MessageKeyData* entitlement_key =
&license_messages_->response_data().keys[entitlement_key_index];
// Load the entitlement key from |key_array_|.
AES_KEY aes_key;
AES_set_encrypt_key(entitlement_key->key_data, 256, &aes_key);
// Encrypt the content key with the entitlement key.
uint8_t iv[16];
memcpy(&iv[0], key_data->content_key_data_iv, KEY_IV_SIZE);
AES_cbc_encrypt(key_data->content_key_data,
key_data->encrypted_content_key_data, KEY_SIZE, &aes_key,
iv, AES_ENCRYPT);
}
// Convert the OEMCrypto_EntitledContentKeyObject to
// OEMCrypto_EntitledCasKeyObject. Only the first two key object is used.
OEMCrypto_EntitledContentKeyObject even_key;
OEMCrypto_EntitledContentKeyObject odd_key;
bool has_even = load_even && num_keys_ >= 1;
bool has_odd = load_odd && num_keys_ >= 2;
if (has_even) {
even_key.entitlement_key_id = entitled_key_array_[0].entitlement_key_id;
even_key.content_key_id = entitled_key_array_[0].content_key_id;
even_key.content_key_data_iv = entitled_key_array_[0].content_key_data_iv;
even_key.content_key_data = entitled_key_array_[0].content_key_data;
even_key.content_iv.length = 0;
}
if (has_odd) {
odd_key.entitlement_key_id = entitled_key_array_[1].entitlement_key_id;
odd_key.content_key_id = entitled_key_array_[1].content_key_id;
odd_key.content_key_data_iv = entitled_key_array_[1].content_key_data_iv;
odd_key.content_key_data = entitled_key_array_[1].content_key_data;
odd_key.content_iv.length = 0;
}
OEMCryptoResult sts = OEMCrypto_LoadCasECMKeys(
entitled_key_session_,
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(entitled_key_data_),
sizeof(entitled_key_data_), has_even ? &even_key : nullptr,
has_odd ? &odd_key : nullptr);
ASSERT_EQ(expected_sts, sts);
if (expected_sts != OEMCrypto_SUCCESS) {
return;
}
if (has_even) {
VerifyEntitlementTestKey(0);
}
if (has_odd) {
VerifyEntitlementTestKey(1);
}
}
// This function verifies that the key control blocks reported by OEMCrypto
// agree with the truth key control block. Failures in this function probably
// indicate the OEMCrypto_LoadEntitledKeys did not correctly process the key
// control block.
void EntitledMessage::VerifyKCBs() {
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < num_keys_; i++) {
VerifyEntitlementTestKey(i);
}
}
void EntitledMessage::VerifyEntitlementTestKey(size_t index) {
ASSERT_GE(num_keys_, index);
EntitledContentKeyData* key_data = &entitled_key_data_[index];
const size_t entitlement_key_index = key_data->key_index;
MessageKeyData* entitlement_key =
&license_messages_->response_data().keys[entitlement_key_index];
KeyControlBlock block;
size_t size = sizeof(block);
OEMCryptoResult sts =
OEMCrypto_QueryKeyControl(entitled_key_session_, key_data->content_key_id,
key_data->content_key_id_length,
reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&block), &size);
if (sts != OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED) {
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, sts);
ASSERT_EQ(sizeof(block), size);
// control duration and bits stored in network byte order. For printing
// we change to host byte order.
ASSERT_EQ((htonl_fnc(entitlement_key->control.duration)),
(htonl_fnc(block.duration)))
<< "For key " << index;
ASSERT_EQ(htonl_fnc(entitlement_key->control.control_bits),
htonl_fnc(block.control_bits))
<< "For key " << index;
}
}
void EntitledMessage::VerifyDecrypt() {
// Loop through all the keys and try decrypt with each one.
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < num_keys_; i++) {
const EntitledContentKeyData* const key_data = &entitled_key_data_[i];
vector<uint8_t> key_handle;
OEMCryptoResult result = GetKeyHandleIntoVector(
entitled_key_session_, key_data->content_key_id,
key_data->content_key_id_length, OEMCrypto_CipherMode_CENC, key_handle);
ASSERT_EQ(result, OEMCrypto_SUCCESS) << "For key " << i;
vector<uint8_t> expected_data;
vector<uint8_t> actual_data;
result = DecryptCTR(key_handle, key_data->content_key_data, &expected_data,
&actual_data);
EXPECT_EQ(result, OEMCrypto_SUCCESS) << "For key " << i;
EXPECT_EQ(actual_data, expected_data) << "For key " << i;
}
}
void RenewalRoundTrip::VerifyRequestSignature(
const vector<uint8_t>& data, const vector<uint8_t>& generated_signature,
size_t core_message_length) {
ASSERT_EQ(HMAC_SHA256_SIGNATURE_SIZE, generated_signature.size());
std::vector<uint8_t> expected_signature;
session()->key_deriver().ClientSignBuffer(data, &expected_signature);
ASSERT_EQ(expected_signature, generated_signature);
}
void RenewalRoundTrip::FillAndVerifyCoreRequest(
const std::string& core_message_string) {
if (is_release_) {
// For a release we expect that no core request was created.
EXPECT_FALSE(
oemcrypto_core_message::deserialize::CoreRenewalRequestFromMessage(
core_message_string, &core_request_));
} else {
EXPECT_TRUE(
oemcrypto_core_message::deserialize::CoreRenewalRequestFromMessage(
core_message_string, &core_request_));
EXPECT_EQ(license_messages_->api_version(),
core_request_.api_major_version);
EXPECT_EQ(license_messages_->core_request().nonce, core_request_.nonce);
EXPECT_EQ(license_messages_->core_request().session_id,
core_request_.session_id);
}
}
void RenewalRoundTrip::CreateDefaultResponse() {
if (is_release_) {
uint32_t control = 0;
uint32_t nonce = 0;
// A single key object with no key id should update all keys.
constexpr size_t index = 0;
response_data_.keys[index].key_id_length = 0;
response_data_.keys[index].key_id[0] = '\0';
const uint32_t renewal_api =
std::max<uint32_t>(core_request_.api_major_version, 15u);
std::string kcVersion = "kc" + std::to_string(renewal_api);
memcpy(response_data_.keys[index].control.verification, kcVersion.c_str(),
4);
const uint32_t duration = static_cast<uint32_t>(
license_messages_->core_response()
.timer_limits.initial_renewal_duration_seconds);
response_data_.keys[index].control.duration = htonl(duration);
response_data_.keys[index].control.nonce = htonl(nonce);
response_data_.keys[index].control.control_bits = htonl(control);
}
}
void RenewalRoundTrip::EncryptAndSignResponse() {
// Renewal messages are not encrypted.
encrypted_response_data_ = response_data_;
// Create a core response for a call to LoadRenewal.
// TODO(b/191724203): Test renewal server has different version from license
// server.
ASSERT_NE(license_messages_, nullptr);
CoreMessageFeatures features =
CoreMessageFeatures::DefaultFeatures(license_messages_->api_version());
ASSERT_TRUE(oemcrypto_core_message::serialize::CreateCoreRenewalResponse(
features, core_request_, renewal_duration_seconds_,
&serialized_core_message_));
// Resize serialize core message to be just big enough or required core
// message size, whichever is larger.
serialized_core_message_.resize(
std::max(required_core_message_size_, serialized_core_message_.size()));
// Make the message buffer a just big enough, or the
// required size, whichever is larger.
const size_t message_size =
std::max(required_message_size_, serialized_core_message_.size() +
sizeof(encrypted_response_data_));
// Stripe the encrypted message.
encrypted_response_.resize(message_size);
for (size_t i = 0; i < encrypted_response_.size(); i++) {
encrypted_response_[i] = i % 0x100;
}
// Concatenate the core message and the response.
ASSERT_GE(encrypted_response_.size(), serialized_core_message_.size());
memcpy(encrypted_response_.data(), serialized_core_message_.data(),
serialized_core_message_.size());
ASSERT_GE(encrypted_response_.size(),
serialized_core_message_.size() + sizeof(encrypted_response_data_));
memcpy(encrypted_response_.data() + serialized_core_message_.size(),
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&encrypted_response_data_),
sizeof(encrypted_response_data_));
session()->key_deriver().ServerSignBuffer(encrypted_response_.data(),
encrypted_response_.size(),
&response_signature_);
SetEncryptAndSignResponseLengths();
}
void RenewalRoundTrip::InjectFuzzedResponseData(
OEMCrypto_Renewal_Response_Fuzz& fuzzed_data,
const uint8_t* renewal_response, const size_t renewal_response_size) {
// TODO(b/191724203): Test renewal server has different version from license
// server.
ASSERT_NE(license_messages_, nullptr);
CoreMessageFeatures features =
CoreMessageFeatures::DefaultFeatures(license_messages_->api_version());
// Serializing core message.
// This call also sets nonce in core response to match with session nonce.
oemcrypto_core_message::serialize::CreateCoreRenewalResponse(
features, fuzzed_data.core_request, fuzzed_data.renewal_duration_seconds,
&serialized_core_message_);
// Copy serialized core message and encrypted response from data and
// calculate signature. Now we will have a valid signature for data
// generated by fuzzer.
encrypted_response_.assign(serialized_core_message_.begin(),
serialized_core_message_.end());
encrypted_response_.insert(encrypted_response_.end(), renewal_response,
renewal_response + renewal_response_size);
session()->key_deriver().ServerSignBuffer(encrypted_response_.data(),
encrypted_response_.size(),
&response_signature_);
}
OEMCryptoResult RenewalRoundTrip::LoadResponse(Session* session) {
// Write corpus for oemcrypto_load_renewal_fuzz. Fuzz script expects
// encrypted response from Renewal server as input corpus data.
// Data will be signed again explicitly by fuzzer script after mutations.
if (ShouldGenerateCorpus()) {
const std::string file_name =
GetFileName("oemcrypto_load_renewal_fuzz_seed_corpus");
// Corpus for renewal response fuzzer should be in the format:
// OEMCrypto_Renewal_Response_Fuzz + license_renewal_response.
OEMCrypto_Renewal_Response_Fuzz renewal_response_fuzz;
renewal_response_fuzz.core_request = core_request_;
renewal_response_fuzz.renewal_duration_seconds = renewal_duration_seconds_;
AppendToFile(file_name,
reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&renewal_response_fuzz),
sizeof(renewal_response_fuzz));
AppendToFile(file_name,
reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&encrypted_response_data_),
sizeof(encrypted_response_data_));
}
VerifyEncryptAndSignResponseLengths();
return OEMCrypto_LoadRenewal(
session->session_id(), encrypted_response_.data(),
encrypted_response_.size(), serialized_core_message_.size(),
response_signature_.data(), response_signature_.size());
}
std::unordered_map<util::EccCurve, std::unique_ptr<util::EccPrivateKey>,
std::hash<int>>
Session::server_ephemeral_keys_;
std::mutex Session::ephemeral_key_map_lock_;
Session::Session() {}
Session::~Session() {
if (!forced_session_id_ && open_) close();
}
void Session::open() {
EXPECT_FALSE(forced_session_id_);
EXPECT_FALSE(open_);
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, OEMCrypto_OpenSession(&session_id_));
open_ = true;
}
void Session::SetSessionId(uint32_t session_id) {
EXPECT_FALSE(open_);
session_id_ = session_id;
forced_session_id_ = true;
}
void Session::close() {
EXPECT_TRUE(open_ || forced_session_id_);
if (open_) {
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, OEMCrypto_CloseSession(session_id_));
}
forced_session_id_ = false;
open_ = false;
}
void Session::GenerateNonce(int* error_counter) {
// We make one attempt. If it fails, we assume there was a nonce flood.
if (OEMCrypto_SUCCESS == OEMCrypto_GenerateNonce(session_id(), &nonce_)) {
return;
}
if (error_counter) {
(*error_counter)++;
} else {
wvutil::TestSleep::Sleep(1); // wait a second, then try again.
// The following is after a 1 second pause, so it cannot be from a nonce
// flood.
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
OEMCrypto_GenerateNonce(session_id(), &nonce_));
}
}
void Session::FillDefaultContext(vector<uint8_t>* mac_context,
vector<uint8_t>* enc_context) {
/* Context strings
* These context strings are normally created by the CDM layer
* from a license request message.
* They are used to test MAC and ENC key generation.
*/
*mac_context = wvutil::a2b_hex(
"41555448454e5449434154494f4e000a4c08001248000000020000101907d9ff"
"de13aa95c122678053362136bdf8408f8276e4c2d87ec52b61aa1b9f646e5873"
"4930acebe899b3e464189a14a87202fb02574e70640bd22ef44b2d7e3912250a"
"230a14080112100915007caa9b5931b76a3a85f046523e10011a093938373635"
"34333231180120002a0c31383836373837343035000000000200");
*enc_context = wvutil::a2b_hex(
"454e4352595054494f4e000a4c08001248000000020000101907d9ffde13aa95"
"c122678053362136bdf8408f8276e4c2d87ec52b61aa1b9f646e58734930aceb"
"e899b3e464189a14a87202fb02574e70640bd22ef44b2d7e3912250a230a1408"
"0112100915007caa9b5931b76a3a85f046523e10011a09393837363534333231"
"180120002a0c31383836373837343035000000000080");
}
// This should only be called if the device uses Provisioning 2.0. A failure in
// this function is probably caused by a bad keybox.
void Session::GenerateDerivedKeysFromKeybox(
const wvoec::WidevineKeybox& keybox) {
vector<uint8_t> mac_context;
vector<uint8_t> enc_context;
FillDefaultContext(&mac_context, &enc_context);
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
OEMCrypto_GenerateDerivedKeys(
session_id(), mac_context.data(), mac_context.size(),
enc_context.data(), enc_context.size()));
key_deriver_.DeriveKeys(keybox.device_key_, sizeof(keybox.device_key_),
mac_context, enc_context);
}
void Session::GenerateDerivedKeysFromSessionKey() {
// Uses test certificate.
vector<uint8_t> session_key;
vector<uint8_t> enc_session_key;
ASSERT_TRUE(public_rsa_ || public_ec_)
<< "No public RSA/ECC key loaded in test code";
// A failure here probably indicates that there is something wrong with the
// test program and its dependency on BoringSSL.
ASSERT_TRUE(GenerateSessionKey(&session_key, &enc_session_key));
vector<uint8_t> mac_context;
vector<uint8_t> enc_context;
FillDefaultContext(&mac_context, &enc_context);
// A failure here is probably caused by having the wrong RSA key loaded.
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
OEMCrypto_DeriveKeysFromSessionKey(
session_id(), enc_session_key.data(), enc_session_key.size(),
mac_context.data(), mac_context.size(), enc_context.data(),
enc_context.size()));
key_deriver_.DeriveKeys(session_key.data(), session_key.size(), mac_context,
enc_context);
}
void Session::TestDecryptCTR(bool get_fresh_key_handle_first,
OEMCryptoResult expected_result,
size_t key_index) {
OEMCryptoResult getkeyhandle_result = OEMCrypto_SUCCESS;
if (get_fresh_key_handle_first) {
// Select the key (from FillSimpleMessage)
getkeyhandle_result = GetKeyHandle(key_handle_, key_index);
}
vector<uint8_t> unencrypted_data;
vector<uint8_t> output_buffer;
const OEMCryptoResult decrypt_result =
DecryptCTR(key_handle_, license_.keys[key_index].key_data,
&unencrypted_data, &output_buffer);
// We only have a few errors that we test are reported.
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(
TestDecryptResult(expected_result, getkeyhandle_result, decrypt_result))
<< "Either GetKeyHandle or DecryptCENC should return " << expected_result
<< ", but they returned " << getkeyhandle_result << " and "
<< decrypt_result << ", respectively.";
if (expected_result == OEMCrypto_SUCCESS) { // No error.
ASSERT_EQ(unencrypted_data, output_buffer);
} else {
ASSERT_NE(unencrypted_data, output_buffer);
}
}
void Session::TestDecryptEntitled(OEMCryptoResult expected_result,
OEMCrypto_SESSION session_id,
const uint8_t* content_key_id,
size_t content_key_id_length) {
// Select the key (from FillSimpleMessage)
const OEMCryptoResult getkeyhandle_result =
GetKeyHandleIntoVector(session_id, content_key_id, content_key_id_length,
OEMCrypto_CipherMode_CENC, key_handle_);
vector<uint8_t> unencrypted_data;
vector<uint8_t> output_buffer;
vector<uint8_t> encrypted_data(kTestSubsampleSectionSize);
vector<uint8_t> in_buffer(256);
vector<uint8_t> out_buffer(in_buffer.size());
OEMCrypto_SampleDescription sample_description;
OEMCrypto_SubSampleDescription subsample_description;
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(GenerateSimpleSampleDescription(
in_buffer, out_buffer, &sample_description, &subsample_description));
OEMCrypto_CENCEncryptPatternDesc pattern = {0, 0};
EncryptCTR(unencrypted_data, content_key_id, &sample_description.iv[0],
&encrypted_data);
// Try to decrypt the data with oemcrypto session id.
const OEMCryptoResult decrypt_result = OEMCrypto_DecryptCENC(
key_handle_.data(), key_handle_.size(), &sample_description, 1, &pattern);
// We only have a few errors that we test are reported.
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(
TestDecryptResult(expected_result, getkeyhandle_result, decrypt_result))
<< "Either GetKeyHandle or DecryptCENC should return" << expected_result
<< ", but they returned " << getkeyhandle_result << " and "
<< decrypt_result << ", respectively.";
}
OEMCryptoResult Session::GetKeyHandle(vector<uint8_t>& key_handle,
size_t key_index,
OEMCryptoCipherMode cipher_mode) {
return GetKeyHandleIntoVector(session_id(), license_.keys[key_index].key_id,
license_.keys[key_index].key_id_length,
cipher_mode, key_handle);
}
void Session::TestDecryptResult(OEMCryptoResult expected_result,
OEMCryptoResult actual_getkeyhandle_result,
OEMCryptoResult actual_decrypt_result) {
// In most cases, we expect the result to come from either the select key or
// from the decrypt call.
if (expected_result == OEMCrypto_SUCCESS) { // No error.
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, actual_getkeyhandle_result);
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, actual_decrypt_result);
} else if (expected_result == OEMCrypto_ERROR_KEY_EXPIRED ||
expected_result == OEMCrypto_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_HDCP ||
expected_result == OEMCrypto_ERROR_ANALOG_OUTPUT) {
// Key expired or output problems may be reported from select key or
// decrypt, but must be reported.
ASSERT_TRUE(actual_getkeyhandle_result == expected_result ||
actual_decrypt_result == expected_result);
} else if (expected_result == OEMCrypto_WARNING_MIXED_OUTPUT_PROTECTION) {
// OEMCrypto is allowed to report either this warning or
// OEMCrypto_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_HDCP depending on if it can disable
// restricted displays.
ASSERT_TRUE(
actual_getkeyhandle_result ==
OEMCrypto_WARNING_MIXED_OUTPUT_PROTECTION ||
actual_getkeyhandle_result == OEMCrypto_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_HDCP ||
actual_decrypt_result == OEMCrypto_WARNING_MIXED_OUTPUT_PROTECTION ||
actual_decrypt_result == OEMCrypto_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_HDCP);
} else {
// OEM's can fine tune other error codes for debugging.
ASSERT_TRUE(actual_getkeyhandle_result != OEMCrypto_SUCCESS ||
actual_decrypt_result != OEMCrypto_SUCCESS);
}
}
void Session::TestGetKeyHandleExpired(size_t key_index) {
if (global_features.api_version >= 13) {
OEMCryptoResult status = GetKeyHandle(key_handle_, key_index);
// It is OK for GetKeyHandle to succeed with an expired key, but if there is
// an error, it must be OEMCrypto_ERROR_KEY_EXIRED.
if (status != OEMCrypto_SUCCESS) {
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_ERROR_KEY_EXPIRED, status);
}
}
}
void Session::LoadOEMCert(bool verify_cert) {
// Get the OEM Public Cert from OEMCrypto
vector<uint8_t> public_cert;
size_t public_cert_length = 0;
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER,
OEMCrypto_GetOEMPublicCertificate(nullptr, &public_cert_length));
ASSERT_LT(0u, public_cert_length);
public_cert.resize(public_cert_length);
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, OEMCrypto_GetOEMPublicCertificate(
public_cert.data(), &public_cert_length));
public_cert.resize(public_cert_length);
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, OEMCrypto_LoadOEMPrivateKey(session_id()));
// The cert is a PKCS7 signed data type. First, parse it into an OpenSSL
// structure and find the certificate list.
//
// We must make defensive copies of public_cert's properties because of how
// d2i_PKCS7() works.
const unsigned char* cert_data =
reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(public_cert.data());
long cert_size = static_cast<long>(public_cert.size());
boringssl_ptr<PKCS7, PKCS7_free> pkcs7(
d2i_PKCS7(nullptr, &cert_data, cert_size));
ASSERT_TRUE(pkcs7.NotNull()) << "Error parsing PKCS7 message";
ASSERT_TRUE(PKCS7_type_is_signed(pkcs7.get()))
<< "Unexpected PKCS7 message type";
STACK_OF(X509)* certs = pkcs7->d.sign->cert;
// Load the public cert's key into public_rsa_ and verify, if requested
for (size_t i = 0; certs && i < static_cast<size_t>(sk_X509_num(certs));
++i) {
X509* x509_cert = sk_X509_value(certs, static_cast<int>(i));
boringssl_ptr<EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_free> pubkey(X509_get_pubkey(x509_cert));
ASSERT_TRUE(pubkey.NotNull());
if (i == 0) {
public_rsa_ =
util::RsaPublicKey::FromSslHandle(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pubkey.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(public_rsa_)
<< "Failed to extract public RSA key from OEM certificate";
return;
}
if (verify_cert) {
vector<char> buffer(80);
X509_NAME* name = X509_get_subject_name(x509_cert);
printf(" OEM Certificate Name: %s\n",
X509_NAME_oneline(name, buffer.data(),
static_cast<int>(buffer.size())));
boringssl_ptr<X509_STORE, X509_STORE_free> store(X509_STORE_new());
ASSERT_TRUE(store.NotNull());
boringssl_ptr<X509_STORE_CTX, X509_STORE_CTX_free> store_ctx(
X509_STORE_CTX_new());
ASSERT_TRUE(store_ctx.NotNull());
X509_STORE_CTX_init(store_ctx.get(), store.get(), x509_cert, nullptr);
// TODO(fredgc): Verify cert is signed by Google.
int result = X509_verify_cert(store_ctx.get());
ASSERT_GE(0, result) << " OEM Cert not valid. "
<< X509_verify_cert_error_string(
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(store_ctx.get()));
if (result == 0) {
printf("Cert not verified: %s.\n",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(store_ctx.get())));
}
}
}
}
void Session::SetTestRsaPublicKey() {
public_ec_.reset();
public_rsa_ = util::RsaPublicKey::LoadPrivateKeyInfo(
kTestRSAPKCS8PrivateKeyInfo2_2048,
sizeof(kTestRSAPKCS8PrivateKeyInfo2_2048));
ASSERT_TRUE(public_rsa_) << "Could not parse test RSA public key #2";
}
void Session::SetPublicKeyFromPrivateKeyInfo(OEMCrypto_PrivateKeyType key_type,
const uint8_t* buffer,
size_t length) {
switch (key_type) {
case OEMCrypto_RSA_Private_Key:
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(
SetRsaPublicKeyFromPrivateKeyInfo(buffer, length));
return;
case OEMCrypto_ECC_Private_Key:
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(
SetEccPublicKeyFromPrivateKeyInfo(buffer, length));
return;
}
FAIL() << "Unknown key type: " << static_cast<int>(key_type);
}
void Session::SetRsaPublicKeyFromPrivateKeyInfo(const uint8_t* buffer,
size_t length) {
public_ec_.reset();
public_rsa_ = util::RsaPublicKey::LoadPrivateKeyInfo(buffer, length);
ASSERT_TRUE(public_rsa_) << "Could not parse RSA public key";
}
void Session::SetEccPublicKeyFromPrivateKeyInfo(const uint8_t* buffer,
size_t length) {
public_rsa_.reset();
public_ec_ = util::EccPublicKey::LoadPrivateKeyInfo(buffer, length);
ASSERT_TRUE(public_ec_) << "Could not parse ECC public key";
}
void Session::SetPublicKeyFromSubjectPublicKey(
OEMCrypto_PrivateKeyType key_type, const uint8_t* buffer, size_t length) {
switch (key_type) {
case OEMCrypto_RSA_Private_Key:
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(
SetRsaPublicKeyFromSubjectPublicKey(buffer, length));
return;
case OEMCrypto_ECC_Private_Key:
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(
SetEccPublicKeyFromSubjectPublicKey(buffer, length));
return;
}
FAIL() << "Unknown key type: " << static_cast<int>(key_type);
}
void Session::SetRsaPublicKeyFromSubjectPublicKey(const uint8_t* buffer,
size_t length) {
public_ec_.reset();
public_rsa_ = util::RsaPublicKey::Load(buffer, length);
ASSERT_TRUE(public_rsa_) << "Could not parse RSA public key";
}
void Session::SetEccPublicKeyFromSubjectPublicKey(const uint8_t* buffer,
size_t length) {
public_rsa_.reset();
public_ec_ = util::EccPublicKey::Load(buffer, length);
ASSERT_TRUE(public_ec_) << "Could not parse ECC public key";
}
void Session::VerifyRsaSignature(const vector<uint8_t>& message,
const uint8_t* signature,
size_t signature_length,
RSA_Padding_Scheme padding_scheme) {
ASSERT_TRUE(public_rsa_) << "No public RSA key loaded in test code";
if (padding_scheme != kSign_RSASSA_PSS &&
padding_scheme != kSign_PKCS1_Block1) {
FAIL() << "Padding scheme not supported: " << padding_scheme;
return;
}
const util::RsaSignatureAlgorithm algorithm =
padding_scheme == kSign_RSASSA_PSS ? util::kRsaPssDefault
: util::kRsaPkcs1Cast;
OEMCrypto_SignatureHashAlgorithm hash_algorithm = OEMCrypto_SHA1;
if (algorithm == util::kRsaPssDefault) {
ASSERT_THAT(
OEMCrypto_GetSignatureHashAlgorithm(session_id(), &hash_algorithm),
AnyOf(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED));
}
const OEMCryptoResult result =
public_rsa_->VerifySignature(message.data(), message.size(), signature,
signature_length, algorithm, hash_algorithm);
ASSERT_EQ(result, OEMCrypto_SUCCESS) << "RSA signature check failed";
}
void Session::VerifyEccSignature(const vector<uint8_t>& message,
const uint8_t* signature,
size_t signature_length) {
ASSERT_TRUE(public_ec_) << "No public ECC key loaded in test code";
const OEMCryptoResult result = public_ec_->VerifySignature(
message.data(), message.size(), signature, signature_length);
ASSERT_EQ(result, OEMCrypto_SUCCESS) << "ECC signature check failed";
}
void Session::VerifySignature(const vector<uint8_t>& message,
const uint8_t* signature, size_t signature_length,
RSA_Padding_Scheme padding_scheme) {
if (public_rsa_ != nullptr) {
return VerifyRsaSignature(message, signature, signature_length,
padding_scheme);
} else if (public_ec_ != nullptr) {
return VerifyEccSignature(message, signature, signature_length);
}
FAIL() << "No public RSA or ECC key loaded in test code";
}
bool Session::GenerateRsaSessionKey(vector<uint8_t>* session_key,
vector<uint8_t>* enc_session_key) {
if (!public_rsa_) {
cerr << "No public RSA key loaded in test code\n";
return false;
}
*session_key = wvutil::a2b_hex("6fa479c731d2770b6a61a5d1420bb9d1");
*enc_session_key = public_rsa_->EncryptSessionKey(*session_key);
return !enc_session_key->empty();
}
bool Session::GenerateEccSessionKey(vector<uint8_t>* session_key,
vector<uint8_t>* ecdh_public_key_data) {
if (!public_ec_) {
cerr << "No public ECC key loaded in test code\n";
return false;
}
std::unique_lock<std::mutex> lock(Session::ephemeral_key_map_lock_);
const util::EccCurve curve = public_ec_->curve();
if (server_ephemeral_keys_.count(curve) == 0) {
server_ephemeral_keys_[curve] = util::EccPrivateKey::New(curve);
}
if (server_ephemeral_keys_.count(curve) == 0) {
cerr << "Failed to find/create server ECC key for curve "
<< util::EccCurveToString(curve) << std::endl;
return false;
}
*session_key = server_ephemeral_keys_[curve]->DeriveSessionKey(*public_ec_);
if (session_key->empty()) {
return false;
}
*ecdh_public_key_data = server_ephemeral_keys_[curve]->SerializeAsPublicKey();
if (ecdh_public_key_data->empty()) {
session_key->clear();
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool Session::GenerateSessionKey(vector<uint8_t>* session_key,
vector<uint8_t>* key_material) {
if (public_rsa_ != nullptr) {
return GenerateRsaSessionKey(session_key, key_material);
} else if (public_ec_ != nullptr) {
return GenerateEccSessionKey(session_key, key_material);
}
cerr << "No public RSA or ECC key loaded in test code\n";
return false;
}
void Session::LoadWrappedDrmKey(OEMCrypto_PrivateKeyType key_type,
const vector<uint8_t>& wrapped_drm_key) {
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
OEMCrypto_LoadDRMPrivateKey(session_id(), key_type,
wrapped_drm_key.data(),
wrapped_drm_key.size()));
}
void Session::LoadWrappedRsaDrmKey(const vector<uint8_t>& wrapped_rsa_key) {
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(
LoadWrappedDrmKey(OEMCrypto_RSA_Private_Key, wrapped_rsa_key));
}
void Session::LoadWrappedEccDrmKey(const vector<uint8_t>& wrapped_ecc_key) {
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(
LoadWrappedDrmKey(OEMCrypto_ECC_Private_Key, wrapped_ecc_key));
}
void Session::CreateNewUsageEntry(OEMCryptoResult* status) {
OEMCryptoResult result =
OEMCrypto_CreateNewUsageEntry(session_id(), &usage_entry_number_);
if (status) {
*status = result;
return;
}
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, result);
}
void Session::UpdateUsageEntry(std::vector<uint8_t>* header_buffer) {
size_t header_buffer_length = 0;
size_t entry_buffer_length = 0;
ASSERT_EQ(
OEMCrypto_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER,
OEMCrypto_UpdateUsageEntry(session_id(), nullptr, &header_buffer_length,
nullptr, &entry_buffer_length));
ASSERT_LT(0u, header_buffer_length);
header_buffer->resize(header_buffer_length);
ASSERT_LT(0u, entry_buffer_length);
encrypted_usage_entry_.resize(entry_buffer_length);
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
OEMCrypto_UpdateUsageEntry(
session_id(), header_buffer->data(), &header_buffer_length,
encrypted_usage_entry_.data(), &entry_buffer_length));
header_buffer->resize(header_buffer_length);
encrypted_usage_entry_.resize(entry_buffer_length);
}
void Session::LoadUsageEntry(uint32_t index, const vector<uint8_t>& buffer) {
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
OEMCrypto_LoadUsageEntry(session_id(), index, buffer.data(),
buffer.size()));
}
void Session::MoveUsageEntry(uint32_t new_index,
std::vector<uint8_t>* header_buffer,
OEMCryptoResult expect_result) {
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(open());
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(ReloadUsageEntry());
ASSERT_EQ(expect_result, OEMCrypto_MoveEntry(session_id(), new_index));
if (expect_result == OEMCrypto_SUCCESS) {
usage_entry_number_ = new_index;
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(UpdateUsageEntry(header_buffer));
}
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(close());
}
void Session::GenerateReport(const std::string& pst,
OEMCryptoResult expected_result, Session* other) {
ASSERT_TRUE(open_);
if (other) { // If other is specified, copy mac keys.
key_deriver_ = other->key_deriver_;
}
size_t length = 0;
OEMCryptoResult sts = OEMCrypto_ReportUsage(
session_id(), reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(pst.c_str()), pst.length(),
pst_report_buffer_.data(), &length);
if (expected_result == OEMCrypto_SUCCESS) {
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER, sts);
}
if (sts == OEMCrypto_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER) {
pst_report_buffer_.assign(length, 0xFF); // Fill with garbage values.
}
sts = OEMCrypto_ReportUsage(session_id(),
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(pst.c_str()),
pst.length(), pst_report_buffer_.data(), &length);
ASSERT_EQ(expected_result, sts);
if (expected_result != OEMCrypto_SUCCESS) {
return;
}
pst_report_buffer_.resize(length);
EXPECT_EQ(wvutil::Unpacked_PST_Report::report_size(pst.length()), length);
vector<uint8_t> computed_signature(SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
key_deriver_.ClientSignPstReport(pst_report_buffer_, &computed_signature);
EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(computed_signature.data(), pst_report().signature(),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH));
EXPECT_GE(kInactiveUnused, pst_report().status());
EXPECT_GE(kHardwareSecureClock, pst_report().clock_security_level());
EXPECT_EQ(pst.length(), pst_report().pst_length());
EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(pst.c_str(), pst_report().pst(), pst.length()));
}
void Session::VerifyPST(const Test_PST_Report& expected) {
wvutil::Unpacked_PST_Report computed = pst_report();
EXPECT_EQ(expected.status, computed.status());
char* pst_ptr = reinterpret_cast<char*>(computed.pst());
std::string computed_pst(pst_ptr, pst_ptr + computed.pst_length());
ASSERT_EQ(expected.pst, computed_pst);
int64_t now = wvutil::Clock().GetCurrentTime();
int64_t age = now - expected.time_created; // How old is this report.
EXPECT_NEAR(expected.seconds_since_license_received + age,
computed.seconds_since_license_received(), kTimeTolerance);
// Decrypt times only valid on licenses that have been active.
if (expected.status == kActive || expected.status == kInactiveUsed) {
EXPECT_NEAR(expected.seconds_since_first_decrypt + age,
computed.seconds_since_first_decrypt(),
kUsageTableTimeTolerance);
EXPECT_NEAR(expected.seconds_since_last_decrypt + age,
computed.seconds_since_last_decrypt(),
kUsageTableTimeTolerance);
}
std::vector<uint8_t> signature(SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
key_deriver_.ClientSignPstReport(pst_report_buffer_, &signature);
EXPECT_EQ(0,
memcmp(computed.signature(), signature.data(), SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH));
}
void Session::VerifyReport(Test_PST_Report expected,
int64_t time_license_received,
int64_t time_first_decrypt,
int64_t time_last_decrypt) {
const int64_t now = wvutil::Clock().GetCurrentTime();
expected.seconds_since_license_received =
(time_license_received > 0 && time_license_received < now)
? now - time_license_received
: 0;
expected.seconds_since_first_decrypt =
(time_first_decrypt > 0 && time_first_decrypt < now)
? now - time_first_decrypt
: 0;
expected.seconds_since_last_decrypt =
(time_last_decrypt > 0 && time_last_decrypt < now)
? now - time_last_decrypt
: 0;
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(VerifyPST(expected));
}
bool ConvertByteToValidBoolean(const bool* in) {
const char* buf = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(in);
for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(bool); i++) {
if (buf[i]) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
template <class CoreRequest>
void WriteRequestApiCorpus(size_t signature_length, size_t core_message_length,
vector<uint8_t>& data) {
std::string file_name;
if (std::is_same<CoreRequest,
oemcrypto_core_message::ODK_LicenseRequest>::value) {
file_name = GetFileName("oemcrypto_license_request_fuzz_seed_corpus");
} else if (std::is_same<
CoreRequest,
oemcrypto_core_message::ODK_ProvisioningRequest>::value) {
file_name = GetFileName("oemcrypto_provisioning_request_fuzz_seed_corpus");
} else if (std::is_same<CoreRequest,
oemcrypto_core_message::ODK_RenewalRequest>::value) {
file_name = GetFileName("oemcrypto_renewal_request_fuzz_seed_corpus");
} else {
LOGE("Invalid CoreRequest type while writing request api corups.");
}
// Corpus for request APIs should be signature_length + core_message_length +
// data pointer.
OEMCrypto_Request_Fuzz request_fuzz_struct;
request_fuzz_struct.core_message_length = core_message_length;
request_fuzz_struct.signature_length = signature_length;
AppendToFile(file_name, reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&request_fuzz_struct),
sizeof(OEMCrypto_Request_Fuzz));
AppendToFile(file_name, reinterpret_cast<const char*>(data.data()),
data.size());
}
OEMCryptoResult GetKeyHandleIntoVector(OEMCrypto_SESSION session,
const uint8_t* key_id,
size_t key_id_length,
OEMCryptoCipherMode cipher_mode,
vector<uint8_t>& key_handle) {
size_t key_handle_length = 0;
const OEMCryptoResult result = OEMCrypto_GetKeyHandle(
session, key_id, key_id_length, cipher_mode, nullptr, &key_handle_length);
if (result == OEMCrypto_SUCCESS) {
LOGE(
"OEMCrypto_GetKeyHandle returned SUCCESS despite getting no key handle "
"buffer");
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
} else if (result != OEMCrypto_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER) {
return result;
}
key_handle.resize(key_handle_length);
return OEMCrypto_GetKeyHandle(session, key_id, key_id_length, cipher_mode,
key_handle.data(), &key_handle_length);
}
} // namespace wvoec
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