Source release v3.2.0
This commit is contained in:
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
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// Copyright 2016 Google Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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//
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// OEMCrypto device features for unit tests
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//
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#include "oec_device_features.h"
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#include <stdio.h>
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@@ -21,29 +25,49 @@ void DeviceFeatures::Initialize(bool is_cast_receiver,
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api_version = 0;
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derive_key_method = NO_METHOD;
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if (OEMCrypto_SUCCESS != OEMCrypto_Initialize()) {
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printf("OEMCrypto_Initialze failed. All tests will fail.\n");
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printf("OEMCrypto_Initialize failed. All tests will fail.\n");
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return;
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}
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uint32_t nonce = 0;
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uint8_t buffer[1];
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size_t size = 0;
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provisioning_method = OEMCrypto_GetProvisioningMethod();
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printf("provisioning_method = %s\n",
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ProvisioningMethodName(provisioning_method));
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uses_keybox =
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(OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED != OEMCrypto_GetKeyData(buffer, &size));
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printf("uses_keybox = %s.\n", uses_keybox ? "true" : "false");
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loads_certificate = uses_keybox && (OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED !=
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OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey(
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0, buffer, 0, buffer, 0, &nonce,
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buffer, 0, buffer, buffer, &size));
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OEMCrypto_SESSION session;
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OEMCryptoResult result = OEMCrypto_OpenSession(&session);
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if (result != OEMCrypto_SUCCESS) {
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printf("--- ERROR: Could not open session: %d ----\n", result);
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}
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// If the device uses a keybox, check to see if loading a certificate is
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// installed.
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if (provisioning_method == OEMCrypto_Keybox) {
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loads_certificate =
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(OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED !=
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OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey(session, buffer, 0, buffer, 0, &nonce,
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buffer, 0, buffer, buffer, &size));
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} else if (provisioning_method == OEMCrypto_OEMCertificate) {
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// If the device says it uses Provisioning 3.0, then it should be able to
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// load a DRM certificate. These devices must support RewrapDeviceRSAKey30.
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loads_certificate = true;
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} else {
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// Other devices are either broken, or they have a baked in certificate.
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loads_certificate = false;
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}
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printf("loads_certificate = %s.\n", loads_certificate ? "true" : "false");
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uses_certificate = (OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED !=
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OEMCrypto_GenerateRSASignature(0, buffer, 0, buffer,
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OEMCrypto_GenerateRSASignature(session, buffer, 0, buffer,
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&size, kSign_RSASSA_PSS));
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printf("uses_certificate = %s.\n", uses_certificate ? "true" : "false");
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generic_crypto =
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(OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED !=
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OEMCrypto_Generic_Encrypt(0, buffer, 0, buffer,
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OEMCrypto_Generic_Encrypt(session, buffer, 0, buffer,
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OEMCrypto_AES_CBC_128_NO_PADDING, buffer));
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printf("generic_crypto = %s.\n", generic_crypto ? "true" : "false");
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OEMCrypto_CloseSession(session);
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api_version = OEMCrypto_APIVersion();
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printf("api_version = %d.\n", api_version);
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usage_table = OEMCrypto_SupportsUsageTable();
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@@ -76,6 +100,9 @@ void DeviceFeatures::Initialize(bool is_cast_receiver,
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case FORCE_TEST_KEYBOX:
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printf("FORCE_TEST_KEYBOX: User requested calling InstallKeybox.\n");
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break;
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case TEST_PROVISION_30:
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printf("TEST_PROVISION_30: Device provisioed with OEM Cert.\n");
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break;
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}
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OEMCrypto_Terminate();
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}
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@@ -91,8 +118,11 @@ std::string DeviceFeatures::RestrictFilter(const std::string& initial_filter) {
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if (!cast_receiver) FilterOut(&filter, "*CastReceiver*");
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if (!usage_table) FilterOut(&filter, "*UsageTable*");
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if (derive_key_method == NO_METHOD) FilterOut(&filter, "*SessionTest*");
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if (provisioning_method
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!= OEMCrypto_OEMCertificate) FilterOut(&filter, "*Prov30*");
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if (api_version < 10) FilterOut(&filter, "*API10*");
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if (api_version < 11) FilterOut(&filter, "*API11*");
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if (api_version < 12) FilterOut(&filter, "*API12*");
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// Performance tests take a long time. Filter them out if they are not
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// specifically requested.
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if (filter.find("Performance") == std::string::npos) {
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@@ -102,6 +132,27 @@ std::string DeviceFeatures::RestrictFilter(const std::string& initial_filter) {
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}
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void DeviceFeatures::PickDerivedKey() {
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if (api_version >= 12) {
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switch (provisioning_method) {
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case OEMCrypto_OEMCertificate:
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derive_key_method = TEST_PROVISION_30;
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return;
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case OEMCrypto_DrmCertificate:
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if (OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED != OEMCrypto_LoadTestRSAKey()) {
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derive_key_method = LOAD_TEST_RSA_KEY;
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}
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return;
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case OEMCrypto_Keybox:
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// Fall through to api_version < 12 case.
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break;
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case OEMCrypto_ProvisioningError:
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printf(
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"ERROR: OEMCrypto_GetProvisioningMethod() returns "
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"OEMCrypto_ProvisioningError\n");
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// Then fall through to api_version < 12 case.
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break;
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}
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}
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if (uses_keybox) {
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// If device uses a keybox, try to load the test keybox.
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if (OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED != OEMCrypto_LoadTestKeybox()) {
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@@ -141,4 +192,17 @@ void DeviceFeatures::FilterOut(std::string* current_filter,
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}
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}
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const char* ProvisioningMethodName(OEMCrypto_ProvisioningMethod method) {
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switch (method) {
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case OEMCrypto_ProvisioningError:
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return "OEMCrypto_ProvisioningError";
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case OEMCrypto_DrmCertificate:
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return "OEMCrypto_DrmCertificate";
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case OEMCrypto_Keybox:
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return "OEMCrypto_Keybox";
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case OEMCrypto_OEMCertificate:
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return "OEMCrypto_OEMCertificate";
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}
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}
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} // namespace wvoec
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@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ class DeviceFeatures {
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LOAD_TEST_RSA_KEY, // Call LoadTestRSAKey before deriving keys.
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EXISTING_TEST_KEYBOX, // Keybox is already the test keybox.
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FORCE_TEST_KEYBOX, // User requested calling InstallKeybox.
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TEST_PROVISION_30, // Device has OEM Certificate installed.
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};
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enum DeriveMethod derive_key_method;
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@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ class DeviceFeatures {
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bool cast_receiver; // Device supports alternate rsa signature padding.
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bool usage_table; // Device saves usage information.
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uint32_t api_version;
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OEMCrypto_ProvisioningMethod provisioning_method;
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void Initialize(bool is_cast_receiver, bool force_load_test_keybox);
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std::string RestrictFilter(const std::string& initial_filter);
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@@ -37,6 +39,7 @@ class DeviceFeatures {
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};
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extern DeviceFeatures global_features;
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const char* ProvisioningMethodName(OEMCrypto_ProvisioningMethod method);
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} // namespace wvoec
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@@ -9,7 +9,10 @@
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#include <openssl/aes.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include <openssl/pem.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
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#include <stdint.h>
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#include <gtest/gtest.h>
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@@ -17,13 +20,14 @@
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#include <string>
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#include <vector>
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#include "OEMCryptoCENC.h"
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#include "log.h"
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#include "oec_device_features.h"
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#include "oec_test_data.h"
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#include "oemcrypto_key_mock.h"
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#include "OEMCryptoCENC.h"
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#include "string_conversions.h"
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#include "wv_cdm_constants.h"
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#include "wv_cdm_types.h"
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#include "wv_keybox.h"
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using namespace std;
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@@ -68,6 +72,23 @@ void dump_openssl_error() {
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}
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}
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template <typename T, void (*func)(T*)>
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class openssl_ptr {
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public:
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explicit openssl_ptr(T* p = NULL) : ptr_(p) {}
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~openssl_ptr() {
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if (ptr_) func(ptr_);
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}
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T& operator*() const { return *ptr_; }
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T* operator->() const { return ptr_; }
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T* get() const { return ptr_; }
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bool NotNull() { return ptr_; }
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private:
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T* ptr_;
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CORE_DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(openssl_ptr);
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};
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Session::Session()
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: open_(false),
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forced_session_id_(false),
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@@ -75,7 +96,15 @@ Session::Session()
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mac_key_server_(wvcdm::MAC_KEY_SIZE),
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mac_key_client_(wvcdm::MAC_KEY_SIZE),
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enc_key_(wvcdm::KEY_SIZE),
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public_rsa_(0) {}
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public_rsa_(0),
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message_size_(sizeof(MessageData)),
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num_keys_(4) { // Most tests only use 4 keys.
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// Other tests will explicitly call set_num_keys.
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// Stripe the padded message.
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for (int i = 0; i < sizeof(padded_message_.padding); i++) {
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padded_message_.padding[i] = i % 0x100;
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}
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}
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Session::~Session() {
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if (!forced_session_id_ && open_) close();
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@@ -104,8 +133,8 @@ void Session::close() {
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open_ = false;
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}
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void Session::GenerateNonce(uint32_t* nonce, int* error_counter) {
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if (OEMCrypto_SUCCESS == OEMCrypto_GenerateNonce(session_id(), nonce)) {
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void Session::GenerateNonce(int* error_counter) {
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if (OEMCrypto_SUCCESS == OEMCrypto_GenerateNonce(session_id(), &nonce_)) {
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return;
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}
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if (error_counter) {
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@@ -113,7 +142,7 @@ void Session::GenerateNonce(uint32_t* nonce, int* error_counter) {
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} else {
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sleep(1); // wait a second, then try again.
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ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
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OEMCrypto_GenerateNonce(session_id(), nonce));
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OEMCrypto_GenerateNonce(session_id(), &nonce_));
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}
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}
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@@ -139,7 +168,7 @@ void Session::FillDefaultContext(vector<uint8_t>* mac_context,
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}
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void Session::GenerateDerivedKeysFromKeybox() {
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GenerateNonce(&nonce_);
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GenerateNonce();
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vector<uint8_t> mac_context;
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vector<uint8_t> enc_context;
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FillDefaultContext(&mac_context, &enc_context);
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@@ -159,10 +188,11 @@ void Session::GenerateDerivedKeysFromKeybox() {
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void Session::GenerateDerivedKeysFromSessionKey() {
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// Uses test certificate.
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GenerateNonce(&nonce_);
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GenerateNonce();
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vector<uint8_t> session_key;
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vector<uint8_t> enc_session_key;
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PreparePublicKey();
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ASSERT_TRUE(GenerateRSASessionKey(&enc_session_key));
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ASSERT_TRUE(GenerateRSASessionKey(&session_key, &enc_session_key));
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vector<uint8_t> mac_context;
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vector<uint8_t> enc_context;
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FillDefaultContext(&mac_context, &enc_context);
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@@ -181,71 +211,64 @@ void Session::GenerateDerivedKeysFromSessionKey() {
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enc_key_ = wvcdm::a2b_hex("CB477D09014D72C9B8DCE76C33EA43B3");
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}
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void Session::GenerateTestSessionKeys() {
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if (global_features.derive_key_method == DeviceFeatures::LOAD_TEST_RSA_KEY) {
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GenerateDerivedKeysFromSessionKey();
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} else {
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GenerateDerivedKeysFromKeybox();
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}
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}
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void Session::LoadTestKeys(const std::string& pst, bool new_mac_keys) {
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uint8_t* pst_ptr = NULL;
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if (pst.length() > 0) {
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pst_ptr = encrypted_license_.pst;
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pst_ptr = encrypted_license().pst;
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}
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if (new_mac_keys) {
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ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
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OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(
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session_id(), message_ptr(), sizeof(MessageData),
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&signature_[0], signature_.size(),
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encrypted_license_.mac_key_iv, encrypted_license_.mac_keys,
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kNumKeys, key_array_, pst_ptr, pst.length()));
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OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(session_id(), message_ptr(), message_size_,
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&signature_[0], signature_.size(),
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encrypted_license().mac_key_iv,
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encrypted_license().mac_keys, num_keys_,
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key_array_, pst_ptr, pst.length()));
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// Update new generated keys.
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memcpy(&mac_key_server_[0], license_.mac_keys, wvcdm::MAC_KEY_SIZE);
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memcpy(&mac_key_client_[0], license_.mac_keys + wvcdm::MAC_KEY_SIZE,
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wvcdm::MAC_KEY_SIZE);
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} else {
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ASSERT_EQ(
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OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
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OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(session_id(), message_ptr(), sizeof(MessageData),
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&signature_[0], signature_.size(), NULL, NULL,
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kNumKeys, key_array_, pst_ptr, pst.length()));
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ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
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OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(session_id(), message_ptr(), message_size_,
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&signature_[0], signature_.size(), NULL, NULL,
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num_keys_, key_array_, pst_ptr, pst.length()));
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}
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VerifyTestKeys();
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}
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void Session::VerifyTestKeys() {
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for (unsigned int i = 0; i < kNumKeys; i++) {
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for (unsigned int i = 0; i < num_keys_; i++) {
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KeyControlBlock block;
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size_t size = sizeof(block);
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OEMCryptoResult sts = OEMCrypto_QueryKeyControl(
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session_id(), license_.keys[i].key_id, license_.keys[i].key_id_length,
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reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&block), &size);
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session_id(), license_.keys[i].key_id, license_.keys[i].key_id_length,
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reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&block), &size);
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if (sts != OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED) {
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ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, sts);
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ASSERT_EQ(sizeof(block), size);
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// control duration and bits stored in network byte order. For printing
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// we change to host byte order.
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ASSERT_EQ((htonl_fnc(license_.keys[i].control.duration)),
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(htonl_fnc(block.duration))) << "For key " << i;
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(htonl_fnc(block.duration)))
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<< "For key " << i;
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ASSERT_EQ(htonl_fnc(license_.keys[i].control.control_bits),
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htonl_fnc(block.control_bits)) << "For key " << i;
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htonl_fnc(block.control_bits))
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<< "For key " << i;
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}
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}
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}
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void Session::RefreshTestKeys(const size_t key_count,
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uint32_t control_bits, uint32_t nonce,
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OEMCryptoResult expected_result) {
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void Session::RefreshTestKeys(const size_t key_count, uint32_t control_bits,
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uint32_t nonce, OEMCryptoResult expected_result) {
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// Note: we store the message in encrypted_license_, but the refresh key
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// message is not actually encrypted. It is, however, signed.
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FillRefreshMessage(key_count, control_bits, nonce);
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ServerSignMessage(encrypted_license_, &signature_);
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ServerSignBuffer(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&padded_message_),
|
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message_size_, &signature_);
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OEMCrypto_KeyRefreshObject key_array[key_count];
|
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FillRefreshArray(key_array, key_count);
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OEMCryptoResult sts = OEMCrypto_RefreshKeys(
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session_id(), message_ptr(), sizeof(MessageData), &signature_[0],
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session_id(), message_ptr(), message_size_, &signature_[0],
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signature_.size(), key_count, key_array);
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ASSERT_EQ(expected_result, sts);
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@@ -268,29 +291,28 @@ void Session::SetKeyId(int index, const string& key_id) {
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memcpy(key.key_id, key_id.data(), key.key_id_length);
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}
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void Session::FillSimpleMessage(
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uint32_t duration, uint32_t control, uint32_t nonce,
|
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const std::string& pst) {
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EXPECT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
|
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OEMCrypto_GetRandom(license_.mac_key_iv,
|
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sizeof(license_.mac_key_iv)));
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EXPECT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
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OEMCrypto_GetRandom(license_.mac_keys, sizeof(license_.mac_keys)));
|
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for (unsigned int i = 0; i < kNumKeys; i++) {
|
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void Session::FillSimpleMessage(uint32_t duration, uint32_t control,
|
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uint32_t nonce, const std::string& pst) {
|
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EXPECT_EQ(
|
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1, RAND_pseudo_bytes(license_.mac_key_iv, sizeof(license_.mac_key_iv)));
|
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EXPECT_EQ(1, RAND_pseudo_bytes(license_.mac_keys, sizeof(license_.mac_keys)));
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for (unsigned int i = 0; i < num_keys_; i++) {
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memset(license_.keys[i].key_id, 0, kTestKeyIdMaxLength);
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license_.keys[i].key_id_length = kDefaultKeyIdLength;
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memset(license_.keys[i].key_id, i, license_.keys[i].key_id_length);
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EXPECT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
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OEMCrypto_GetRandom(license_.keys[i].key_data,
|
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sizeof(license_.keys[i].key_data)));
|
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EXPECT_EQ(1, RAND_pseudo_bytes(license_.keys[i].key_data,
|
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sizeof(license_.keys[i].key_data)));
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license_.keys[i].key_data_length = wvcdm::KEY_SIZE;
|
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EXPECT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
|
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OEMCrypto_GetRandom(license_.keys[i].key_iv,
|
||||
sizeof(license_.keys[i].key_iv)));
|
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EXPECT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
|
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OEMCrypto_GetRandom(license_.keys[i].control_iv,
|
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sizeof(license_.keys[i].control_iv)));
|
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if (control & wvoec_mock::kControlSecurityPatchLevelMask) {
|
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EXPECT_EQ(1, RAND_pseudo_bytes(license_.keys[i].key_iv,
|
||||
sizeof(license_.keys[i].key_iv)));
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(1, RAND_pseudo_bytes(license_.keys[i].control_iv,
|
||||
sizeof(license_.keys[i].control_iv)));
|
||||
// For version 12, we require OEMCrypto to handle kc12 for all licenses.
|
||||
if (global_features.api_version == 12) {
|
||||
memcpy(license_.keys[i].control.verification, "kc12", 4);
|
||||
} else if (control & wvoec_mock::kControlSecurityPatchLevelMask) {
|
||||
// For versions before 12, we require the special key control block only
|
||||
// when there are newer features present.
|
||||
memcpy(license_.keys[i].control.verification, "kc11", 4);
|
||||
} else if (control & wvoec_mock::kControlRequireAntiRollbackHardware) {
|
||||
memcpy(license_.keys[i].control.verification, "kc10", 4);
|
||||
@@ -311,48 +333,57 @@ void Session::FillSimpleMessage(
|
||||
void Session::FillRefreshMessage(size_t key_count, uint32_t control_bits,
|
||||
uint32_t nonce) {
|
||||
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < key_count; i++) {
|
||||
encrypted_license_.keys[i].key_id_length = license_.keys[i].key_id_length;
|
||||
memcpy(encrypted_license_.keys[i].key_id, license_.keys[i].key_id,
|
||||
encrypted_license_.keys[i].key_id_length);
|
||||
memcpy(encrypted_license_.keys[i].control.verification, "kctl", 4);
|
||||
encrypted_license_.keys[i].control.duration = htonl(kLongDuration);
|
||||
encrypted_license_.keys[i].control.nonce = htonl(nonce);
|
||||
encrypted_license_.keys[i].control.control_bits = htonl(control_bits);
|
||||
encrypted_license().keys[i].key_id_length = license_.keys[i].key_id_length;
|
||||
memcpy(encrypted_license().keys[i].key_id, license_.keys[i].key_id,
|
||||
encrypted_license().keys[i].key_id_length);
|
||||
if (global_features.api_version == 12) {
|
||||
// For version 12, we require OEMCrypto to handle kc12 for all licenses.
|
||||
memcpy(encrypted_license().keys[i].control.verification, "kc12", 4);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// For versions before 12, we require the special key control block only
|
||||
// when there are newer features present.
|
||||
memcpy(encrypted_license().keys[i].control.verification, "kctl", 4);
|
||||
}
|
||||
encrypted_license().keys[i].control.duration = htonl(kLongDuration);
|
||||
encrypted_license().keys[i].control.nonce = htonl(nonce);
|
||||
encrypted_license().keys[i].control.control_bits = htonl(control_bits);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void Session::EncryptAndSign() {
|
||||
encrypted_license_ = license_;
|
||||
encrypted_license() = license_;
|
||||
|
||||
uint8_t iv_buffer[16];
|
||||
memcpy(iv_buffer, &license_.mac_key_iv[0], wvcdm::KEY_IV_SIZE);
|
||||
AES_KEY aes_key;
|
||||
AES_set_encrypt_key(&enc_key_[0], 128, &aes_key);
|
||||
AES_cbc_encrypt(&license_.mac_keys[0], &encrypted_license_.mac_keys[0],
|
||||
AES_cbc_encrypt(&license_.mac_keys[0], &encrypted_license().mac_keys[0],
|
||||
2 * wvcdm::MAC_KEY_SIZE, &aes_key, iv_buffer, AES_ENCRYPT);
|
||||
|
||||
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < kNumKeys; i++) {
|
||||
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < num_keys_; i++) {
|
||||
memcpy(iv_buffer, &license_.keys[i].control_iv[0], wvcdm::KEY_IV_SIZE);
|
||||
AES_set_encrypt_key(&license_.keys[i].key_data[0], 128, &aes_key);
|
||||
AES_cbc_encrypt(
|
||||
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&license_.keys[i].control),
|
||||
reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&encrypted_license_.keys[i].control),
|
||||
reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&encrypted_license().keys[i].control),
|
||||
wvcdm::KEY_SIZE, &aes_key, iv_buffer, AES_ENCRYPT);
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(iv_buffer, &license_.keys[i].key_iv[0], wvcdm::KEY_IV_SIZE);
|
||||
AES_set_encrypt_key(&enc_key_[0], 128, &aes_key);
|
||||
AES_cbc_encrypt(&license_.keys[i].key_data[0],
|
||||
&encrypted_license_.keys[i].key_data[0],
|
||||
license_.keys[i].key_data_length, &aes_key, iv_buffer,
|
||||
AES_ENCRYPT);
|
||||
AES_cbc_encrypt(
|
||||
&license_.keys[i].key_data[0], &encrypted_license().keys[i].key_data[0],
|
||||
license_.keys[i].key_data_length, &aes_key, iv_buffer, AES_ENCRYPT);
|
||||
}
|
||||
memcpy(encrypted_license_.pst, license_.pst, sizeof(license_.pst));
|
||||
ServerSignMessage(encrypted_license_, &signature_);
|
||||
FillKeyArray(encrypted_license_, key_array_);
|
||||
memcpy(encrypted_license().pst, license_.pst, sizeof(license_.pst));
|
||||
ServerSignBuffer(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&padded_message_),
|
||||
message_size_, &signature_);
|
||||
FillKeyArray(encrypted_license(), key_array_);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void Session::EncryptMessage(RSAPrivateKeyMessage* data,
|
||||
RSAPrivateKeyMessage* encrypted) {
|
||||
void Session::EncryptProvisioningMessage(
|
||||
RSAPrivateKeyMessage* data, RSAPrivateKeyMessage* encrypted,
|
||||
const vector<uint8_t>& encryption_key) {
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(encryption_key.size(), wvcdm::KEY_SIZE);
|
||||
*encrypted = *data;
|
||||
size_t padding = wvcdm::KEY_SIZE - (data->rsa_key_length % wvcdm::KEY_SIZE);
|
||||
memset(data->rsa_key + data->rsa_key_length, static_cast<uint8_t>(padding),
|
||||
@@ -361,20 +392,18 @@ void Session::EncryptMessage(RSAPrivateKeyMessage* data,
|
||||
uint8_t iv_buffer[16];
|
||||
memcpy(iv_buffer, &data->rsa_key_iv[0], wvcdm::KEY_IV_SIZE);
|
||||
AES_KEY aes_key;
|
||||
AES_set_encrypt_key(&enc_key_[0], 128, &aes_key);
|
||||
AES_set_encrypt_key(&encryption_key[0], 128, &aes_key);
|
||||
AES_cbc_encrypt(&data->rsa_key[0], &encrypted->rsa_key[0],
|
||||
encrypted->rsa_key_length, &aes_key, iv_buffer,
|
||||
AES_ENCRYPT);
|
||||
encrypted->rsa_key_length, &aes_key, iv_buffer, AES_ENCRYPT);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
template <typename T>
|
||||
void Session::ServerSignMessage(const T& data,
|
||||
std::vector<uint8_t>* signature) {
|
||||
void Session::ServerSignBuffer(const uint8_t* data, size_t data_length,
|
||||
std::vector<uint8_t>* signature) {
|
||||
ASSERT_LE(data_length, kMaxMessageSize);
|
||||
signature->assign(SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0);
|
||||
unsigned int md_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
|
||||
HMAC(EVP_sha256(), &mac_key_server_[0], mac_key_server_.size(),
|
||||
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&data), sizeof(data),
|
||||
&(signature->front()), &md_len);
|
||||
HMAC(EVP_sha256(), &mac_key_server_[0], mac_key_server_.size(), data,
|
||||
data_length, &(signature->front()), &md_len);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void Session::ClientSignMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& data,
|
||||
@@ -385,9 +414,29 @@ void Session::ClientSignMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& data,
|
||||
&(data.front()), data.size(), &(signature->front()), &md_len);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void Session::VerifyClientSignature(size_t data_length) {
|
||||
// In the real world, a message should be signed by the client and
|
||||
// verified by the server. This simulates that.
|
||||
vector<uint8_t> data(data_length);
|
||||
for (int i = 0; i < data.size(); i++) data[i] = i % 0xFF;
|
||||
OEMCryptoResult sts;
|
||||
size_t gen_signature_length = 0;
|
||||
sts = OEMCrypto_GenerateSignature(session_id(), &data[0], data.size(), NULL,
|
||||
&gen_signature_length);
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER, sts);
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(static_cast<size_t>(32), gen_signature_length);
|
||||
vector<uint8_t> gen_signature(gen_signature_length);
|
||||
sts = OEMCrypto_GenerateSignature(session_id(), &data[0], data.size(),
|
||||
&gen_signature[0], &gen_signature_length);
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, sts);
|
||||
std::vector<uint8_t> expected_signature;
|
||||
ClientSignMessage(data, &expected_signature);
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(expected_signature, gen_signature);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void Session::FillKeyArray(const MessageData& data,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_KeyObject* key_array) {
|
||||
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < kNumKeys; i++) {
|
||||
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < num_keys_; i++) {
|
||||
key_array[i].key_id = data.keys[i].key_id;
|
||||
key_array[i].key_id_length = data.keys[i].key_id_length;
|
||||
key_array[i].key_data_iv = data.keys[i].key_iv;
|
||||
@@ -404,21 +453,21 @@ void Session::FillRefreshArray(OEMCrypto_KeyRefreshObject* key_array,
|
||||
size_t key_count) {
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < key_count; i++) {
|
||||
if (key_count > 1) {
|
||||
key_array[i].key_id = encrypted_license_.keys[i].key_id;
|
||||
key_array[i].key_id_length = encrypted_license_.keys[i].key_id_length;
|
||||
key_array[i].key_id = encrypted_license().keys[i].key_id;
|
||||
key_array[i].key_id_length = encrypted_license().keys[i].key_id_length;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
key_array[i].key_id = NULL;
|
||||
key_array[i].key_id_length = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
key_array[i].key_control_iv = NULL;
|
||||
key_array[i].key_control =
|
||||
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&encrypted_license_.keys[i].control);
|
||||
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&encrypted_license().keys[i].control);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void Session::EncryptCTR(
|
||||
const vector<uint8_t>& in_buffer, const uint8_t *key,
|
||||
const uint8_t* starting_iv, vector<uint8_t>* out_buffer) {
|
||||
void Session::EncryptCTR(const vector<uint8_t>& in_buffer, const uint8_t* key,
|
||||
const uint8_t* starting_iv,
|
||||
vector<uint8_t>* out_buffer) {
|
||||
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<void*>(NULL), key);
|
||||
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<void*>(NULL), starting_iv);
|
||||
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<void*>(NULL), out_buffer);
|
||||
@@ -441,25 +490,24 @@ void Session::EncryptCTR(
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void Session::TestDecryptCTR(bool select_key_first,
|
||||
OEMCryptoResult expected_result) {
|
||||
OEMCryptoResult expected_result, int key_index) {
|
||||
OEMCryptoResult sts;
|
||||
if (select_key_first) {
|
||||
// Select the key (from FillSimpleMessage)
|
||||
sts = OEMCrypto_SelectKey(session_id(), license_.keys[0].key_id,
|
||||
license_.keys[0].key_id_length);
|
||||
sts = OEMCrypto_SelectKey(session_id(), license_.keys[key_index].key_id,
|
||||
license_.keys[key_index].key_id_length);
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, sts);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
vector<uint8_t> unencryptedData(256);
|
||||
for(size_t i=0; i < unencryptedData.size(); i++) unencryptedData[i] = i % 256;
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_GetRandom(&unencryptedData[0], unencryptedData.size()));
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < unencryptedData.size(); i++)
|
||||
unencryptedData[i] = i % 256;
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(1, RAND_pseudo_bytes(&unencryptedData[0], unencryptedData.size()));
|
||||
vector<uint8_t> encryptionIv(wvcdm::KEY_IV_SIZE);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_GetRandom(&encryptionIv[0], wvcdm::KEY_IV_SIZE));
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(1, RAND_pseudo_bytes(&encryptionIv[0], wvcdm::KEY_IV_SIZE));
|
||||
vector<uint8_t> encryptedData(unencryptedData.size());
|
||||
EncryptCTR(unencryptedData, license_.keys[0].key_data, &encryptionIv[0],
|
||||
&encryptedData);
|
||||
EncryptCTR(unencryptedData, license_.keys[key_index].key_data,
|
||||
&encryptionIv[0], &encryptedData);
|
||||
|
||||
// Describe the output
|
||||
vector<uint8_t> outputBuffer(256);
|
||||
@@ -495,38 +543,61 @@ void Session::TestDecryptCTR(bool select_key_first,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void Session::MakeRSACertificate(
|
||||
struct RSAPrivateKeyMessage* encrypted, std::vector<uint8_t>* signature,
|
||||
uint32_t allowed_schemes, const vector<uint8_t>& rsa_key) {
|
||||
// Dummy context for testing signature generation.
|
||||
vector<uint8_t> context = wvcdm::a2b_hex(
|
||||
"0a4c08001248000000020000101907d9ffde13aa95c122678053362136bdf840"
|
||||
"8f8276e4c2d87ec52b61aa1b9f646e58734930acebe899b3e464189a14a87202"
|
||||
"fb02574e70640bd22ef44b2d7e3912250a230a14080112100915007caa9b5931"
|
||||
"b76a3a85f046523e10011a09393837363534333231180120002a0c3138383637"
|
||||
"38373430350000");
|
||||
|
||||
OEMCryptoResult sts;
|
||||
|
||||
// Generate signature
|
||||
size_t gen_signature_length = 0;
|
||||
sts = OEMCrypto_GenerateSignature(session_id(), &context[0], context.size(),
|
||||
NULL, &gen_signature_length);
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER, sts);
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(static_cast<size_t>(32), gen_signature_length);
|
||||
vector<uint8_t> gen_signature(gen_signature_length);
|
||||
sts = OEMCrypto_GenerateSignature(session_id(), &context[0], context.size(),
|
||||
&gen_signature[0], &gen_signature_length);
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, sts);
|
||||
std::vector<uint8_t> expected_signature;
|
||||
ClientSignMessage(context, &expected_signature);
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(expected_signature, gen_signature);
|
||||
|
||||
// Rewrap Canned Response
|
||||
|
||||
// In the real world, the signature above would just have been used to
|
||||
// contact the certificate provisioning server to get this response.
|
||||
void Session::LoadOEMCert(bool verify_cert) {
|
||||
vector<uint8_t> public_cert;
|
||||
size_t public_cert_length = 0;
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_GetOEMPublicCertificate(session_id(), NULL,
|
||||
&public_cert_length));
|
||||
ASSERT_GT(public_cert_length, 0);
|
||||
public_cert.resize(public_cert_length);
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_GetOEMPublicCertificate(session_id(), &public_cert[0],
|
||||
&public_cert_length));
|
||||
// load the cert into rsa_key_.
|
||||
openssl_ptr<BIO, BIO_vfree> bio(
|
||||
BIO_new_mem_buf(&public_cert[0], public_cert_length));
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(bio.NotNull());
|
||||
openssl_ptr<X509, X509_free> cert(
|
||||
PEM_read_bio_X509(bio.get(), NULL, 0, NULL));
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(cert.NotNull());
|
||||
openssl_ptr<EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_free> pubkey(X509_get_pubkey(cert.get()));
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(pubkey.NotNull());
|
||||
public_rsa_ = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pubkey.get());
|
||||
if (!public_rsa_) {
|
||||
cout << "d2i_RSAPrivateKey failed.\n";
|
||||
dump_openssl_error();
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != public_rsa_);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (verify_cert) {
|
||||
vector<char> buffer(80);
|
||||
X509_NAME* name = X509_get_subject_name(cert.get());
|
||||
printf(" OEM Certificate Name: %s\n",
|
||||
X509_NAME_oneline(name, &buffer[0], buffer.size()));
|
||||
openssl_ptr<X509_STORE, X509_STORE_free> store(X509_STORE_new());
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(store.NotNull());
|
||||
openssl_ptr<X509_STORE_CTX, X509_STORE_CTX_free> store_ctx(
|
||||
X509_STORE_CTX_new());
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(store_ctx.NotNull());
|
||||
X509_STORE_CTX_init(store_ctx.get(), store.get(), cert.get(), NULL);
|
||||
// TODO(fredgc): Verify cert is signed by Google.
|
||||
int result = X509_verify_cert(store_ctx.get());
|
||||
ASSERT_GE(0, result) << " OEM Cert not valid. "
|
||||
<< X509_verify_cert_error_string(store_ctx->error);
|
||||
if (result == 0) {
|
||||
printf("Cert not verified: %s.\n",
|
||||
X509_verify_cert_error_string(store_ctx->error));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void Session::MakeRSACertificate(struct RSAPrivateKeyMessage* encrypted,
|
||||
size_t message_size,
|
||||
std::vector<uint8_t>* signature,
|
||||
uint32_t allowed_schemes,
|
||||
const vector<uint8_t>& rsa_key,
|
||||
const vector<uint8_t>* encryption_key) {
|
||||
if (encryption_key == NULL) encryption_key = &enc_key_;
|
||||
struct RSAPrivateKeyMessage message;
|
||||
if (allowed_schemes != kSign_RSASSA_PSS) {
|
||||
uint32_t algorithm_n = htonl(allowed_schemes);
|
||||
@@ -538,33 +609,56 @@ void Session::MakeRSACertificate(
|
||||
memcpy(message.rsa_key, rsa_key.data(), rsa_key.size());
|
||||
message.rsa_key_length = rsa_key.size();
|
||||
}
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_GetRandom(message.rsa_key_iv, wvcdm::KEY_IV_SIZE));
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(1, RAND_pseudo_bytes(message.rsa_key_iv, wvcdm::KEY_IV_SIZE));
|
||||
message.nonce = nonce_;
|
||||
|
||||
EncryptMessage(&message, encrypted);
|
||||
ServerSignMessage(*encrypted, signature);
|
||||
EncryptProvisioningMessage(&message, encrypted, *encryption_key);
|
||||
ServerSignBuffer(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(encrypted), message_size,
|
||||
signature);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void Session::RewrapRSAKey(const struct RSAPrivateKeyMessage& encrypted,
|
||||
size_t message_size,
|
||||
const std::vector<uint8_t>& signature,
|
||||
vector<uint8_t>* wrapped_key, bool force) {
|
||||
size_t wrapped_key_length = 0;
|
||||
const uint8_t* message_ptr = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&encrypted);
|
||||
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey(
|
||||
session_id(), message_ptr, sizeof(encrypted), &signature[0],
|
||||
session_id(), message_ptr, message_size, &signature[0],
|
||||
signature.size(), &encrypted.nonce, encrypted.rsa_key,
|
||||
encrypted.rsa_key_length, encrypted.rsa_key_iv, NULL,
|
||||
&wrapped_key_length));
|
||||
wrapped_key->clear();
|
||||
wrapped_key->assign(wrapped_key_length, 0);
|
||||
OEMCryptoResult sts = OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey(
|
||||
session_id(), message_ptr, sizeof(encrypted), &signature[0],
|
||||
signature.size(), &encrypted.nonce, encrypted.rsa_key,
|
||||
encrypted.rsa_key_length, encrypted.rsa_key_iv, &(wrapped_key->front()),
|
||||
&wrapped_key_length);
|
||||
session_id(), message_ptr, message_size, &signature[0], signature.size(),
|
||||
&encrypted.nonce, encrypted.rsa_key, encrypted.rsa_key_length,
|
||||
encrypted.rsa_key_iv, &(wrapped_key->front()), &wrapped_key_length);
|
||||
if (force) {
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, sts);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (OEMCrypto_SUCCESS != sts) {
|
||||
wrapped_key->clear();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
void Session::RewrapRSAKey30(const struct RSAPrivateKeyMessage& encrypted,
|
||||
size_t message_size,
|
||||
const std::vector<uint8_t>& encrypted_message_key,
|
||||
vector<uint8_t>* wrapped_key, bool force) {
|
||||
size_t wrapped_key_length = 0;
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey30(
|
||||
session_id(), &nonce_, &encrypted_message_key[0],
|
||||
encrypted_message_key.size(), encrypted.rsa_key,
|
||||
encrypted.rsa_key_length, encrypted.rsa_key_iv, NULL,
|
||||
&wrapped_key_length));
|
||||
wrapped_key->clear();
|
||||
wrapped_key->assign(wrapped_key_length, 0);
|
||||
OEMCryptoResult sts = OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey30(
|
||||
session_id(), &nonce_, &encrypted_message_key[0],
|
||||
encrypted_message_key.size(), encrypted.rsa_key, encrypted.rsa_key_length,
|
||||
encrypted.rsa_key_iv, &(wrapped_key->front()), &wrapped_key_length);
|
||||
if (force) {
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, sts);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -573,48 +667,42 @@ void Session::RewrapRSAKey(const struct RSAPrivateKeyMessage& encrypted,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void Session::PreparePublicKey(const uint8_t* rsa_key,
|
||||
size_t rsa_key_length) {
|
||||
void Session::PreparePublicKey(const uint8_t* rsa_key, size_t rsa_key_length) {
|
||||
if (rsa_key == NULL) {
|
||||
rsa_key = kTestRSAPKCS8PrivateKeyInfo2_2048;
|
||||
rsa_key_length = sizeof(kTestRSAPKCS8PrivateKeyInfo2_2048);
|
||||
}
|
||||
uint8_t* p = const_cast<uint8_t*>(rsa_key);
|
||||
BIO* bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(p, rsa_key_length);
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != bio);
|
||||
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO* pkcs8_pki = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(bio, NULL);
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != pkcs8_pki);
|
||||
EVP_PKEY* evp = NULL;
|
||||
evp = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(pkcs8_pki);
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != evp);
|
||||
openssl_ptr<BIO, BIO_vfree> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(p, rsa_key_length));
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(bio.NotNull());
|
||||
openssl_ptr<PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free> pkcs8_pki(
|
||||
d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(bio.get(), NULL));
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(pkcs8_pki.NotNull());
|
||||
openssl_ptr<EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_free> evp(EVP_PKCS82PKEY(pkcs8_pki.get()));
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(evp.NotNull());
|
||||
if (public_rsa_) RSA_free(public_rsa_);
|
||||
public_rsa_ = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(evp);
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_free(evp);
|
||||
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(pkcs8_pki);
|
||||
BIO_free(bio);
|
||||
public_rsa_ = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(evp.get());
|
||||
if (!public_rsa_) {
|
||||
cout << "d2i_RSAPrivateKey failed. ";
|
||||
dump_openssl_error();
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(false);
|
||||
FAIL() << "Could not parse public RSA key.";
|
||||
}
|
||||
switch (RSA_check_key(public_rsa_)) {
|
||||
case 1: // valid.
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(true);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
case 0: // not valid.
|
||||
cout << "[rsa key not valid] ";
|
||||
dump_openssl_error();
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(false);
|
||||
default: // -1 == check failed.
|
||||
cout << "[error checking rsa key] ";
|
||||
dump_openssl_error();
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(false);
|
||||
case 1: // valid.
|
||||
return;
|
||||
case 0: // not valid.
|
||||
dump_openssl_error();
|
||||
FAIL() << "[rsa key not valid] ";
|
||||
default: // -1 == check failed.
|
||||
dump_openssl_error();
|
||||
FAIL() << "[error checking rsa key] ";
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool Session::VerifyPSSSignature(
|
||||
EVP_PKEY* pkey, const uint8_t* message, size_t message_length,
|
||||
const uint8_t* signature, size_t signature_length) {
|
||||
bool Session::VerifyPSSSignature(EVP_PKEY* pkey, const uint8_t* message,
|
||||
size_t message_length,
|
||||
const uint8_t* signature,
|
||||
size_t signature_length) {
|
||||
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
|
||||
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_CTX* pctx = NULL;
|
||||
@@ -656,28 +744,27 @@ bool Session::VerifyPSSSignature(
|
||||
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
err:
|
||||
dump_openssl_error();
|
||||
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void Session::VerifyRSASignature(
|
||||
const vector<uint8_t>& message, const uint8_t* signature,
|
||||
size_t signature_length, RSA_Padding_Scheme padding_scheme) {
|
||||
void Session::VerifyRSASignature(const vector<uint8_t>& message,
|
||||
const uint8_t* signature,
|
||||
size_t signature_length,
|
||||
RSA_Padding_Scheme padding_scheme) {
|
||||
EXPECT_TRUE(NULL != public_rsa_)
|
||||
<< "No public RSA key loaded in test code.\n";
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(static_cast<size_t>(RSA_size(public_rsa_)), signature_length)
|
||||
<< "Signature size is wrong. " << signature_length << ", should be "
|
||||
<< RSA_size(public_rsa_) << "\n";
|
||||
|
||||
if (padding_scheme == kSign_RSASSA_PSS) {
|
||||
EVP_PKEY* pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, public_rsa_) == 1);
|
||||
openssl_ptr<EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_free> pkey(EVP_PKEY_new());
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(1, EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey.get(), public_rsa_));
|
||||
|
||||
const bool ok = VerifyPSSSignature(pkey, &message[0], message.size(),
|
||||
const bool ok = VerifyPSSSignature(pkey.get(), &message[0], message.size(),
|
||||
signature, signature_length);
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
||||
EXPECT_TRUE(ok) << "PSS signature check failed.";
|
||||
} else if (padding_scheme == kSign_PKCS1_Block1) {
|
||||
vector<uint8_t> padded_digest(signature_length);
|
||||
@@ -694,51 +781,35 @@ void Session::VerifyRSASignature(
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool Session::GenerateRSASessionKey(vector<uint8_t>* enc_session_key) {
|
||||
bool Session::GenerateRSASessionKey(vector<uint8_t>* session_key,
|
||||
vector<uint8_t>* enc_session_key) {
|
||||
if (!public_rsa_) {
|
||||
cout << "No public RSA key loaded in test code.\n";
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
vector<uint8_t> session_key =
|
||||
wvcdm::a2b_hex("6fa479c731d2770b6a61a5d1420bb9d1");
|
||||
*session_key = wvcdm::a2b_hex("6fa479c731d2770b6a61a5d1420bb9d1");
|
||||
enc_session_key->assign(RSA_size(public_rsa_), 0);
|
||||
int status = RSA_public_encrypt(session_key.size(), &session_key[0],
|
||||
int status = RSA_public_encrypt(session_key->size(), &(session_key->front()),
|
||||
&(enc_session_key->front()), public_rsa_,
|
||||
RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
|
||||
int size = static_cast<int>(RSA_size(public_rsa_));
|
||||
if (status != size) {
|
||||
cout << "GenerateRSASessionKey error encrypting session key. ";
|
||||
cout << "GenerateRSASessionKey error encrypting session key.\n";
|
||||
dump_openssl_error();
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void Session::InstallRSASessionTestKey(
|
||||
const vector<uint8_t>& wrapped_rsa_key) {
|
||||
void Session::InstallRSASessionTestKey(const vector<uint8_t>& wrapped_rsa_key) {
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_LoadDeviceRSAKey(session_id(), &wrapped_rsa_key[0],
|
||||
wrapped_rsa_key.size()));
|
||||
GenerateDerivedKeysFromSessionKey();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void Session::DisallowDeriveKeys() {
|
||||
GenerateNonce(&nonce_);
|
||||
vector<uint8_t> enc_session_key;
|
||||
PreparePublicKey();
|
||||
ASSERT_TRUE(GenerateRSASessionKey(&enc_session_key));
|
||||
vector<uint8_t> mac_context;
|
||||
vector<uint8_t> enc_context;
|
||||
FillDefaultContext(&mac_context, &enc_context);
|
||||
ASSERT_NE(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_DeriveKeysFromSessionKey(
|
||||
session_id(), &enc_session_key[0], enc_session_key.size(),
|
||||
&mac_context[0], mac_context.size(), &enc_context[0],
|
||||
enc_context.size()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void Session::GenerateReport(
|
||||
const std::string& pst, bool expect_success, Session* other) {
|
||||
void Session::GenerateReport(const std::string& pst, bool expect_success,
|
||||
Session* other) {
|
||||
if (other) { // If other is specified, copy mac keys.
|
||||
mac_key_server_ = other->mac_key_server_;
|
||||
mac_key_client_ = other->mac_key_client_;
|
||||
@@ -780,12 +851,13 @@ OEMCrypto_PST_Report* Session::pst_report() {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void Session::DeleteEntry(const std::string& pst) {
|
||||
uint8_t* pst_ptr = encrypted_license_.pst;
|
||||
uint8_t* pst_ptr = encrypted_license().pst;
|
||||
memcpy(pst_ptr, pst.c_str(), min(sizeof(license_.pst), pst.length()));
|
||||
ServerSignMessage(encrypted_license_, &signature_);
|
||||
ServerSignBuffer(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&padded_message_),
|
||||
message_size_, &signature_);
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_DeleteUsageEntry(session_id(), pst_ptr, pst.length(),
|
||||
message_ptr(), sizeof(MessageData),
|
||||
message_ptr(), message_size_,
|
||||
&signature_[0], signature_.size()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -796,7 +868,13 @@ void Session::ForceDeleteEntry(const std::string& pst) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const uint8_t* Session::message_ptr() {
|
||||
return reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&encrypted_license_);
|
||||
return reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&encrypted_license());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void Session::set_message_size(size_t size) {
|
||||
message_size_ = size;
|
||||
ASSERT_GE(message_size_, sizeof(MessageData));
|
||||
ASSERT_LE(message_size_, kMaxMessageSize);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
} // namespace wvoec
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ void PrintTo(const PatternTestVariant& param, ostream* os);
|
||||
|
||||
namespace wvoec {
|
||||
|
||||
const size_t kNumKeys = 4;
|
||||
const size_t kMaxNumKeys = 20;
|
||||
|
||||
namespace {
|
||||
#if defined(TEST_SPEED_MULTIPLIER) // Can slow test time limits when
|
||||
@@ -66,7 +66,10 @@ const size_t kTestKeyIdMaxLength = 16;
|
||||
// Most content will use a key id that is 16 bytes long.
|
||||
const int kDefaultKeyIdLength = 16;
|
||||
|
||||
const size_t kMaxTestRSAKeyLength = 2000; // Rough estimate.
|
||||
const size_t kMaxTestRSAKeyLength = 2000; // Rough estimate.
|
||||
const size_t kMaxPSTLength = 255; // In specification.
|
||||
const size_t kMaxMessageSize = 8 * 1024; // In specification.
|
||||
const size_t kMaxDecryptSize = 100 * 1024; // In specification.
|
||||
|
||||
typedef struct {
|
||||
uint8_t key_id[kTestKeyIdMaxLength];
|
||||
@@ -83,12 +86,14 @@ typedef struct {
|
||||
|
||||
// This structure will be signed to simulate a message from the server.
|
||||
struct MessageData {
|
||||
MessageKeyData keys[kNumKeys];
|
||||
MessageKeyData keys[kMaxNumKeys];
|
||||
uint8_t mac_key_iv[wvcdm::KEY_IV_SIZE];
|
||||
uint8_t mac_keys[2 * wvcdm::MAC_KEY_SIZE];
|
||||
uint8_t pst[kTestKeyIdMaxLength];
|
||||
uint8_t pst[kMaxPSTLength];
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// This structure will be signed to simulate a provisioning response from the
|
||||
// server.
|
||||
struct RSAPrivateKeyMessage {
|
||||
uint8_t rsa_key[kMaxTestRSAKeyLength];
|
||||
uint8_t rsa_key_iv[wvcdm::KEY_IV_SIZE];
|
||||
@@ -113,79 +118,177 @@ class Session {
|
||||
Session();
|
||||
~Session();
|
||||
|
||||
// Returns the most recently generated nonce.
|
||||
// Valid after call to GenerateNonce.
|
||||
uint32_t get_nonce() { return nonce_; }
|
||||
|
||||
// Valid after call to open().
|
||||
uint32_t session_id() { return (uint32_t)session_id_; }
|
||||
|
||||
// Call OEMCrypto_OpenSession, with GTest ASSERTs.
|
||||
void open();
|
||||
// Call OEMCrypto_CloseSession, with GTest ASSERTs.
|
||||
void close();
|
||||
// Artifically set session id without calling OEMCrypto_OpenSession. This is
|
||||
// used in core/test/generic_crypto_unittest.cpp.
|
||||
void SetSessionId(uint32_t session_id);
|
||||
|
||||
uint32_t GetOecSessionId() { return session_id_; }
|
||||
void GenerateNonce(uint32_t* nonce, int* error_counter = NULL);
|
||||
// Generates one nonce. If error_counter is null, this will sleep 1 second
|
||||
// and try again if a nonce flood has been detected. If error_counter is
|
||||
// not null, it will be incremented when a nonce flood is detected.
|
||||
void GenerateNonce(int* error_counter = NULL);
|
||||
// Fill the vectors with test context which generate known mac and enc keys.
|
||||
void FillDefaultContext(vector<uint8_t>* mac_context,
|
||||
vector<uint8_t>* enc_context);
|
||||
// Generate known mac and enc keys using OEMCrypto_GenerateDerivedKeys and
|
||||
// also fill out enc_key_, mac_key_server_, and mac_key_client_.
|
||||
void GenerateDerivedKeysFromKeybox();
|
||||
// Generate known mac and enc keys using OEMCrypto_DeriveKeysFromSessionKey
|
||||
// and also fill out enc_key_, mac_key_server_, and mac_key_client_.
|
||||
void GenerateDerivedKeysFromSessionKey();
|
||||
void GenerateTestSessionKeys();
|
||||
// Loads and verifies the keys in the message pointed to by message_ptr()
|
||||
// using OEMCrypto_LoadKeys. This message should have already been created
|
||||
// by FillSimpleMessage, modified if needed, and then encrypted and signed by
|
||||
// the server's mac key in EncryptAndSign.
|
||||
void LoadTestKeys(const std::string& pst = "", bool new_mac_keys = true);
|
||||
// This uses OEMCrypto_QueryKeyControl to check that the keys in OEMCrypto
|
||||
// have the correct key control data.
|
||||
void VerifyTestKeys();
|
||||
// This creates a refresh key or license renewal message, signs it with the
|
||||
// server's mac key, and calls OEMCrypto_RefreshKeys.
|
||||
void RefreshTestKeys(const size_t key_count, uint32_t control_bits,
|
||||
uint32_t nonce, OEMCryptoResult expected_result);
|
||||
// This sets the key id in the current message data to the specified string.
|
||||
// This is used to test with different key id lengths.
|
||||
void SetKeyId(int index, const string& key_id);
|
||||
// This fills the data structure license_ with key information. This data
|
||||
// can be modified, and then should be encrypted and signed in EncryptAndSign
|
||||
// before being loaded in LoadTestKeys.
|
||||
void FillSimpleMessage(uint32_t duration, uint32_t control, uint32_t nonce,
|
||||
const std::string& pst = "");
|
||||
|
||||
// Like FillSimpleMessage, this fills encrypted_license_ with data. The name
|
||||
// is a little misleading: the license renewal message is not encrypted, it
|
||||
// is just signed. The signature is computed in RefreshTestKeys, above.
|
||||
void FillRefreshMessage(size_t key_count, uint32_t control_bits,
|
||||
uint32_t nonce);
|
||||
// This copies data from license_ to encrypted_license_, and then encrypts
|
||||
// each field in the key array appropriately. It then signes the buffer with
|
||||
// the server mac keys. It then fills out the key_array_ so that pointers in
|
||||
// that array point to the locations in the encrypted message.
|
||||
void EncryptAndSign();
|
||||
void EncryptMessage(RSAPrivateKeyMessage* data,
|
||||
RSAPrivateKeyMessage* encrypted);
|
||||
|
||||
template <typename T>
|
||||
void ServerSignMessage(const T& data, std::vector<uint8_t>* signature);
|
||||
|
||||
// This encrypts an RSAPrivateKeyMessage with encryption_key so that it may be
|
||||
// loaded with OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey.
|
||||
void EncryptProvisioningMessage(RSAPrivateKeyMessage* data,
|
||||
RSAPrivateKeyMessage* encrypted,
|
||||
const vector<uint8_t>& encryption_key);
|
||||
// Sign the buffer with server's mac key.
|
||||
void ServerSignBuffer(const uint8_t* data, size_t data_length,
|
||||
std::vector<uint8_t>* signature);
|
||||
// Sign the buffer with client's known mac key. Known test keys must be
|
||||
// installed first.
|
||||
void ClientSignMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& data,
|
||||
std::vector<uint8_t>* signature);
|
||||
// This checks the signature generated by OEMCrypto_GenerateSignature against
|
||||
// that generaged by ClientSignMessage.
|
||||
void VerifyClientSignature(size_t data_length = 400);
|
||||
// Set the pointers in key_array[*] to point values inside data. This is
|
||||
// needed to satisfy range checks in OEMCrypto_LoadKeys.
|
||||
void FillKeyArray(const MessageData& data, OEMCrypto_KeyObject* key_array);
|
||||
// As in FillKeyArray but for the license renewal message passed to
|
||||
// OEMCrypto_RefreshKeys.
|
||||
void FillRefreshArray(OEMCrypto_KeyRefreshObject* key_array,
|
||||
size_t key_count);
|
||||
void EncryptCTR(
|
||||
const vector<uint8_t>& in_buffer, const uint8_t *key,
|
||||
const uint8_t* starting_iv, vector<uint8_t>* out_buffer);
|
||||
// Encrypt a block of data using CTR mode.
|
||||
void EncryptCTR(const vector<uint8_t>& in_buffer, const uint8_t* key,
|
||||
const uint8_t* starting_iv, vector<uint8_t>* out_buffer);
|
||||
// Encrypt some data and pass to OEMCrypto_DecryptCENC to verify decryption.
|
||||
void TestDecryptCTR(bool select_key_first = true,
|
||||
OEMCryptoResult expected_result = OEMCrypto_SUCCESS);
|
||||
void MakeRSACertificate(
|
||||
struct RSAPrivateKeyMessage* encrypted, std::vector<uint8_t>* signature,
|
||||
uint32_t allowed_schemes, const vector<uint8_t>& rsa_key);
|
||||
OEMCryptoResult expected_result = OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
|
||||
int key_index = 0);
|
||||
// Calls OEMCrypto_GetOEMPublicCertificate and loads the OEM cert's public
|
||||
// rsa key into public_rsa_.
|
||||
void LoadOEMCert(bool verify_cert = false);
|
||||
// Creates RSAPrivateKeyMessage for the specified rsa_key, encrypts it with
|
||||
// the specified encryption key, and then signs it with the server's mac key.
|
||||
// If encryption_key is null, use the session's enc_key_.
|
||||
void MakeRSACertificate(struct RSAPrivateKeyMessage* encrypted,
|
||||
size_t message_size, std::vector<uint8_t>* signature,
|
||||
uint32_t allowed_schemes,
|
||||
const vector<uint8_t>& rsa_key,
|
||||
const vector<uint8_t>* encryption_key = NULL);
|
||||
// Calls OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey with the given provisioning response
|
||||
// message. If force is true, we assert that the key loads successfully.
|
||||
void RewrapRSAKey(const struct RSAPrivateKeyMessage& encrypted,
|
||||
const std::vector<uint8_t>& signature,
|
||||
size_t message_size, const std::vector<uint8_t>& signature,
|
||||
vector<uint8_t>* wrapped_key, bool force);
|
||||
// Loads the specified RSA public key into public_rsa_. If rsa_key is null,
|
||||
// the default test key is loaded.
|
||||
void PreparePublicKey(const uint8_t* rsa_key = NULL,
|
||||
size_t rsa_key_length = 0);
|
||||
static bool VerifyPSSSignature(
|
||||
EVP_PKEY* pkey, const uint8_t* message, size_t message_length,
|
||||
const uint8_t* signature, size_t signature_length);
|
||||
void VerifyRSASignature(
|
||||
const vector<uint8_t>& message, const uint8_t* signature,
|
||||
size_t signature_length, RSA_Padding_Scheme padding_scheme);
|
||||
bool GenerateRSASessionKey(vector<uint8_t>* enc_session_key);
|
||||
// Verifies the given signature is from the given message and RSA key, pkey.
|
||||
static bool VerifyPSSSignature(EVP_PKEY* pkey, const uint8_t* message,
|
||||
size_t message_length,
|
||||
const uint8_t* signature,
|
||||
size_t signature_length);
|
||||
// Verify that the message was signed by the private key associated with
|
||||
// |public_rsa_| using the specified padding scheme.
|
||||
void VerifyRSASignature(const vector<uint8_t>& message,
|
||||
const uint8_t* signature, size_t signature_length,
|
||||
RSA_Padding_Scheme padding_scheme);
|
||||
// Encrypts a known session key with public_rsa_ for use in future calls to
|
||||
// OEMCrypto_DeriveKeysFromSessionKey or OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey30.
|
||||
// The unencrypted session key is stored in session_key.
|
||||
bool GenerateRSASessionKey(vector<uint8_t>* session_key,
|
||||
vector<uint8_t>* enc_session_key);
|
||||
// Calls OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey30 with the given provisioning response
|
||||
// message. If force is true, we assert that the key loads successfully.
|
||||
void RewrapRSAKey30(const struct RSAPrivateKeyMessage& encrypted,
|
||||
size_t message_size,
|
||||
const std::vector<uint8_t>& encrypted_message_key,
|
||||
vector<uint8_t>* wrapped_key, bool force);
|
||||
// Loads the specified wrapped_rsa_key into OEMCrypto, and then runs
|
||||
// GenerateDerivedKeysFromSessionKey to install known encryption and mac keys.
|
||||
void InstallRSASessionTestKey(const vector<uint8_t>& wrapped_rsa_key);
|
||||
void DisallowDeriveKeys();
|
||||
// Generates a usage report for the specified pst. If expect_success is true,
|
||||
// the report's signature is verified, and several fields are given sanity
|
||||
// checks. If other is not null, then the mac keys are copied from other in
|
||||
// order to verify signatures.
|
||||
void GenerateReport(const std::string& pst, bool expect_success = true,
|
||||
Session* other = 0);
|
||||
// Returns a pointer to the usage report generated by the previous call to
|
||||
// GenerateReport.
|
||||
OEMCrypto_PST_Report* pst_report();
|
||||
// Creates a signed delete usage table entry message and calls
|
||||
// OEMCrypto_DeleteUsageEntry on it.
|
||||
void DeleteEntry(const std::string& pst);
|
||||
// Calls OEMCrypto_ForceDeleteUsageEntry to delete a usage table entry without
|
||||
// a signed message.
|
||||
void ForceDeleteEntry(const std::string& pst);
|
||||
|
||||
// The unencrypted license response or license renewal response.
|
||||
MessageData& license() { return license_; }
|
||||
MessageData& encrypted_license() { return encrypted_license_; }
|
||||
// The encrypted license response or license renewal response.
|
||||
MessageData& encrypted_license() { return padded_message_; }
|
||||
|
||||
// A pointer to the buffer holding encrypted_license.
|
||||
const uint8_t* message_ptr();
|
||||
|
||||
// An array of key objects for use in LoadKeys.
|
||||
OEMCrypto_KeyObject* key_array() { return key_array_; }
|
||||
// The last signature generated with the server's mac key.
|
||||
std::vector<uint8_t>& signature() { return signature_; }
|
||||
|
||||
// Set the number of keys to use in the license(), encrypted_license()
|
||||
// and key_array().
|
||||
void set_num_keys(int num_keys) { num_keys_ = num_keys; }
|
||||
// The current number of keys to use in the license(), encrypted_license()
|
||||
// and key_array().
|
||||
int num_keys() const { return num_keys_; }
|
||||
|
||||
// Set the size of the buffer used the encrypted license.
|
||||
// Must be between sizeof(MessageData) and kMaxMessageSize.
|
||||
void set_message_size(size_t size);
|
||||
// The size of the encrypted message.
|
||||
size_t message_size() { return message_size_; }
|
||||
|
||||
private:
|
||||
bool open_;
|
||||
bool forced_session_id_;
|
||||
@@ -197,9 +300,13 @@ class Session {
|
||||
RSA* public_rsa_;
|
||||
vector<uint8_t> pst_report_buffer_;
|
||||
MessageData license_;
|
||||
MessageData encrypted_license_;
|
||||
OEMCrypto_KeyObject key_array_[kNumKeys];
|
||||
struct PaddedMessageData : public MessageData {
|
||||
uint8_t padding[kMaxMessageSize - sizeof(MessageData)];
|
||||
} padded_message_;
|
||||
size_t message_size_; // How much of the padded message to use.
|
||||
OEMCrypto_KeyObject key_array_[kMaxNumKeys];
|
||||
std::vector<uint8_t> signature_;
|
||||
int num_keys_;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
} // namespace wvoec
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2016 Google Inc. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Test data for OEMCrypto unit tests.
|
||||
//
|
||||
#ifndef CDM_OEC_TEST_DATA_H_
|
||||
#define CDM_OEC_TEST_DATA_H_
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -21,21 +21,21 @@ namespace wvoec {
|
||||
// These tests are required for LollyPop Android devices.
|
||||
class OEMCryptoAndroidLMPTest : public ::testing::Test {
|
||||
protected:
|
||||
virtual void SetUp() {
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, OEMCrypto_Initialize());
|
||||
}
|
||||
virtual void SetUp() { ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, OEMCrypto_Initialize()); }
|
||||
|
||||
virtual void TearDown() {
|
||||
OEMCrypto_Terminate();
|
||||
}
|
||||
virtual void TearDown() { OEMCrypto_Terminate(); }
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Android devices must have a keybox.
|
||||
// Android devices must have a keybox, or use provisioning 3.0.
|
||||
TEST_F(OEMCryptoAndroidLMPTest, GetKeyDataImplemented) {
|
||||
uint8_t key_data[256];
|
||||
size_t key_data_len = sizeof(key_data);
|
||||
ASSERT_NE(OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_GetKeyData(key_data, &key_data_len));
|
||||
if (OEMCrypto_Keybox == OEMCrypto_GetProvisioningMethod()) {
|
||||
ASSERT_NE(OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_GetKeyData(key_data, &key_data_len));
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_OEMCertificate, OEMCrypto_GetProvisioningMethod());
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
TEST_F(OEMCryptoAndroidLMPTest, MinVersionNumber9) {
|
||||
@@ -48,15 +48,21 @@ TEST_F(OEMCryptoAndroidLMPTest, ValidKeyboxTest) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
TEST_F(OEMCryptoAndroidLMPTest, RewrapDeviceRSAKeyImplemented) {
|
||||
ASSERT_NE(OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey(0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL,
|
||||
NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL));
|
||||
if (OEMCrypto_Keybox == OEMCrypto_GetProvisioningMethod()) {
|
||||
ASSERT_NE(OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey(0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, 0,
|
||||
NULL, NULL, NULL));
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ASSERT_NE(OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey30(0, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL,
|
||||
NULL, NULL));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
TEST_F(OEMCryptoAndroidLMPTest, RSASignatureImplemented) {
|
||||
ASSERT_NE(OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_GenerateRSASignature(0, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL,
|
||||
kSign_RSASSA_PSS));
|
||||
ASSERT_NE(
|
||||
OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_GenerateRSASignature(0, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, kSign_RSASSA_PSS));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
TEST_F(OEMCryptoAndroidLMPTest, GenericCryptoImplemented) {
|
||||
@@ -66,12 +72,12 @@ TEST_F(OEMCryptoAndroidLMPTest, GenericCryptoImplemented) {
|
||||
ASSERT_NE(OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_Generic_Decrypt(0, NULL, 0, NULL,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_AES_CBC_128_NO_PADDING, NULL));
|
||||
ASSERT_NE(OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_Generic_Sign(0, NULL, 0,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_HMAC_SHA256, NULL, NULL));
|
||||
ASSERT_NE(OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_Generic_Verify(0, NULL, 0,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_HMAC_SHA256, NULL, 0));
|
||||
ASSERT_NE(
|
||||
OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_Generic_Sign(0, NULL, 0, OEMCrypto_HMAC_SHA256, NULL, NULL));
|
||||
ASSERT_NE(
|
||||
OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_Generic_Verify(0, NULL, 0, OEMCrypto_HMAC_SHA256, NULL, 0));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
TEST_F(OEMCryptoAndroidLMPTest, SupportsUsageTable) {
|
||||
@@ -96,7 +102,12 @@ TEST_F(OEMCryptoAndroidMNCTest, MinVersionNumber10) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
TEST_F(OEMCryptoAndroidMNCTest, LoadsTestKeyboxImplemented) {
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, OEMCrypto_LoadTestKeybox());
|
||||
if (OEMCrypto_Keybox == OEMCrypto_GetProvisioningMethod()) {
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, OEMCrypto_LoadTestKeybox());
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// Android should use keybox or provisioning 3.0.
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_OEMCertificate, OEMCrypto_GetProvisioningMethod());
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
TEST_F(OEMCryptoAndroidMNCTest, NumberOfSessionsImplemented) {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
|
||||
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
|
||||
#include <iostream>
|
||||
|
||||
#include "OEMCryptoCENC.h"
|
||||
#include "log.h"
|
||||
#include "oec_device_features.h"
|
||||
#include "OEMCryptoCENC.h"
|
||||
#include "properties.h"
|
||||
|
||||
static void acknowledge_cast() {
|
||||
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv) {
|
||||
bool is_cast_receiver = false;
|
||||
bool force_load_test_keybox = false;
|
||||
bool filter_tests = true;
|
||||
for(int i=0; i < argc; i++) {
|
||||
for (int i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
|
||||
if (!strcmp(argv[i], "--cast")) {
|
||||
acknowledge_cast();
|
||||
is_cast_receiver = true;
|
||||
@@ -29,15 +29,15 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv) {
|
||||
force_load_test_keybox = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!strcmp(argv[i], "--no_filter")) {
|
||||
filter_tests = false;
|
||||
filter_tests = false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
wvoec::global_features.Initialize(is_cast_receiver, force_load_test_keybox);
|
||||
// If the user requests --no_filter, we don't change the filter, otherwise, we
|
||||
// filter out features that are not supported.
|
||||
if (filter_tests) {
|
||||
::testing::GTEST_FLAG(filter)
|
||||
= wvoec::global_features.RestrictFilter(::testing::GTEST_FLAG(filter));
|
||||
::testing::GTEST_FLAG(filter) =
|
||||
wvoec::global_features.RestrictFilter(::testing::GTEST_FLAG(filter));
|
||||
}
|
||||
return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user