OEMCrypto v15.2
See the file docs/Widevine_Modular_DRM_Version_15_Delta.pdf for changes since version 15.1.
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oem_certificate_generator/oem_certificate_test_helper.py
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158
oem_certificate_generator/oem_certificate_test_helper.py
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@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
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# Copyright 2017 Google LLC. All Rights Reserved.
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"""Common test utility functions for OEM certificate generation."""
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import datetime
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import StringIO
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from cryptography import x509
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from cryptography.hazmat import backends
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa
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from cryptography.x509 import oid
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import oem_certificate
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_COUNTRY_NAME = 'US'
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_STATE_OR_PROVINCE_NAME = 'WA'
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_LOCALITY_NAME = 'Kirkland'
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_ORGANIZATION_NAME = 'CompanyXYZ'
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_ORGANIZATIONAL_UNIT_NAME = 'ContentProtection'
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_NOT_VALID_BEFORE = datetime.datetime(2001, 8, 9)
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_VALID_DURATION = 100
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_LEAF_CERT_VALID_DURATION = 8000
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_SYSTEM_ID = 2001
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_ROOT_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSPHRASE = 'root_passphrase'
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class ArgParseObject(object):
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"""A convenient object to allow adding arbitrary attribute to it."""
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def create_root_certificate_and_key():
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"""Creates a root certificate and key."""
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key = rsa.generate_private_key(
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public_exponent=65537,
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key_size=3072,
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backend=backends.default_backend())
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subject_name = x509.Name(
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[x509.NameAttribute(oid.NameOID.COMMON_NAME, u'root_cert')])
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certificate = oem_certificate.build_certificate(
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subject_name, subject_name, None,
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datetime.datetime(2001, 8, 9), 1000, key.public_key(), key, True)
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return (key, certificate)
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def setup_csr_args(country_name=_COUNTRY_NAME,
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state_or_province_name=_STATE_OR_PROVINCE_NAME,
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locality_name=_LOCALITY_NAME,
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organization_name=_ORGANIZATION_NAME,
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organizational_unit_name=_ORGANIZATIONAL_UNIT_NAME,
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key_size=4096,
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output_csr_file=None,
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output_private_key_file=None,
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passphrase=None,
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common_name=None):
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"""Sets up arguments to OEM Certificate generator for generating csr."""
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args = ArgParseObject()
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args.key_size = key_size
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args.country_name = country_name
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args.state_or_province_name = state_or_province_name
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args.locality_name = locality_name
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args.organization_name = organization_name
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args.organizational_unit_name = organizational_unit_name
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args.common_name = common_name
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if output_csr_file:
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args.output_csr_file = output_csr_file
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else:
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args.output_csr_file = StringIO.StringIO()
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if output_private_key_file:
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args.output_private_key_file = output_private_key_file
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else:
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args.output_private_key_file = StringIO.StringIO()
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args.passphrase = passphrase
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return args
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def setup_intermediate_cert_args(
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csr_bytes, root_key, root_certificate, not_valid_before=_NOT_VALID_BEFORE,
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valid_duration=_VALID_DURATION, system_id=_SYSTEM_ID,
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root_private_key_passphrase=_ROOT_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSPHRASE,
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output_certificate_file=None):
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"""Sets up args to OEM Cert generator for generating intermediate cert."""
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args = ArgParseObject()
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args.not_valid_before = not_valid_before
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args.valid_duration = valid_duration
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args.system_id = system_id
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args.csr_file = StringIO.StringIO(csr_bytes)
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args.root_private_key_passphrase = root_private_key_passphrase
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if output_certificate_file:
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args.output_certificate_file = output_certificate_file
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else:
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args.output_certificate_file = StringIO.StringIO()
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serialized_private_key = root_key.private_bytes(
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serialization.Encoding.DER,
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format=serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8,
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encryption_algorithm=serialization.BestAvailableEncryption(
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args.root_private_key_passphrase))
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serialized_certificate = root_certificate.public_bytes(
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serialization.Encoding.DER)
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args.root_certificate_file = StringIO.StringIO(serialized_certificate)
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args.root_private_key_file = StringIO.StringIO(serialized_private_key)
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return args
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def setup_leaf_cert_args(intermediate_key_bytes,
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intermediate_certificate_bytes,
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key_size=1024,
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passphrase=None,
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not_valid_before=_NOT_VALID_BEFORE,
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valid_duration=_LEAF_CERT_VALID_DURATION,
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output_certificate_file=None,
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output_private_key_file=None):
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"""Sets up args to OEM Certificate generator for generating leaf cert."""
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args = ArgParseObject()
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args.key_size = key_size
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args.not_valid_before = not_valid_before
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args.valid_duration = valid_duration
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args.intermediate_private_key_passphrase = None
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if output_certificate_file:
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args.output_certificate_file = output_certificate_file
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else:
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args.output_certificate_file = StringIO.StringIO()
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if output_private_key_file:
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args.output_private_key_file = output_private_key_file
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else:
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args.output_private_key_file = StringIO.StringIO()
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args.passphrase = passphrase
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args.intermediate_private_key_file = StringIO.StringIO(
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intermediate_key_bytes)
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args.intermediate_certificate_file = StringIO.StringIO(
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intermediate_certificate_bytes)
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return args
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def create_intermediate_certificate_and_key_bytes(key_size=4096,
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passphrase=None,
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pem_format=True):
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"""Creates an intermediate certificate and key."""
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csr_args = setup_csr_args(key_size=key_size, passphrase=passphrase)
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oem_certificate.generate_csr(csr_args)
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csr_bytes = csr_args.output_csr_file.getvalue()
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root_key, root_certificate = create_root_certificate_and_key()
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args = setup_intermediate_cert_args(csr_bytes, root_key, root_certificate)
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oem_certificate.generate_intermediate_certificate(args)
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cert_bytes = args.output_certificate_file.getvalue()
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if pem_format:
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cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(cert_bytes,
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backends.default_backend())
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cert_bytes = cert.public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM)
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return (csr_args.output_private_key_file.getvalue(), cert_bytes)
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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
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* Reference APIs needed to support Widevine's crypto algorithms.
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*
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* See the document "WV Modular DRM Security Integration Guide for Common
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* Encryption (CENC) -- version 15" for a description of this API. You
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* Encryption (CENC) -- version 15.2" for a description of this API. You
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* can find this document in the widevine repository as
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* docs/WidevineModularDRMSecurityIntegrationGuideforCENC_v15.pdf
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* Changes between different versions of this API are documented in the files
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@@ -339,9 +339,9 @@ typedef enum OEMCrypto_Clock_Security_Level {
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typedef uint8_t RSA_Padding_Scheme;
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// RSASSA-PSS with SHA1.
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const RSA_Padding_Scheme kSign_RSASSA_PSS = 0x1;
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#define kSign_RSASSA_PSS ((RSA_Padding_Scheme)0x1)
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// PKCS1 with block type 1 padding (only).
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const RSA_Padding_Scheme kSign_PKCS1_Block1 = 0x2;
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#define kSign_PKCS1_Block1 ((RSA_Padding_Scheme)0x2)
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/*
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* OEMCrypto_HDCP_Capability is used in the key control block to enforce HDCP
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@@ -376,9 +376,9 @@ typedef enum OEMCrypto_ProvisioningMethod {
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/*
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* Flags indicating full decrypt path hash supported.
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*/
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const uint32_t OEMCrypto_Hash_Not_Supported = 0;
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const uint32_t OEMCrypto_CRC_Clear_Buffer = 1;
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const uint32_t OEMCrypto_Partner_Defined_Hash = 2;
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#define OEMCrypto_Hash_Not_Supported 0
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#define OEMCrypto_CRC_Clear_Buffer 1
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#define OEMCrypto_Partner_Defined_Hash 2
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/*
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* Return values from OEMCrypto_GetAnalogOutputFlags.
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@@ -800,13 +800,17 @@ OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_DeriveKeysFromSessionKey(
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* before requesting more nonces, then OEMCrypto will reset the error
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* condition and generate valid nonces again.
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*
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* To prevent Birthday Paradox attacks, OEMCrypto shall verify that the value
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* generated is not in this session's nonce table, and that it is not in the
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* nonce table of any other session.
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*
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* Parameters:
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* [in] session: handle for the session to be used.
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* [out] nonce: pointer to memory to receive the computed nonce.
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*
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* Results:
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* nonce: the nonce is also stored in secure memory. At least 4 nonces should
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* be stored for each session.
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* nonce: the nonce is also stored in secure memory. Each session should
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* store 4 nonces.
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*
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* Returns:
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* OEMCrypto_SUCCESS success
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@@ -817,11 +821,9 @@ OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_DeriveKeysFromSessionKey(
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* OEMCrypto_ERROR_SYSTEM_INVALIDATED
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*
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* Threading:
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* This is a "Session Function" and may be called simultaneously with session
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* functions for other sessions but not simultaneously with other functions
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* for this session. It will not be called simultaneously with initialization
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* or usage table functions. It is as if the CDM holds a write lock for this
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* session, and a read lock on the OEMCrypto system.
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* This is a "Session Initialization Function" and will not be called
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* simultaneously with any other function, as if the CDM holds a write lock
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* on the OEMCrypto system.
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*
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* Version:
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* This method changed in API version 5.
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@@ -1049,6 +1051,9 @@ OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_LoadSRM(const uint8_t* buffer, size_t buffer_length);
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* entry is marked as "inactive" (either kInactiveUsed or
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* kInactiveUnused), then the keys are not loaded, and the error
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* OEMCrypto_ERROR_LICENSE_INACTIVE is returned.
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* 12. The data in enc_mac_keys_iv is not identical to the 16 bytes before
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* enc_mac_keys. If it is, return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT.
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*
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* Usage Table and Provider Session Token (pst)
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*
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* If a key control block has a nonzero value for Replay_Control, then all
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@@ -1627,8 +1632,8 @@ OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_SelectKey(OEMCrypto_SESSION session,
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* 6. If the current session has an entry in the Usage Table, and the
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* status of that entry is either kInactiveUsed or kInactiveUnused, then
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* return the error OEMCrypto_ERROR_LICENSE_INACTIVE.
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* 7. If an Decrypt Hash has been initialized via OEMCrypto_SetDecryptHash,
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* and the current key's control block does not have the
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* 7. If a Decrypt Hash has been initialized via OEMCrypto_SetDecryptHash,
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* and the current key's control block does not have the
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* Allow_Hash_Verification bit set, then do not compute a hash and
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* return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE.
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* If the flag is_encrypted is false, then no verification is performed. This
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@@ -2201,7 +2206,7 @@ OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_InstallKeyboxOrOEMCert(const uint8_t* rot,
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* Version:
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* This method is new API version 12.
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*/
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OEMCrypto_ProvisioningMethod OEMCrypto_GetProvisioningMethod();
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OEMCrypto_ProvisioningMethod OEMCrypto_GetProvisioningMethod(void);
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/*
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* OEMCrypto_IsKeyboxOrOEMCertValid
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@@ -2257,7 +2262,7 @@ OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_IsKeyboxOrOEMCertValid(void);
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* system upgrade.
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*
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* This function is optional but recommended for Provisioning 3.0 in API v15.
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* It may be required for future version of this API.
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* It may be required for a future version of this API.
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*
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* Parameters:
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* [out] deviceId - pointer to the buffer that receives the Device ID
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@@ -2459,7 +2464,7 @@ OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_GetRandom(uint8_t* randomData, size_t dataLength);
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* Version:
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* This method changed in each API version.
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*/
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uint32_t OEMCrypto_APIVersion();
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uint32_t OEMCrypto_APIVersion(void);
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/*
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* OEMCrypto_BuildInformation
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@@ -2497,7 +2502,7 @@ uint32_t OEMCrypto_APIVersion();
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* Version:
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* This method changed in each API version.
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*/
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const char* OEMCrypto_BuildInformation();
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const char* OEMCrypto_BuildInformation(void);
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/*
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* OEMCrypto_Security_Patch_Level
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@@ -2524,7 +2529,7 @@ const char* OEMCrypto_BuildInformation();
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* Version:
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* This method was introduced in API version 11.
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*/
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uint8_t OEMCrypto_Security_Patch_Level();
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uint8_t OEMCrypto_Security_Patch_Level(void);
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/*
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* OEMCrypto_SecurityLevel
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@@ -2550,7 +2555,7 @@ uint8_t OEMCrypto_Security_Patch_Level();
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* Version:
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* This method changed in API version 6.
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*/
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const char* OEMCrypto_SecurityLevel();
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const char* OEMCrypto_SecurityLevel(void);
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/*
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* OEMCrypto_GetHDCPCapability
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@@ -2565,12 +2570,6 @@ const char* OEMCrypto_SecurityLevel();
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* instead of HDMI output. Notice that HDCP must use flag Type 1: all
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* downstream devices will also use the same version or higher.
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*
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* The current HDCP should be the minimum value of any display currently
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* connected through any channel, either through HDMI or a supported wireless
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* format. The current value can be used by the application or server to
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* decide which license can currently be used. If the key control block
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* requires the current HDCP level, we expect the key to be usable.
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*
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* The maximum HDCP level should be the maximum value that the device can
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* enforce. For example, if the device has an HDCP 1.0 port and an HDCP 2.0
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* port, and the first port can be disabled, then the maximum is HDCP 2.0. If
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@@ -2581,6 +2580,30 @@ const char* OEMCrypto_SecurityLevel();
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* user intends to view the content on a local display. The user will want to
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* download the higher quality content.
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*
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* The current HDCP level should be the level of HDCP currently negotiated
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* with any connected receivers or repeaters either through HDMI or a
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* supported wireless format. If multiple ports are connected, the current
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* level should be the minimum HDCP level of all ports. If the key control
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* block requires an HDCP level equal to or lower than the current HDCP
|
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* level, the key is expected to be usable. If the key control block requires
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* a higher HDCP level, the key is expected to be forbidden.
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*
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* When a key has version HDCP_V2_3 required in the key control block, the
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* transmitter must have HDCP version 2.3 and have negotiated a connection
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* with a version 2.3 receiver or repeater. The transmitter must configure
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* the content stream to be Type 1. Since the transmitter cannot distinguish
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* between 2.2 and 2.3 downstream receivers when connected to a repeater, it
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* may transmit to both 2.2 and 2.3 receivers, but not 2.1 receivers.
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*
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* For example, if the transmitter is 2.3, and is connected to a receiver
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* that supports 2.3 then the current level is HDCP_V2_3. If the transmitter
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* is 2.3 and is connected to a 2.3 repeater, the current level is HDCP_V2_3
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* even though the repeater can negotiate a connection with a 2.2 downstream
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* receiver for a Type 1 Content Stream.
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*
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* As another example, if the transmitter can support 2.3, but a receiver
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* supports 2.0, then the current level is HDCP_V2.
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*
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* When a license requires HDCP, a device may use a wireless protocol to
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* connect to a display only if that protocol supports the version of HDCP as
|
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* required by the license. Both WirelessHD (formerly WiFi Display) and
|
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@@ -2633,7 +2656,7 @@ OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_GetHDCPCapability(OEMCrypto_HDCP_Capability* current,
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* Version:
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* This method changed in API version 9.
|
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*/
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bool OEMCrypto_SupportsUsageTable();
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bool OEMCrypto_SupportsUsageTable(void);
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/*
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* OEMCrypto_IsAntiRollbackHwPresent
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@@ -2661,7 +2684,7 @@ bool OEMCrypto_SupportsUsageTable();
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* Version:
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* This method is new in API version 10.
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*/
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bool OEMCrypto_IsAntiRollbackHwPresent();
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bool OEMCrypto_IsAntiRollbackHwPresent(void);
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/*
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* OEMCrypto_GetNumberOfOpenSessions
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@@ -2762,7 +2785,7 @@ OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_GetMaxNumberOfSessions(size_t* max);
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* Version:
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||||
* This method changed in API version 13.
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*/
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uint32_t OEMCrypto_SupportedCertificates();
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uint32_t OEMCrypto_SupportedCertificates(void);
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||||
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||||
/*
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||||
* OEMCrypto_IsSRMUpdateSupported
|
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@@ -2789,7 +2812,7 @@ uint32_t OEMCrypto_SupportedCertificates();
|
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* Version:
|
||||
* This method changed in API version 13.
|
||||
*/
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bool OEMCrypto_IsSRMUpdateSupported();
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bool OEMCrypto_IsSRMUpdateSupported(void);
|
||||
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||||
/*
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* OEMCrypto_GetCurrentSRMVersion
|
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@@ -2856,7 +2879,7 @@ OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_GetCurrentSRMVersion(uint16_t* version);
|
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* Version:
|
||||
* This method is new in API version 14.
|
||||
*/
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uint32_t OEMCrypto_GetAnalogOutputFlags();
|
||||
uint32_t OEMCrypto_GetAnalogOutputFlags(void);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* OEMCrypto_ResourceRatingTier
|
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@@ -2865,7 +2888,7 @@ uint32_t OEMCrypto_GetAnalogOutputFlags();
|
||||
* This function returns a positive number indicating which resource rating
|
||||
* it supports. This value will bubble up to the application level as a
|
||||
* property. This will allow applications to estimate what resolution and
|
||||
* bandwidth the device expects to support.
|
||||
* bandwidth the device is expected to support.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* OEMCrypto unit tests and Android GTS tests will verify that devices do
|
||||
* support the resource values specified in the table below at the tier
|
||||
@@ -2925,8 +2948,6 @@ uint32_t OEMCrypto_GetAnalogOutputFlags();
|
||||
* +-----------------------------------+-----------+------------+-----------+
|
||||
* |Number of keys per session |4 |20 |20 |
|
||||
* +-----------------------------------+-----------+------------+-----------+
|
||||
* |Simultaneous secure playback |1 |2 |2 |
|
||||
* +-----------------------------------+-----------+------------+-----------+
|
||||
* |Decrypted Frames per Second |30 fps SD |30 fps HD |60 fps HD |
|
||||
* +-----------------------------------+-----------+------------+-----------+
|
||||
*
|
||||
@@ -2945,7 +2966,7 @@ uint32_t OEMCrypto_GetAnalogOutputFlags();
|
||||
* Version:
|
||||
* This method is new in API version 15.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
uint32_t OEMCrypto_ResourceRatingTier();
|
||||
uint32_t OEMCrypto_ResourceRatingTier(void);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey30
|
||||
@@ -3306,7 +3327,7 @@ OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_LoadDeviceRSAKey(OEMCrypto_SESSION session,
|
||||
* Version:
|
||||
* This method is new in API version 10.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_LoadTestRSAKey();
|
||||
OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_LoadTestRSAKey(void);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* OEMCrypto_GenerateRSASignature
|
||||
@@ -3648,8 +3669,10 @@ OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_UpdateUsageEntry(OEMCrypto_SESSION session,
|
||||
* means that the state of the usage entry is changed to InactiveUsed if it
|
||||
* was Active, or InactiveUnused if it was Unused. This also increments the
|
||||
* entry's generation number, and the header's master generation number. The
|
||||
* entry's flag ForbidReport will be set. This flag prevents an application
|
||||
* from generating a report of a deactivated license without first saving the
|
||||
* corresponding generation number in the usage table header is also
|
||||
* incremented so that it matches the one in the entry. The entry's flag
|
||||
* ForbidReport will be set. This flag prevents an application from
|
||||
* generating a report of a deactivated license without first saving the
|
||||
* entry.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* It is allowed to call this function multiple times. If the state is
|
||||
@@ -3954,14 +3977,14 @@ OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_CopyOldUsageEntry(OEMCrypto_SESSION session,
|
||||
* Version:
|
||||
* This method is new in API version 13.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_DeleteOldUsageTable();
|
||||
OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_DeleteOldUsageTable(void);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* OEMCrypto_RemoveSRM
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Description:
|
||||
* Delete the current SRM. Any valid SRM, regardless of version number, will
|
||||
* be installable after this via OEMCrypto_LoadSRM.
|
||||
* Delete the current SRM. Any valid SRM, regardless of its version number,
|
||||
* will be installable after this via OEMCrypto_LoadSRM.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This function should not be implemented on production devices, and will
|
||||
* only be used to verify unit tests on a test device.
|
||||
@@ -3981,7 +4004,7 @@ OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_DeleteOldUsageTable();
|
||||
* Version:
|
||||
* This method is new in API version 13.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_RemoveSRM();
|
||||
OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_RemoveSRM(void);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* OEMCrypto_CreateOldUsageEntry
|
||||
@@ -4027,7 +4050,7 @@ OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_CreateOldUsageEntry(uint64_t time_since_license_receiv
|
||||
* supported. OEMCrypto is not required by Google to support this feature,
|
||||
* but support will greatly improve automated testing. A hash type of
|
||||
* OEMCrypto_CRC_Clear_Buffer = 1 means the device will be able to compute
|
||||
* the CRC32 checksum of the decrypted content in the secure buffer after a
|
||||
* the CRC 32 checksum of the decrypted content in the secure buffer after a
|
||||
* call to OEMCrypto_DecryptCENC. Google intends to provide test applications
|
||||
* on some platforms, such as Android, that will automate decryption testing
|
||||
* using the CRC 32 checksum of all frames in some test content.
|
||||
@@ -4055,7 +4078,7 @@ OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_CreateOldUsageEntry(uint64_t time_since_license_receiv
|
||||
* Version:
|
||||
* This method is new in API version 15.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
uint32_t OEMCrypto_SupportsDecryptHash();
|
||||
uint32_t OEMCrypto_SupportsDecryptHash(void);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* OEMCrypto_SetDecryptHash
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -182,6 +182,14 @@ time_t CryptoEngine::RollbackCorrectedOfflineTime() {
|
||||
return current_time;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool CryptoEngine::NonceCollision(uint32_t nonce) {
|
||||
for (const auto & session_pair : sessions_) {
|
||||
const SessionContext* session = session_pair.second;
|
||||
if (session->NonceCollision(nonce)) return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
OEMCrypto_HDCP_Capability CryptoEngine::config_current_hdcp_capability() {
|
||||
return config_local_display_only() ? HDCP_NO_DIGITAL_OUTPUT : HDCP_V1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -91,6 +91,10 @@ class CryptoEngine {
|
||||
|
||||
time_t RollbackCorrectedOfflineTime();
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify that this nonce does not collide with another nonce in any session's
|
||||
// nonce table.
|
||||
virtual bool NonceCollision(uint32_t nonce);
|
||||
|
||||
// Returns the HDCP version currently in use.
|
||||
virtual OEMCrypto_HDCP_Capability config_current_hdcp_capability();
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -58,6 +58,13 @@ bool NonceTable::CheckNonce(uint32_t nonce) {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool NonceTable::NonceCollision(uint32_t nonce) const {
|
||||
for (int i = 0; i < kTableSize; ++i) {
|
||||
if (nonce == nonces_[i]) return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void NonceTable::Flush() {
|
||||
for (int i = 0; i < kTableSize; ++i) {
|
||||
if (kNTStateFlushPending == state_[i]) {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ namespace wvoec_ref {
|
||||
|
||||
class NonceTable {
|
||||
public:
|
||||
static const int kTableSize = 16;
|
||||
static const int kTableSize = 4;
|
||||
NonceTable() {
|
||||
for (int i = 0; i < kTableSize; ++i) {
|
||||
state_[i] = kNTStateInvalid;
|
||||
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ class NonceTable {
|
||||
~NonceTable() {}
|
||||
void AddNonce(uint32_t nonce);
|
||||
bool CheckNonce(uint32_t nonce);
|
||||
// Verify that the nonce is not the same as any in this table.
|
||||
bool NonceCollision(uint32_t nonce) const;
|
||||
void Flush();
|
||||
|
||||
private:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -189,13 +189,15 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_GenerateNonce(OEMCrypto_SESSION session,
|
||||
last_nonce_time = now;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
uint32_t nonce_value;
|
||||
uint32_t nonce_value = 0;
|
||||
uint8_t* nonce_string = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&nonce_value);
|
||||
|
||||
// Generate 4 bytes of random data
|
||||
if (!RAND_bytes(nonce_string, 4)) {
|
||||
LOGE("[OEMCrypto_GenerateNonce(): Random bytes failure]");
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
||||
while (nonce_value == 0 || crypto_engine->NonceCollision(nonce_value)) {
|
||||
// Generate 4 bytes of random data
|
||||
if (!RAND_bytes(nonce_string, 4)) {
|
||||
LOGE("[OEMCrypto_GenerateNonce(): Random bytes failure]");
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
session_ctx->AddNonce(nonce_value);
|
||||
*nonce = nonce_value;
|
||||
@@ -281,9 +283,8 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(
|
||||
!RangeCheck(message_length, enc_mac_keys, true) ||
|
||||
!RangeCheck(message_length, pst, true) ||
|
||||
!RangeCheck(message_length, srm_restriction_data, true)) {
|
||||
LOGE(
|
||||
"[OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(): OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT - range "
|
||||
"check.]");
|
||||
LOGE("[OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(): OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT - "
|
||||
"range check.]");
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -293,13 +294,25 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(
|
||||
!RangeCheck(message_length, key_array[i].key_data_iv, false) ||
|
||||
!RangeCheck(message_length, key_array[i].key_control, false) ||
|
||||
!RangeCheck(message_length, key_array[i].key_control_iv, false)) {
|
||||
LOGE(
|
||||
"[OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(): OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT -range "
|
||||
"check %d]",
|
||||
i);
|
||||
LOGE("[OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(): OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT - "
|
||||
"range check %d]", i);
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (enc_mac_keys.offset >= wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE && enc_mac_keys.length > 0) {
|
||||
if (enc_mac_keys_iv.offset + wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE == enc_mac_keys.offset) {
|
||||
LOGE("[OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(): OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT - "
|
||||
"range check iv]");
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if (memcmp(message + enc_mac_keys.offset - wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE,
|
||||
message + enc_mac_keys_iv.offset, wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE) == 0) {
|
||||
LOGE("[OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(): OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT - "
|
||||
"suspicious iv]");
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return session_ctx->LoadKeys(message, message_length, signature,
|
||||
signature_length, enc_mac_keys_iv, enc_mac_keys,
|
||||
num_keys, key_array, pst, srm_restriction_data,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2018 Google LLC. All Rights Reserved. This file and proprietary
|
||||
// source code may only be used and distributed under the Widevine Master
|
||||
// License Agreement.
|
||||
#ifndef OEMCRYPTO_SCOPED_PTR_H_
|
||||
#define OEMCRYPTO_SCOPED_PTR_H_
|
||||
|
||||
#include <stddef.h>
|
||||
#include <memory>
|
||||
|
||||
#include <arpa/inet.h>
|
||||
|
||||
namespace wvoec_ref {
|
||||
|
||||
// TODO(fredgc, jfore): scoped_ptr may not be the best name for this smart
|
||||
// pointer type. It basically works like auto_ptr which is deprecated.
|
||||
#if __cplusplus < 201103L
|
||||
|
||||
template <typename T>
|
||||
class scoped_ptr {
|
||||
public:
|
||||
explicit scoped_ptr(T* p = NULL) : ptr_(p) {}
|
||||
T* get() const { return ptr_.get(); }
|
||||
void reset(T* p = NULL) { ptr_.reset(p); }
|
||||
|
||||
private:
|
||||
std::auto_ptr<T> ptr_;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
#else
|
||||
|
||||
template <typename T>
|
||||
class scoped_ptr {
|
||||
public:
|
||||
explicit scoped_ptr(T* p = nullptr) : ptr_(p) {}
|
||||
scoped_ptr(scoped_ptr& r) { ptr_ = std::move(r.ptr_); }
|
||||
T& operator*() const { return *ptr_; }
|
||||
T* operator->() const { return ptr_.get(); }
|
||||
T* get() const { return ptr_.get(); }
|
||||
void reset(T* p = NULL) { ptr_.reset(p); }
|
||||
|
||||
private:
|
||||
std::unique_ptr<T> ptr_;
|
||||
};
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
} // namespace wvoec_ref
|
||||
|
||||
#endif // OEMCRYPTO_SCOPED_PTR_H_
|
||||
@@ -636,6 +636,7 @@ OEMCryptoResult SessionContext::LoadKeys(
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
encryption_key_.clear();
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_SUCCESS;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -173,6 +173,10 @@ class SessionContext {
|
||||
|
||||
void AddNonce(uint32_t nonce);
|
||||
bool CheckNonce(uint32_t nonce);
|
||||
// Verify that the nonce does not match any in this session's nonce table.
|
||||
bool NonceCollision(uint32_t nonce) const {
|
||||
return nonce_table_.NonceCollision(nonce);
|
||||
}
|
||||
void FlushNonces();
|
||||
|
||||
virtual OEMCryptoResult CreateNewUsageEntry(uint32_t* usage_entry_number);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -153,33 +153,12 @@ std::string DeviceFeatures::RestrictFilter(const std::string& initial_filter) {
|
||||
if (provisioning_method
|
||||
!= OEMCrypto_OEMCertificate) FilterOut(&filter, "*Prov30*");
|
||||
if (!supports_rsa_3072) FilterOut(&filter, "*RSAKey3072*");
|
||||
if (api_version < 14) {
|
||||
// Because API 13 uses an old hard coded test keybox, none of these tests
|
||||
// will pass. Partners who wish to test with a v13 OEMCrypto should use
|
||||
// code on an older v13 branch.
|
||||
printf("These unit tests are designed for OEMCrypto API 15 and above.\n");
|
||||
printf("This device has an OEMCrypto with API version %d.\n", api_version);
|
||||
printf("To verify correctness, please build unit tests from a "
|
||||
"compatible branch.\n");
|
||||
FilterOut(&filter, "*API09*");
|
||||
FilterOut(&filter, "*API10*");
|
||||
FilterOut(&filter, "*API11*");
|
||||
FilterOut(&filter, "*API12*");
|
||||
FilterOut(&filter, "*API13*");
|
||||
FilterOut(&filter, "*API14*");
|
||||
FilterOut(&filter, "*TestKeyboxTest*");
|
||||
FilterOut(&filter, "*SessionTest*");
|
||||
FilterOut(&filter, "*UsageTable*");
|
||||
FilterOut(&filter, "*GenericCrypto*");
|
||||
FilterOut(&filter, "*LoadsCertificate*");
|
||||
FilterOut(&filter, "*UsesCertificate*");
|
||||
// We also expect some CDM tests to fail without a new test keybox:
|
||||
FilterOut(&filter, "*WvCdmRequestLicenseTest*");
|
||||
FilterOut(&filter, "*WvGenericOperations*");
|
||||
FilterOut(&filter, "*WvCdmEngine*");
|
||||
FilterOut(&filter, "*Cdm/WvCdm*");
|
||||
FilterOut(&filter, "*Cdm/WvHls*");
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (api_version < 9) FilterOut(&filter, "*API09*");
|
||||
if (api_version < 10) FilterOut(&filter, "*API10*");
|
||||
if (api_version < 11) FilterOut(&filter, "*API11*");
|
||||
if (api_version < 12) FilterOut(&filter, "*API12*");
|
||||
if (api_version < 13) FilterOut(&filter, "*API13*");
|
||||
if (api_version < 14) FilterOut(&filter, "*API14*");
|
||||
if (api_version < 15) FilterOut(&filter, "*API15*");
|
||||
// Some tests may require root access. If user is not root, filter these tests
|
||||
// out.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -539,6 +539,7 @@ void Session::FillSimpleMessage(uint32_t duration, uint32_t control,
|
||||
uint32_t nonce, const std::string& pst) {
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(
|
||||
1, GetRandBytes(license_.mac_key_iv, sizeof(license_.mac_key_iv)));
|
||||
memset(license_.padding, 0, sizeof(license_.padding));
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(1, GetRandBytes(license_.mac_keys, sizeof(license_.mac_keys)));
|
||||
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < num_keys_; i++) {
|
||||
memset(license_.keys[i].key_id, 0, kTestKeyIdMaxLength);
|
||||
@@ -1268,7 +1269,6 @@ void Session::GenerateReport(const std::string& pst,
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER, sts);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (sts == OEMCrypto_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER) {
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(wvcdm::Unpacked_PST_Report::report_size(pst.length()), length);
|
||||
pst_report_buffer_.assign(length, 0xFF); // Fill with garbage values.
|
||||
}
|
||||
sts = OEMCrypto_ReportUsage(session_id(),
|
||||
@@ -1278,7 +1278,7 @@ void Session::GenerateReport(const std::string& pst,
|
||||
if (expected_result != OEMCrypto_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(pst_report_buffer_.size(), length);
|
||||
EXPECT_EQ(wvcdm::Unpacked_PST_Report::report_size(pst.length()), length);
|
||||
vector<uint8_t> computed_signature(SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
|
||||
unsigned int sig_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
|
||||
HMAC(EVP_sha1(), mac_key_client_.data(), mac_key_client_.size(),
|
||||
@@ -1359,6 +1359,9 @@ void Session::GenerateVerifyReport(const std::string& pst,
|
||||
Test_PST_Report expected(pst, status);
|
||||
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(VerifyReport(expected, time_license_received,
|
||||
time_first_decrypt, time_last_decrypt));
|
||||
// The PST report was signed above. Below we verify that the entire message
|
||||
// that is sent to the server will be signed by the right mac keys.
|
||||
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(VerifyClientSignature());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void Session::CreateOldEntry(const Test_PST_Report& report) {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ typedef struct {
|
||||
struct MessageData {
|
||||
MessageKeyData keys[kMaxNumKeys];
|
||||
uint8_t mac_key_iv[KEY_IV_SIZE];
|
||||
uint8_t padding[KEY_IV_SIZE];
|
||||
uint8_t mac_keys[2 * MAC_KEY_SIZE];
|
||||
uint8_t pst[kMaxPSTLength];
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -15,6 +15,41 @@
|
||||
|
||||
namespace wvoec {
|
||||
|
||||
// TODO(fredgc, b/119316243): REMOVE THIS KEYBOX!
|
||||
// This test keybox is used for testing with OEMCrypto v13.
|
||||
// It should be removed before release!
|
||||
static const WidevineKeybox kTestKeyboxForV13 = {
|
||||
// Sample keybox used for test vectors
|
||||
{
|
||||
// deviceID
|
||||
0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x30, // TestKey01
|
||||
0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // ........
|
||||
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // ........
|
||||
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // ........
|
||||
}, {
|
||||
// key
|
||||
0xfb, 0xda, 0x04, 0x89, 0xa1, 0x58, 0x16, 0x0e,
|
||||
0xa4, 0x02, 0xe9, 0x29, 0xe3, 0xb6, 0x8f, 0x04,
|
||||
}, {
|
||||
// data
|
||||
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x19,
|
||||
0x07, 0xd9, 0xff, 0xde, 0x13, 0xaa, 0x95, 0xc1,
|
||||
0x22, 0x67, 0x80, 0x53, 0x36, 0x21, 0x36, 0xbd,
|
||||
0xf8, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x82, 0x76, 0xe4, 0xc2, 0xd8,
|
||||
0x7e, 0xc5, 0x2b, 0x61, 0xaa, 0x1b, 0x9f, 0x64,
|
||||
0x6e, 0x58, 0x73, 0x49, 0x30, 0xac, 0xeb, 0xe8,
|
||||
0x99, 0xb3, 0xe4, 0x64, 0x18, 0x9a, 0x14, 0xa8,
|
||||
0x72, 0x02, 0xfb, 0x02, 0x57, 0x4e, 0x70, 0x64,
|
||||
0x0b, 0xd2, 0x2e, 0xf4, 0x4b, 0x2d, 0x7e, 0x39,
|
||||
}, {
|
||||
// magic
|
||||
0x6b, 0x62, 0x6f, 0x78,
|
||||
}, {
|
||||
// Crc
|
||||
0x0a, 0x7a, 0x2c, 0x35,
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// This is a test keybox. It will not be accepted by production systems. By
|
||||
// using a known keybox for these tests, the results for a given set of inputs
|
||||
// to a test are predictable and can be compared to the actual results.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -105,6 +105,8 @@ void SessionUtil::EnsureTestKeys() {
|
||||
switch (global_features.derive_key_method) {
|
||||
case DeviceFeatures::LOAD_TEST_KEYBOX:
|
||||
keybox_ = kTestKeybox;
|
||||
// TODO(fredgc, b/119316243): REMOVE FOLLOWING LINE:
|
||||
if (global_features.api_version < 14) keybox_ = kTestKeyboxForV13;
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_LoadTestKeybox(
|
||||
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&keybox_),
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -871,6 +871,24 @@ TEST_F(OEMCryptoSessionTests, LoadKeyNoNonce) {
|
||||
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.LoadTestKeys());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify that a second license may be not be loaded in a session.
|
||||
TEST_F(OEMCryptoSessionTests, LoadKeyNoNonceTwice) {
|
||||
Session s;
|
||||
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.open());
|
||||
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(InstallTestSessionKeys(&s));
|
||||
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.FillSimpleMessage(kDuration, 0, 42));
|
||||
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.EncryptAndSign());
|
||||
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.LoadTestKeys());
|
||||
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.EncryptAndSign());
|
||||
ASSERT_NE(
|
||||
OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(s.session_id(), s.message_ptr(), s.message_size(),
|
||||
s.signature().data(), s.signature().size(),
|
||||
s.enc_mac_keys_iv_substr(), s.enc_mac_keys_substr(),
|
||||
s.num_keys(), s.key_array(), s.pst_substr(),
|
||||
GetSubstring(), OEMCrypto_ContentLicense));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify that a license may be loaded with a nonce.
|
||||
TEST_F(OEMCryptoSessionTests, LoadKeyWithNonce) {
|
||||
Session s;
|
||||
@@ -882,6 +900,24 @@ TEST_F(OEMCryptoSessionTests, LoadKeyWithNonce) {
|
||||
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.LoadTestKeys());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify that a second license may be not be loaded in a session.
|
||||
TEST_F(OEMCryptoSessionTests, LoadKeyWithNonceTwice) {
|
||||
Session s;
|
||||
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.open());
|
||||
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(InstallTestSessionKeys(&s));
|
||||
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(
|
||||
s.FillSimpleMessage(0, wvoec::kControlNonceEnabled, s.get_nonce()));
|
||||
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.EncryptAndSign());
|
||||
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.LoadTestKeys());
|
||||
ASSERT_NE(
|
||||
OEMCrypto_SUCCESS,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(s.session_id(), s.message_ptr(), s.message_size(),
|
||||
s.signature().data(), s.signature().size(),
|
||||
s.enc_mac_keys_iv_substr(), s.enc_mac_keys_substr(),
|
||||
s.num_keys(), s.key_array(), s.pst_substr(),
|
||||
GetSubstring(), OEMCrypto_ContentLicense));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// This asks for several nonce. This simulates several license requests being
|
||||
// lost. OEMCrypto is required to keep up to four nonce in the nonce table.
|
||||
TEST_F(OEMCryptoSessionTests, LoadKeySeveralNonce) {
|
||||
@@ -1179,6 +1215,27 @@ TEST_F(OEMCryptoSessionTests, LoadKeyWithBadRange7) {
|
||||
ASSERT_NE(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, sts);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The IV should not be identical to the data right before the encrypted mac
|
||||
// keys.
|
||||
TEST_F(OEMCryptoSessionTests, LoadKeyWithSuspiciousIV) {
|
||||
Session s;
|
||||
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.open());
|
||||
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(InstallTestSessionKeys(&s));
|
||||
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.FillSimpleMessage(0, 0, 0));
|
||||
// This is suspicious: the data right before the mac keys is identical to the
|
||||
// iv.
|
||||
memcpy(s.license().padding, s.license().mac_key_iv,
|
||||
sizeof(s.license().padding));
|
||||
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.EncryptAndSign());
|
||||
|
||||
OEMCryptoResult sts = OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(
|
||||
s.session_id(), s.message_ptr(), s.message_size(), s.signature().data(),
|
||||
s.signature().size(), s.enc_mac_keys_iv_substr(), s.enc_mac_keys_substr(),
|
||||
s.num_keys(), s.key_array(), GetSubstring(), GetSubstring(),
|
||||
OEMCrypto_ContentLicense);
|
||||
ASSERT_NE(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, sts);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Test that LoadKeys fails when a key is loaded with no key control block.
|
||||
TEST_F(OEMCryptoSessionTests, LoadKeyWithNullKeyControl) {
|
||||
Session s;
|
||||
@@ -5396,9 +5453,9 @@ TEST_P(UsageTableTestWithMAC, ReloadOfflineLicenseWithRefresh) {
|
||||
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(s.close());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify that a license that has been we can still reload an offline license
|
||||
// after OEMCrypto_Terminate and Initialize are called. This is as close to a
|
||||
// reboot as we can do in a unit test.
|
||||
// Verify that we can still reload an offline license after OEMCrypto_Terminate
|
||||
// and Initialize are called. This is as close to a reboot as we can do in a
|
||||
// unit test.
|
||||
TEST_P(UsageTableTestWithMAC, ReloadOfflineLicenseWithTerminate) {
|
||||
std::string pst = "my_pst";
|
||||
Session s;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -50,6 +50,11 @@ TEST_F(OEMCryptoAndroidLMPTest, ValidKeybox) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
TEST_F(OEMCryptoAndroidLMPTest, MinVersionNumber9) {
|
||||
uint32_t version = OEMCrypto_APIVersion();
|
||||
ASSERT_LE(9u, version);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
TEST_F(OEMCryptoAndroidLMPTest, ValidKeyboxTest) {
|
||||
ASSERT_EQ(OEMCrypto_SUCCESS, OEMCrypto_IsKeyboxValid());
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -108,6 +113,11 @@ TEST_F(OEMCryptoAndroidLMPTest, Level1Required) {
|
||||
// These tests are required for M Android devices.
|
||||
class OEMCryptoAndroidMNCTest : public OEMCryptoAndroidLMPTest {};
|
||||
|
||||
TEST_F(OEMCryptoAndroidMNCTest, MinVersionNumber10) {
|
||||
uint32_t version = OEMCrypto_APIVersion();
|
||||
ASSERT_GE(version, 10u);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Android devices using Provisioning 2.0 must be able to load a test keybox.
|
||||
// If they are not using Provisioning 2.0, then they must use Provisioning 3.0.
|
||||
TEST_F(OEMCryptoAndroidMNCTest, LoadsTestKeyboxImplemented) {
|
||||
@@ -135,4 +145,28 @@ TEST_F(OEMCryptoAndroidMNCTest, QueryKeyControlImplemented) {
|
||||
OEMCrypto_QueryKeyControl(0, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// These tests are required for N Android devices.
|
||||
class OEMCryptoAndroidNYCTest : public OEMCryptoAndroidMNCTest {};
|
||||
|
||||
TEST_F(OEMCryptoAndroidNYCTest, MinVersionNumber11) {
|
||||
uint32_t version = OEMCrypto_APIVersion();
|
||||
ASSERT_GE(version, 11u);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// These tests are required for O MR1 Android devices.
|
||||
class OEMCryptoAndroidOCTest : public OEMCryptoAndroidNYCTest {};
|
||||
|
||||
TEST_F(OEMCryptoAndroidOCTest, MinVersionNumber13) {
|
||||
uint32_t version = OEMCrypto_APIVersion();
|
||||
ASSERT_GE(version, 13u);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// These tests are required for Q Android devices.
|
||||
class OEMCryptoAndroidQTest : public OEMCryptoAndroidOCTest {};
|
||||
|
||||
TEST_F(OEMCryptoAndroidQTest, MinVersionNumber14) {
|
||||
uint32_t version = OEMCrypto_APIVersion();
|
||||
ASSERT_GE(version, 15u);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
} // namespace wvoec
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// Copyright 2018 Google LLC. All Rights Reserved. This file and proprietary
|
||||
// source code may only be used and distributed under the Widevine Master
|
||||
// License Agreement.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Lock - Platform independent interface for a Mutex class
|
||||
//
|
||||
#ifndef WVCDM_UTIL_LOCK_H_
|
||||
#define WVCDM_UTIL_LOCK_H_
|
||||
|
||||
#include "disallow_copy_and_assign.h"
|
||||
|
||||
namespace wvcdm {
|
||||
|
||||
// Simple lock class. The implementation is platform dependent.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The lock must be unlocked by the thread that locked it.
|
||||
// The lock is also not recursive (ie. cannot be taken multiple times).
|
||||
class Lock {
|
||||
public:
|
||||
Lock();
|
||||
~Lock();
|
||||
|
||||
void Acquire();
|
||||
void Release();
|
||||
|
||||
friend class AutoLock;
|
||||
|
||||
private:
|
||||
class Impl;
|
||||
Impl* impl_;
|
||||
|
||||
CORE_DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(Lock);
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Manages the lock automatically. It will be locked when AutoLock
|
||||
// is constructed and release when AutoLock goes out of scope.
|
||||
class AutoLock {
|
||||
public:
|
||||
explicit AutoLock(Lock& lock) : lock_(&lock) { lock_->Acquire(); }
|
||||
|
||||
explicit AutoLock(Lock* lock) : lock_(lock) { lock_->Acquire(); }
|
||||
|
||||
~AutoLock() { lock_->Release(); }
|
||||
|
||||
private:
|
||||
Lock* lock_;
|
||||
|
||||
CORE_DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(AutoLock);
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
} // namespace wvcdm
|
||||
|
||||
#endif // WVCDM_UTIL_LOCK_H_
|
||||
@@ -14,11 +14,15 @@ namespace wvcdm {
|
||||
// Simple logging class. The implementation is platform dependent.
|
||||
|
||||
typedef enum {
|
||||
LOG_ERROR,
|
||||
LOG_WARN,
|
||||
LOG_INFO,
|
||||
LOG_DEBUG,
|
||||
LOG_VERBOSE
|
||||
// This log level should only be used for |g_cutoff|, in order to silence all
|
||||
// logging. It should never be passed to |Log()| as a log level.
|
||||
LOG_SILENT = -1,
|
||||
|
||||
LOG_ERROR = 0,
|
||||
LOG_WARN = 1,
|
||||
LOG_INFO = 2,
|
||||
LOG_DEBUG = 3,
|
||||
LOG_VERBOSE = 4,
|
||||
} LogPriority;
|
||||
|
||||
extern LogPriority g_cutoff;
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user