f22cd20466
[ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/105025 ] Clang and GCC allow for warnings against the arguments for printf-like functions (e.i. LOGx). These validate that the format type specified in the format string match the corresponding argument type. Most of the time, format specifer errors are benign; hence why they haven't been seen as an error so far. However, with the enabling of specifier warnings and the enabling of warnings as errors on certain platforms, these existing errors need to be addressed. This CL enables format specifier warnings for most of the Widevine code, with the OEMCrypto L3 implementation which has a single error which requires a fix in the haystack code before being fixed in the Widevine branch. Strict format string warnings are not enabled for non-LP64 systems. Bug: 137583127 Test: Compiled for Linux and Android Change-Id: I051398332d31a20457b86563a90ad8f6d428445f
705 lines
28 KiB
C++
705 lines
28 KiB
C++
// Copyright 2018 Google LLC. All Rights Reserved. This file and proprietary
|
|
// source code may only be used and distributed under the Widevine Master
|
|
// License Agreement.
|
|
//
|
|
// Reference implementation of OEMCrypto APIs
|
|
//
|
|
#include "oemcrypto_usage_table_ref.h"
|
|
|
|
#include <string.h>
|
|
#include <time.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <string>
|
|
#include <vector>
|
|
|
|
#include <openssl/aes.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/rand.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/sha.h>
|
|
|
|
#include "file_store.h"
|
|
#include "log.h"
|
|
#include "odk.h"
|
|
#include "oemcrypto_engine_ref.h"
|
|
// TODO(fredgc): Setting the device files base bath is currently broken as
|
|
// wvcdm::Properties is no longer used by the reference code.
|
|
//#include "properties.h"
|
|
#include "pst_report.h"
|
|
#include "string_conversions.h"
|
|
|
|
namespace wvoec_ref {
|
|
namespace {
|
|
const size_t kMagicLength = 8;
|
|
const char* kEntryVerification = "USEENTRY";
|
|
const char* kHeaderVerification = "USEHEADR";
|
|
// Offset into a signed block where we start encrypting. We need to
|
|
// skip the signature and the iv.
|
|
const size_t kEncryptionOffset = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
// A structure that holds an usage entry and its signature.
|
|
struct SignedEntryBlock {
|
|
uint8_t signature[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
|
uint8_t iv[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
|
uint8_t verification[kMagicLength];
|
|
StoredUsageEntry data;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// This has the data in the header of constant size. There is also an array
|
|
// of generation numbers.
|
|
struct SignedHeaderBlock {
|
|
uint8_t signature[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
|
uint8_t iv[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
|
uint8_t verification[kMagicLength];
|
|
int64_t master_generation;
|
|
uint64_t count;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
} // namespace
|
|
|
|
UsageTableEntry::UsageTableEntry(UsageTable* table, uint32_t index,
|
|
int64_t generation)
|
|
: usage_table_(table), recent_decrypt_(false), forbid_report_(true) {
|
|
memset(&data_, 0, sizeof(data_));
|
|
data_.generation_number = generation;
|
|
data_.index = index;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
UsageTableEntry::~UsageTableEntry() { usage_table_->ReleaseEntry(data_.index); }
|
|
|
|
OEMCryptoResult UsageTableEntry::SetPST(const uint8_t* pst, size_t pst_length) {
|
|
if (pst_length > kMaxPSTLength) return OEMCrypto_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE;
|
|
data_.pst_length = pst_length;
|
|
if (!pst || !pst_length) return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT;
|
|
memcpy(data_.pst, pst, pst_length);
|
|
data_.time_of_license_received = usage_table_->ce_->SystemTime();
|
|
return OEMCrypto_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool UsageTableEntry::VerifyPST(const uint8_t* pst, size_t pst_length) {
|
|
if (pst_length > kMaxPSTLength) return false;
|
|
if (data_.pst_length != pst_length) return false;
|
|
if (!pst || !pst_length) return false;
|
|
return 0 == CRYPTO_memcmp(pst, data_.pst, pst_length);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool UsageTableEntry::VerifyMacKeys(const std::vector<uint8_t>& server,
|
|
const std::vector<uint8_t>& client) {
|
|
return (server.size() == wvoec::MAC_KEY_SIZE) &&
|
|
(client.size() == wvoec::MAC_KEY_SIZE) &&
|
|
(0 == CRYPTO_memcmp(&server[0], data_.mac_key_server,
|
|
wvoec::MAC_KEY_SIZE)) &&
|
|
(0 ==
|
|
CRYPTO_memcmp(&client[0], data_.mac_key_client, wvoec::MAC_KEY_SIZE));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool UsageTableEntry::SetMacKeys(const std::vector<uint8_t>& server,
|
|
const std::vector<uint8_t>& client) {
|
|
if ((server.size() != wvoec::MAC_KEY_SIZE) ||
|
|
(client.size() != wvoec::MAC_KEY_SIZE))
|
|
return false;
|
|
memcpy(data_.mac_key_server, &server[0], wvoec::MAC_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
memcpy(data_.mac_key_client, &client[0], wvoec::MAC_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void UsageTableEntry::ForbidReport() {
|
|
forbid_report_ = true;
|
|
data_.generation_number++;
|
|
usage_table_->IncrementGeneration();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OEMCryptoResult UsageTableEntry::ReportUsage(const std::vector<uint8_t>& pst,
|
|
uint8_t* buffer,
|
|
size_t* buffer_length) {
|
|
if (forbid_report_) return OEMCrypto_ERROR_ENTRY_NEEDS_UPDATE;
|
|
if (recent_decrypt_) return OEMCrypto_ERROR_ENTRY_NEEDS_UPDATE;
|
|
if (pst.size() == 0 || pst.size() > kMaxPSTLength ||
|
|
pst.size() != data_.pst_length) {
|
|
LOGE("ReportUsage: bad pst length = %zu, should be %u.", pst.size(),
|
|
data_.pst_length);
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_WRONG_PST;
|
|
}
|
|
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(&pst[0], data_.pst, data_.pst_length)) {
|
|
LOGE("ReportUsage: wrong pst %s, should be %s.", wvcdm::b2a_hex(pst).c_str(),
|
|
wvcdm::HexEncode(data_.pst, data_.pst_length).c_str());
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_WRONG_PST;
|
|
}
|
|
const size_t length_needed =
|
|
wvcdm::Unpacked_PST_Report::report_size(pst.size());
|
|
if (*buffer_length < length_needed) {
|
|
*buffer_length = length_needed;
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!buffer) {
|
|
LOGE("ReportUsage: buffer was null pointer.");
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT;
|
|
}
|
|
wvcdm::Unpacked_PST_Report pst_report(buffer);
|
|
const int64_t now = usage_table_->ce_->SystemTime();
|
|
pst_report.set_seconds_since_license_received(now -
|
|
data_.time_of_license_received);
|
|
pst_report.set_seconds_since_first_decrypt(now - data_.time_of_first_decrypt);
|
|
pst_report.set_seconds_since_last_decrypt(now - data_.time_of_last_decrypt);
|
|
pst_report.set_status(data_.status);
|
|
pst_report.set_clock_security_level(kSecureTimer);
|
|
pst_report.set_pst_length(data_.pst_length);
|
|
memcpy(pst_report.pst(), data_.pst, data_.pst_length);
|
|
unsigned int md_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
|
|
if (!HMAC(EVP_sha1(), data_.mac_key_client, wvoec::MAC_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
buffer + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, length_needed - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
|
|
pst_report.signature(), &md_len)) {
|
|
LOGE("ReportUsage: could not compute signature.");
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
return OEMCrypto_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void UsageTableEntry::UpdateAndIncrement(ODK_ClockValues* clock_values) {
|
|
if (recent_decrypt_) {
|
|
data_.time_of_last_decrypt = usage_table_->ce_->SystemTime();
|
|
recent_decrypt_ = false;
|
|
}
|
|
data_.time_of_license_received = clock_values->time_of_license_signed;
|
|
data_.time_of_first_decrypt = clock_values->time_of_first_decrypt;
|
|
// Use the most recent time_of_last_decrypt.
|
|
if (static_cast<uint64_t>(data_.time_of_last_decrypt) <
|
|
clock_values->time_of_last_decrypt) {
|
|
// For the reference implementation, we update the clock_values on every
|
|
// decrypt.
|
|
data_.time_of_last_decrypt = clock_values->time_of_last_decrypt;
|
|
} else {
|
|
// For this reference implementation of OEMCrypto, we regularly update
|
|
// clock_values->time_of_last_decrypt and we could just update
|
|
// data_.time_of_last_decrypt here. However, I'm including the line below to
|
|
// make it clear that you could do it the other way around. When this
|
|
// function is called, the two values should be synced so that the usage
|
|
// entry can be saved with the correct value.
|
|
clock_values->time_of_last_decrypt = data_.time_of_last_decrypt;
|
|
}
|
|
data_.status = clock_values->status;
|
|
data_.generation_number++;
|
|
usage_table_->IncrementGeneration();
|
|
forbid_report_ = false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OEMCryptoResult UsageTableEntry::SaveData(CryptoEngine* ce,
|
|
SessionContext* session,
|
|
uint8_t* signed_buffer,
|
|
size_t buffer_size) {
|
|
// buffer_size was determined by calling function.
|
|
if (buffer_size != SignedEntrySize()) return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
|
std::vector<uint8_t> clear_buffer(buffer_size);
|
|
memset(&clear_buffer[0], 0, buffer_size);
|
|
memset(signed_buffer, 0, buffer_size);
|
|
SignedEntryBlock* clear =
|
|
reinterpret_cast<SignedEntryBlock*>(&clear_buffer[0]);
|
|
SignedEntryBlock* encrypted =
|
|
reinterpret_cast<SignedEntryBlock*>(signed_buffer);
|
|
clear->data = data_; // Copy the current data.
|
|
memcpy(clear->verification, kEntryVerification, kMagicLength);
|
|
|
|
// This should be encrypted and signed with a device specific key.
|
|
// For the reference implementation, I'm just going to use the keybox key.
|
|
const std::vector<uint8_t>& key = ce->DeviceRootKey();
|
|
if (key.empty()) {
|
|
LOGE("SaveUsageEntry: DeviceRootKey is unexpectedly empty.");
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Encrypt the entry.
|
|
RAND_bytes(encrypted->iv, wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE);
|
|
uint8_t iv_buffer[wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE]; // working iv buffer.
|
|
memcpy(iv_buffer, encrypted->iv, wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE);
|
|
AES_KEY aes_key;
|
|
AES_set_encrypt_key(&key[0], 128, &aes_key);
|
|
AES_cbc_encrypt(
|
|
&clear_buffer[kEncryptionOffset], &signed_buffer[kEncryptionOffset],
|
|
buffer_size - kEncryptionOffset, &aes_key, iv_buffer, AES_ENCRYPT);
|
|
|
|
// Sign the entry.
|
|
unsigned int sig_length = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
|
|
if (!HMAC(EVP_sha256(), &key[0], key.size(),
|
|
&signed_buffer[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH],
|
|
buffer_size - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, encrypted->signature,
|
|
&sig_length)) {
|
|
LOGE("SaveUsageEntry: Could not sign entry.");
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
return OEMCrypto_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OEMCryptoResult UsageTableEntry::LoadData(CryptoEngine* ce, uint32_t index,
|
|
const std::vector<uint8_t>& buffer,
|
|
ODK_ClockValues* clock_values) {
|
|
if (buffer.size() < SignedEntrySize()) return OEMCrypto_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER;
|
|
if (buffer.size() > SignedEntrySize())
|
|
LOGW("LoadUsageTableEntry: buffer is large. %zu > %zu", buffer.size(),
|
|
SignedEntrySize());
|
|
std::vector<uint8_t> clear_buffer(buffer.size());
|
|
SignedEntryBlock* clear =
|
|
reinterpret_cast<SignedEntryBlock*>(&clear_buffer[0]);
|
|
const SignedEntryBlock* encrypted =
|
|
reinterpret_cast<const SignedEntryBlock*>(&buffer[0]);
|
|
|
|
// This should be encrypted and signed with a device specific key.
|
|
// For the reference implementation, I'm just going to use the keybox key.
|
|
const std::vector<uint8_t>& key = ce->DeviceRootKey();
|
|
if (key.empty()) {
|
|
LOGE("LoadUsageEntry: DeviceRootKey is unexpectedly empty.");
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify the signature of the usage entry. Sign encrypted into clear buffer.
|
|
unsigned int sig_length = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
|
|
if (!HMAC(EVP_sha256(), &key[0], key.size(), &buffer[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH],
|
|
buffer.size() - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, clear->signature,
|
|
&sig_length)) {
|
|
LOGE("LoadUsageEntry: Could not sign entry.");
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(clear->signature, encrypted->signature,
|
|
SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
|
|
LOGE("LoadUsageEntry: Signature did not match.");
|
|
LOGE("LoadUsageEntry: Invalid signature given: %s",
|
|
wvcdm::HexEncode(encrypted->signature, sig_length).c_str());
|
|
LOGE("LoadUsageEntry: Invalid signature computed: %s",
|
|
wvcdm::HexEncode(clear->signature, sig_length).c_str());
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Next, decrypt the entry.
|
|
uint8_t iv_buffer[wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE];
|
|
memcpy(iv_buffer, encrypted->iv, wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE);
|
|
AES_KEY aes_key;
|
|
AES_set_decrypt_key(&key[0], 128, &aes_key);
|
|
AES_cbc_encrypt(&buffer[kEncryptionOffset], &clear_buffer[kEncryptionOffset],
|
|
buffer.size() - kEncryptionOffset, &aes_key, iv_buffer,
|
|
AES_DECRYPT);
|
|
|
|
// Check the verification string is correct.
|
|
if (memcmp(kEntryVerification, clear->verification, kMagicLength)) {
|
|
LOGE("LoadUsageEntry: Invalid magic: %s=%8.8s expected: %s=%8.8s",
|
|
wvcdm::HexEncode(clear->verification, kMagicLength).c_str(),
|
|
clear->verification,
|
|
wvcdm::HexEncode(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(kEntryVerification),
|
|
kMagicLength)
|
|
.c_str(),
|
|
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(kEntryVerification));
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_BAD_MAGIC;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check that the index is correct.
|
|
if (index != clear->data.index) {
|
|
LOGE("LoadUsageEntry: entry says index is %d, not %d", clear->data.index,
|
|
index);
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_SESSION;
|
|
}
|
|
if (clear->data.status > kInactiveUnused) {
|
|
LOGE("LoadUsageEntry: entry has bad status %d", clear->data.status);
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
data_ = clear->data;
|
|
return ODK_ReloadClockValues(
|
|
clock_values, data_.time_of_license_received, data_.time_of_first_decrypt,
|
|
data_.time_of_last_decrypt, data_.status, ce->SystemTime());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t UsageTableEntry::SignedEntrySize() {
|
|
size_t base = sizeof(SignedEntryBlock);
|
|
// round up to make even number of blocks:
|
|
size_t blocks = (base - 1) / wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE + 1;
|
|
return blocks * wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
UsageTable::~UsageTable() {}
|
|
|
|
size_t UsageTable::SignedHeaderSize(size_t count) {
|
|
size_t base = sizeof(SignedHeaderBlock) + count * sizeof(int64_t);
|
|
// round up to make even number of blocks:
|
|
size_t blocks = (base - 1) / wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE + 1;
|
|
return blocks * wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OEMCryptoResult UsageTable::UpdateUsageEntry(
|
|
SessionContext* session, UsageTableEntry* entry, uint8_t* header_buffer,
|
|
size_t* header_buffer_length, uint8_t* entry_buffer,
|
|
size_t* entry_buffer_length, ODK_ClockValues* clock_values) {
|
|
size_t signed_header_size = SignedHeaderSize(generation_numbers_.size());
|
|
if (*entry_buffer_length < UsageTableEntry::SignedEntrySize() ||
|
|
*header_buffer_length < signed_header_size) {
|
|
*entry_buffer_length = UsageTableEntry::SignedEntrySize();
|
|
*header_buffer_length = signed_header_size;
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER;
|
|
}
|
|
*entry_buffer_length = UsageTableEntry::SignedEntrySize();
|
|
*header_buffer_length = signed_header_size;
|
|
if ((!header_buffer) || (!entry_buffer))
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
|
entry->UpdateAndIncrement(clock_values);
|
|
generation_numbers_[entry->index()] = entry->generation_number();
|
|
OEMCryptoResult result =
|
|
entry->SaveData(ce_, session, entry_buffer, *entry_buffer_length);
|
|
if (result != OEMCrypto_SUCCESS) return result;
|
|
result = SaveUsageTableHeader(header_buffer, *header_buffer_length);
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
UsageTableEntry* UsageTable::MakeEntry(uint32_t index) {
|
|
return new UsageTableEntry(this, index, master_generation_number_);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OEMCryptoResult UsageTable::CreateNewUsageEntry(
|
|
SessionContext* session, std::unique_ptr<UsageTableEntry>* entry,
|
|
uint32_t* usage_entry_number) {
|
|
if (!header_loaded_) {
|
|
LOGE("CreateNewUsageEntry: Header not loaded.");
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!entry) return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
|
if (!usage_entry_number) return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
|
const size_t index = generation_numbers_.size();
|
|
const size_t max = ce_->max_usage_table_size();
|
|
if (max > 0 && index >= max) {
|
|
LOGE("Too many usage entries: %zu/%zu", index, max);
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
|
|
}
|
|
UsageTableEntry* new_entry = MakeEntry(index);
|
|
generation_numbers_.push_back(master_generation_number_);
|
|
sessions_.push_back(session);
|
|
master_generation_number_++;
|
|
entry->reset(new_entry);
|
|
*usage_entry_number = index;
|
|
return OEMCrypto_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OEMCryptoResult UsageTable::LoadUsageEntry(
|
|
SessionContext* session, std::unique_ptr<UsageTableEntry>* entry,
|
|
uint32_t index, const std::vector<uint8_t>& buffer,
|
|
ODK_ClockValues* clock_values) {
|
|
if (!header_loaded_) {
|
|
LOGE("CreateNewUsageEntry: Header not loaded.");
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!entry) return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
|
if (index >= generation_numbers_.size())
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
|
if (sessions_[index]) {
|
|
LOGE("LoadUsageEntry: index %d used by other session.", index);
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_SESSION;
|
|
}
|
|
const size_t max = ce_->max_usage_table_size();
|
|
if (max > 0 && index >= max) {
|
|
LOGE("Too many usage entries: %u/%zu", index, max);
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
|
|
}
|
|
std::unique_ptr<UsageTableEntry> new_entry(MakeEntry(index));
|
|
|
|
OEMCryptoResult status =
|
|
new_entry->LoadData(ce_, index, buffer, clock_values);
|
|
if (status != OEMCrypto_SUCCESS) {
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
if (new_entry->generation_number() != generation_numbers_[index]) {
|
|
LOGE("Generation SKEW: %ld -> %ld", new_entry->generation_number(),
|
|
generation_numbers_[index]);
|
|
if ((new_entry->generation_number() + 1 < generation_numbers_[index]) ||
|
|
(new_entry->generation_number() - 1 > generation_numbers_[index])) {
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_GENERATION_SKEW;
|
|
}
|
|
status = OEMCrypto_WARNING_GENERATION_SKEW;
|
|
}
|
|
sessions_[index] = session;
|
|
*entry = std::move(new_entry);
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OEMCryptoResult UsageTable::ShrinkUsageTableHeader(
|
|
uint32_t new_table_size, uint8_t* header_buffer,
|
|
size_t* header_buffer_length) {
|
|
if (new_table_size > generation_numbers_.size()) {
|
|
LOGE("OEMCrypto_ShrinkUsageTableHeader: %u > %zu", new_table_size,
|
|
generation_numbers_.size());
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
size_t signed_header_size = SignedHeaderSize(new_table_size);
|
|
if (*header_buffer_length < signed_header_size) {
|
|
*header_buffer_length = signed_header_size;
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER;
|
|
}
|
|
*header_buffer_length = signed_header_size;
|
|
if (!header_buffer) {
|
|
LOGE("OEMCrypto_ShrinkUsageTableHeader: buffer null.");
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
for (size_t i = new_table_size; i < sessions_.size(); ++i) {
|
|
if (sessions_[i]) {
|
|
LOGE("ShrinkUsageTableHeader: session open for %zu", i);
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_ENTRY_IN_USE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
generation_numbers_.resize(new_table_size);
|
|
sessions_.resize(new_table_size);
|
|
master_generation_number_++;
|
|
return SaveUsageTableHeader(header_buffer, *header_buffer_length);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OEMCryptoResult UsageTable::SaveUsageTableHeader(uint8_t* signed_buffer,
|
|
size_t buffer_size) {
|
|
if (!SaveGenerationNumber()) return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
|
size_t count = generation_numbers_.size();
|
|
// buffer_size was determined by calling function.
|
|
if (buffer_size != SignedHeaderSize(count))
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
|
std::vector<uint8_t> clear_buffer(buffer_size);
|
|
memset(&clear_buffer[0], 0, buffer_size);
|
|
memset(signed_buffer, 0, buffer_size);
|
|
SignedHeaderBlock* clear =
|
|
reinterpret_cast<SignedHeaderBlock*>(&clear_buffer[0]);
|
|
SignedHeaderBlock* encrypted =
|
|
reinterpret_cast<SignedHeaderBlock*>(signed_buffer);
|
|
|
|
// Pack the clear data into the clear buffer.
|
|
memcpy(clear->verification, kHeaderVerification, kMagicLength);
|
|
clear->master_generation = master_generation_number_;
|
|
clear->count = count;
|
|
// This points to the variable size part of the buffer.
|
|
int64_t* stored_generations =
|
|
reinterpret_cast<int64_t*>(&clear_buffer[sizeof(SignedHeaderBlock)]);
|
|
std::copy(generation_numbers_.begin(), generation_numbers_.begin() + count,
|
|
stored_generations);
|
|
|
|
// This should be encrypted and signed with a device specific key.
|
|
// For the reference implementation, I'm just going to use the keybox key.
|
|
const std::vector<uint8_t>& key = ce_->DeviceRootKey();
|
|
if (key.empty()) {
|
|
LOGE("SaveUsageTableHeader: DeviceRootKey is unexpectedly empty.");
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Encrypt the entry.
|
|
RAND_bytes(encrypted->iv, wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE);
|
|
uint8_t iv_buffer[wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE]; // working iv buffer.
|
|
memcpy(iv_buffer, encrypted->iv, wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE);
|
|
AES_KEY aes_key;
|
|
AES_set_encrypt_key(&key[0], 128, &aes_key);
|
|
AES_cbc_encrypt(
|
|
&clear_buffer[kEncryptionOffset], &signed_buffer[kEncryptionOffset],
|
|
buffer_size - kEncryptionOffset, &aes_key, iv_buffer, AES_ENCRYPT);
|
|
|
|
// Sign the entry.
|
|
unsigned int sig_length = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
|
|
if (!HMAC(EVP_sha256(), &key[0], key.size(),
|
|
&signed_buffer[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH],
|
|
buffer_size - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, encrypted->signature,
|
|
&sig_length)) {
|
|
LOGE("SaveUsageHeader: Could not sign entry.");
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
return OEMCrypto_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OEMCryptoResult UsageTable::LoadUsageTableHeader(
|
|
const std::vector<uint8_t>& buffer) {
|
|
if (!LoadGenerationNumber(false)) return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
|
|
|
if (buffer.size() < SignedHeaderSize(0)) return OEMCrypto_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER;
|
|
size_t max = ce_->max_usage_table_size();
|
|
if (max > 0 && buffer.size() > SignedHeaderSize(max)) {
|
|
LOGE("Header too big: %zu bytes/%zu bytes", buffer.size(),
|
|
SignedHeaderSize(max));
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
|
|
}
|
|
std::vector<uint8_t> clear_buffer(buffer.size());
|
|
SignedHeaderBlock* clear =
|
|
reinterpret_cast<SignedHeaderBlock*>(&clear_buffer[0]);
|
|
const SignedHeaderBlock* encrypted =
|
|
reinterpret_cast<const SignedHeaderBlock*>(&buffer[0]);
|
|
|
|
// This should be encrypted and signed with a device specific key.
|
|
// For the reference implementation, I'm just going to use the keybox key.
|
|
const std::vector<uint8_t>& key = ce_->DeviceRootKey();
|
|
if (key.empty()) {
|
|
LOGE("LoadUsageTableHeader: DeviceRootKey is unexpectedly empty.");
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify the signature of the usage entry. Sign encrypted into clear buffer.
|
|
unsigned int sig_length = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
|
|
if (!HMAC(EVP_sha256(), &key[0], key.size(), &buffer[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH],
|
|
buffer.size() - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, clear->signature,
|
|
&sig_length)) {
|
|
LOGE("LoadUsageTableHeader: Could not sign entry.");
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(clear->signature, encrypted->signature,
|
|
SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
|
|
LOGE("LoadUsageTableHeader: Signature did not match.");
|
|
LOGE("LoadUsageTableHeader: Invalid signature given: %s",
|
|
wvcdm::HexEncode(encrypted->signature, sig_length).c_str());
|
|
LOGE("LoadUsageTableHeader: Invalid signature computed: %s",
|
|
wvcdm::HexEncode(clear->signature, sig_length).c_str());
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Next, decrypt the entry.
|
|
uint8_t iv_buffer[wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE];
|
|
memcpy(iv_buffer, encrypted->iv, wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE);
|
|
AES_KEY aes_key;
|
|
AES_set_decrypt_key(&key[0], 128, &aes_key);
|
|
AES_cbc_encrypt(&buffer[kEncryptionOffset], &clear_buffer[kEncryptionOffset],
|
|
buffer.size() - kEncryptionOffset, &aes_key, iv_buffer,
|
|
AES_DECRYPT);
|
|
|
|
// Check the verification string is correct.
|
|
if (memcmp(kHeaderVerification, clear->verification, kMagicLength)) {
|
|
LOGE("LoadUsageTableHeader: Invalid magic: %s=%8.8s expected: %s=%8.8s",
|
|
wvcdm::HexEncode(clear->verification, kMagicLength).c_str(),
|
|
clear->verification,
|
|
wvcdm::HexEncode(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(kHeaderVerification),
|
|
kMagicLength)
|
|
.c_str(),
|
|
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(kHeaderVerification));
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_BAD_MAGIC;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check that size is correct, now that we know what it should be.
|
|
if (buffer.size() < SignedHeaderSize(clear->count)) {
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER;
|
|
}
|
|
if (buffer.size() > SignedHeaderSize(clear->count)) {
|
|
LOGW("LoadUsageTableHeader: buffer is large. %zu > %zu", buffer.size(),
|
|
SignedHeaderSize(clear->count));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OEMCryptoResult status = OEMCrypto_SUCCESS;
|
|
if (clear->master_generation != master_generation_number_) {
|
|
LOGE("Generation SKEW: %ld -> %ld", clear->master_generation,
|
|
master_generation_number_);
|
|
if ((clear->master_generation + 1 < master_generation_number_) ||
|
|
(clear->master_generation - 1 > master_generation_number_)) {
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_GENERATION_SKEW;
|
|
}
|
|
status = OEMCrypto_WARNING_GENERATION_SKEW;
|
|
}
|
|
int64_t* stored_generations =
|
|
reinterpret_cast<int64_t*>(&clear_buffer[0] + sizeof(SignedHeaderBlock));
|
|
generation_numbers_.assign(stored_generations,
|
|
stored_generations + clear->count);
|
|
sessions_.clear();
|
|
sessions_.resize(clear->count);
|
|
header_loaded_ = true;
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OEMCryptoResult UsageTable::MoveEntry(UsageTableEntry* entry,
|
|
uint32_t new_index) {
|
|
if (new_index >= generation_numbers_.size()) {
|
|
LOGE("MoveEntry: index beyond end of usage table %u >= %zu", new_index,
|
|
generation_numbers_.size());
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT;
|
|
}
|
|
if (sessions_[new_index]) {
|
|
LOGE("MoveEntry: session open for %u", new_index);
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_ENTRY_IN_USE;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!entry) {
|
|
LOGE("MoveEntry: null entry");
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
sessions_[new_index] = sessions_[entry->index()];
|
|
sessions_[entry->index()] = 0;
|
|
|
|
entry->set_index(new_index);
|
|
generation_numbers_[new_index] = master_generation_number_;
|
|
entry->set_generation_number(master_generation_number_);
|
|
master_generation_number_++;
|
|
return OEMCrypto_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void UsageTable::IncrementGeneration() {
|
|
master_generation_number_++;
|
|
SaveGenerationNumber();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool UsageTable::SaveGenerationNumber() {
|
|
wvcdm::FileSystem* file_system = ce_->file_system();
|
|
std::string path;
|
|
// Note: this path is OK for a real implementation, but using security level 1
|
|
// would be better.
|
|
// TODO(jfore, rfrias): Address how this property is presented to the ref.
|
|
// For now, the path is empty.
|
|
/*if (!Properties::GetDeviceFilesBasePath(kSecurityLevelL3,
|
|
&path)) {
|
|
LOGE("UsageTable: Unable to get base path");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}*/
|
|
// On a real implementation, you should NOT put the generation number in
|
|
// a file in user space. It should be stored in secure memory.
|
|
std::string filename = path + "GenerationNumber.dat";
|
|
auto file = file_system->Open(
|
|
filename, wvcdm::FileSystem::kCreate | wvcdm::FileSystem::kTruncate);
|
|
if (!file) {
|
|
LOGE("UsageTable: File open failed: %s", path.c_str());
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
file->Write(reinterpret_cast<char*>(&master_generation_number_),
|
|
sizeof(int64_t));
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool UsageTable::LoadGenerationNumber(bool or_make_new_one) {
|
|
wvcdm::FileSystem* file_system = ce_->file_system();
|
|
std::string path;
|
|
// Note: this path is OK for a real implementation, but using security level 1
|
|
// would be better.
|
|
// TODO(jfore, rfrias): Address how this property is presented to the ref.
|
|
// For now, the path is empty.
|
|
/*if (!Properties::GetDeviceFilesBasePath(kSecurityLevelL3,
|
|
&path)) {
|
|
LOGE("UsageTable: Unable to get base path");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}*/
|
|
// On a real implementation, you should NOT put the generation number in
|
|
// a file in user space. It should be stored in secure memory.
|
|
std::string filename = path + "GenerationNumber.dat";
|
|
auto file = file_system->Open(filename, wvcdm::FileSystem::kReadOnly);
|
|
if (!file) {
|
|
if (or_make_new_one) {
|
|
RAND_bytes(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&master_generation_number_),
|
|
sizeof(int64_t));
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
LOGE("UsageTable: File open failed: %s (clearing table)", path.c_str());
|
|
master_generation_number_ = 0;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
file->Read(reinterpret_cast<char*>(&master_generation_number_),
|
|
sizeof(int64_t));
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OEMCryptoResult UsageTable::CreateUsageTableHeader(
|
|
uint8_t* header_buffer, size_t* header_buffer_length) {
|
|
size_t signed_header_size = SignedHeaderSize(0);
|
|
if (*header_buffer_length < signed_header_size) {
|
|
*header_buffer_length = signed_header_size;
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER;
|
|
}
|
|
*header_buffer_length = signed_header_size;
|
|
if (!LoadGenerationNumber(true)) return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
|
// Make sure there are no entries that are currently tied to an open session.
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < sessions_.size(); ++i) {
|
|
if (sessions_[i] != nullptr) {
|
|
LOGE("CreateUsageTableHeader: index %zu used by session.", i);
|
|
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_SESSION;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
sessions_.clear();
|
|
generation_numbers_.clear();
|
|
header_loaded_ = true;
|
|
return SaveUsageTableHeader(header_buffer, *header_buffer_length);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} // namespace wvoec_ref
|