Sync Android reference with CDM reference.
The sc-dev branch on Android is out of sync with several important changes on the CDM master branch. This changes copies several CLs. [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/104524 ] OEMCrypto unittest: generic crypto APIs Add unit tests to verify that generic crypto APIs do not crash for large input buffer lengths and signature lengths. [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/106583 ] Fix secure buffer tests in OEMCrypto testbed The secure buffers were not being used correctly in the testbed, and were failing OEMCryptoMemoryCopyBufferForHugeBufferLengths. [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/109603 ] Reject block_offsets of 16 or greater in OEC Ref This is a potential security hole. We will be enforcing that OEMCrypto rejects this in an upcoming test, so the Ref must be updated to reject it. [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/110165 ] Fix Format String Signedness See above for full description. [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/111784 ] Fix heap overflow test in L3 and OEMCrypto ref Check the length of wrapped_rsa_key_length before casting to WrappedRSAKey struct. [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/113563 ] Reword "blacklisted" to "forbidden" [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/113583 ] Use error code from RAND_bytes The return code from RAND_bytes was not used correctly. [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/113644 ] Check for buffer overflow when computing subsample size The test DecryptCENCForNumBytesClearPlusEncryptedOverflowsSize cleverly picks num_bytes_clear + num_bytes_encrypted = 1 after integer overflow. This is in the refernce code, level 3, and odkitee. [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/113683 ] OEMCrypto reference code: respect analog flags for clear buffers The reference code should honor the analog_display_active flag for both clear and secure buffers. [ Merge of http://go/wvgerrit/114883 ] Add size check for IV in OEMCrypto APIs IV is supposed to be 16 bytes but the size is never checked before iv gets used in LoadProvisioning. Bug: 145026457 Bug: 147569428 Bug: 159847851 Bug: 162372059 Bug: 169278035 Bug: 169980065 Bug: 173460694 Bug: 173994023 Bug: 174523584 Bug: 175001473 Bug: 175041667 Test: No compiled files changed Change-Id: If0ccd1cd3a56f72eedd2a6cb202a34bc7b43ca0d
This commit is contained in:
@@ -230,6 +230,13 @@ OEMCryptoResult CryptoEngine::SetDestination(
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max_length = out_description.buffer.clear.address_length;
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break;
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case OEMCrypto_BufferType_Secure:
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if (out_description.buffer.secure.handle_length <
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out_description.buffer.secure.offset) {
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LOGE("Secure buffer offset too large: %zu < %zu",
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out_description.buffer.secure.handle_length,
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out_description.buffer.secure.offset);
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER;
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}
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destination_ =
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reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(out_description.buffer.secure.handle) +
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out_description.buffer.secure.offset;
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@@ -171,12 +171,12 @@ class CryptoEngine {
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// If 0 no restriction, otherwise it's the max subsample size for
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// DecryptCENC. This is not the same as the max sample or buffer size.
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virtual size_t max_subsample_size() { return 1024 * 100; } // 100 KiB
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virtual size_t max_subsample_size() { return 4 * 1024 * 1024; } // 4 MiB
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// If 0 no restriction, otherwise it's the max sample size for DecryptCENC.
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// This is the same as the max input and output buffer size for DecryptCENC
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// and CopyBuffer. It is not the same as the max subsample size.
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virtual size_t max_sample_size() { return 1024 * 1024; } // 1 MiB
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virtual size_t max_sample_size() { return 16 * 1024 * 1024; } // 16 MiB
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virtual bool srm_update_supported() { return false; }
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@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ class CryptoEngine {
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
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}
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virtual bool srm_blacklisted_device_attached() { return false; }
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virtual bool srm_forbidden_device_attached() { return false; }
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// Rate limit for nonce generation. Default to 200 nonce/second.
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virtual int nonce_flood_count() { return 200; }
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@@ -32,9 +32,9 @@
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#include "string_conversions.h"
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#if defined(_WIN32)
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# define OEMCRYPTO_API extern "C" __declspec(dllexport)
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# define OEMCRYPTO_API extern "C" __declspec(dllexport)
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#else // defined(_WIN32)
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# define OEMCRYPTO_API extern "C" __attribute__((visibility("default")))
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# define OEMCRYPTO_API extern "C" __attribute__((visibility("default")))
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#endif // defined(_WIN32)
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namespace {
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@@ -42,6 +42,12 @@ const uint8_t kBakedInCertificateMagicBytes[] = {0xDE, 0xAD, 0xBE, 0xEF};
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// Maximum context key length used for performance reasons, not mandated by
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// specification.
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const size_t kMaxContextKeyLength = 1024 * 1024;
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// Maximum buffer length used by reference implementation for performance
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// reasons. This is not mandated by specification.
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const size_t kMaxInputMessageBuferLength = 1024 * 1024;
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// Maximum signature length used by reference implementation for performance
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// reasons. This is not mandated by specification.
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const size_t kMaxInputSignatureLength = 10 * 1024;
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// Return uint32 referenced through a potentially unaligned pointer.
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// If the pointer is nullptr, return 0.
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@@ -100,8 +106,8 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_Terminate(void) {
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return OEMCrypto_SUCCESS;
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}
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OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_OpenSession(
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OEMCrypto_SESSION* session) {
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OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult
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OEMCrypto_OpenSession(OEMCrypto_SESSION* session) {
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if (crypto_engine == nullptr) {
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LOGE("OEMCrypto_OpenSession: OEMCrypto not initialized.");
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
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@@ -120,8 +126,8 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_OpenSession(
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return OEMCrypto_SUCCESS;
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}
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OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_CloseSession(
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OEMCrypto_SESSION session) {
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OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult
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OEMCrypto_CloseSession(OEMCrypto_SESSION session) {
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if (crypto_engine == nullptr) {
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LOGE("OEMCrypto_CloseSession: OEMCrypto not initialized.");
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
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@@ -209,7 +215,7 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_GenerateNonce(OEMCrypto_SESSION session,
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while (nonce_value == 0 || crypto_engine->NonceCollision(nonce_value)) {
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// Generate 4 bytes of random data
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if (!RAND_bytes(nonce_string, 4)) {
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if (RAND_bytes(nonce_string, 4) != 1) {
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LOGE("[OEMCrypto_GenerateNonce(): Random bytes failure]");
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
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}
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@@ -309,7 +315,7 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_LoadLicense(OEMCrypto_SESSION session,
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}
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SessionContext* session_ctx = crypto_engine->FindSession(session);
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if (session_ctx == nullptr || !session_ctx->isValid()) {
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LOGE("ERROR_INVALID_SESSION sid=%d", session);
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LOGE("ERROR_INVALID_SESSION sid=%u", session);
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_SESSION;
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}
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return session_ctx->LoadLicense(message, message_length, core_message_length,
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@@ -333,7 +339,7 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(
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}
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SessionContext* session_ctx = crypto_engine->FindSession(session);
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if (session_ctx == nullptr || !session_ctx->isValid()) {
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LOGE("ERROR_INVALID_SESSION sid=%d", session);
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LOGE("ERROR_INVALID_SESSION sid=%u", session);
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_SESSION;
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}
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if (message == nullptr || message_length == 0 || signature == nullptr ||
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@@ -347,33 +353,38 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(
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!RangeCheck(message_length, enc_mac_keys, true) ||
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!RangeCheck(message_length, pst, true) ||
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!RangeCheck(message_length, srm_restriction_data, true)) {
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LOGE("[OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(): OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT - "
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"range check.]");
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LOGE(
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"[OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(): OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT - "
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"range check.]");
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT;
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}
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for (unsigned int i = 0; i < num_keys; i++) {
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for (size_t i = 0; i < num_keys; i++) {
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if (!RangeCheck(message_length, key_array[i].key_id, false) ||
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!RangeCheck(message_length, key_array[i].key_data, false) ||
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!RangeCheck(message_length, key_array[i].key_data_iv, false) ||
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!RangeCheck(message_length, key_array[i].key_control, false) ||
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!RangeCheck(message_length, key_array[i].key_control_iv, false)) {
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LOGE("[OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(): OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT - "
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"range check %d]", i);
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LOGE(
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"[OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(): OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT - range "
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"check %zu]",
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i);
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT;
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}
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}
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if (enc_mac_keys.offset >= wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE && enc_mac_keys.length > 0) {
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if (enc_mac_keys_iv.offset + wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE == enc_mac_keys.offset) {
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LOGE("[OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(): OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT - "
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"range check iv]");
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LOGE(
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"[OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(): OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT - "
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"range check iv]");
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT;
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} else {
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if (CRYPTO_memcmp(message + enc_mac_keys.offset - wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE,
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message + enc_mac_keys_iv.offset,
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wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE) == 0) {
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LOGE("[OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(): OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT - "
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"suspicious iv]");
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LOGE(
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"[OEMCrypto_LoadKeys(): OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT - "
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"suspicious iv]");
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT;
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}
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}
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@@ -570,9 +581,9 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_QueryKeyControl(
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return OEMCrypto_SUCCESS;
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}
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OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_SelectKey(
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const OEMCrypto_SESSION session, const uint8_t* key_id,
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size_t key_id_length, OEMCryptoCipherMode cipher_mode) {
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OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult
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OEMCrypto_SelectKey(const OEMCrypto_SESSION session, const uint8_t* key_id,
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size_t key_id_length, OEMCryptoCipherMode cipher_mode) {
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#ifndef NDEBUG
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if (!crypto_engine->ValidRootOfTrust()) {
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LOGE("[OEMCrypto_SelectKey(): ERROR_KEYBOX_INVALID]");
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@@ -619,7 +630,14 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_DecryptCENC(
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_KEYBOX_INVALID;
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}
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#endif
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// The maximum subsample and sample sizes we use -- if 0, we just pick a
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// very large size for a validity check.
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const size_t max_subsample_size = crypto_engine->max_subsample_size() > 0
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? crypto_engine->max_subsample_size()
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: 100 * 1024 * 1024;
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const size_t max_sample_size = crypto_engine->max_subsample_size() > 0
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? crypto_engine->max_subsample_size()
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: 1000 * 1024 * 1024;
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// Iterate through all the samples and validate them before doing any decrypt
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for (size_t sample_index = 0; sample_index < samples_length; ++sample_index) {
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const OEMCrypto_SampleDescription& sample = samples[sample_index];
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@@ -636,17 +654,20 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_DecryptCENC(
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LOGE("[OEMCrypto_DecryptCENC(): Sample too large]");
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE;
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}
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// Iterate through all the subsamples and sum their lengths
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size_t subsample_length_tally = 0;
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for (size_t subsample_index = 0; subsample_index < sample.subsamples_length;
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++subsample_index) {
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const OEMCrypto_SubSampleDescription& subsample =
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sample.subsamples[subsample_index];
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// Compute the length now, but we check for possible overflow in the next
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// if statement.
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const size_t length =
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subsample.num_bytes_clear + subsample.num_bytes_encrypted;
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if (crypto_engine->max_subsample_size() > 0 &&
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length > crypto_engine->max_subsample_size()) {
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if (subsample.num_bytes_clear > max_subsample_size ||
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subsample.num_bytes_encrypted > max_subsample_size ||
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length > max_subsample_size ||
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subsample_length_tally > max_sample_size) {
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// For testing reasons only, pretend that this integration only supports
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// the given buffer size.
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LOGE("[OEMCrypto_DecryptCENC(): Subsample too large]");
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@@ -711,8 +732,8 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_WrapKeyboxOrOEMCert(
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return OEMCrypto_SUCCESS;
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}
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OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_InstallKeyboxOrOEMCert(
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const uint8_t* keybox, size_t keyBoxLength) {
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OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult
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OEMCrypto_InstallKeyboxOrOEMCert(const uint8_t* keybox, size_t keyBoxLength) {
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if (crypto_engine == nullptr) {
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LOGE("OEMCrypto_InstallKeyboxOrOEMCert: OEMCrypto Not Initialized.");
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
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@@ -876,7 +897,7 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_GetRandom(uint8_t* randomData,
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if (!randomData) {
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
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}
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if (RAND_bytes(randomData, dataLength)) {
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if (RAND_bytes(randomData, dataLength) == 1) {
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return OEMCrypto_SUCCESS;
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}
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
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@@ -944,11 +965,11 @@ static OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey30(
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// Now we generate a wrapped keybox.
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WrappedRSAKey* wrapped = reinterpret_cast<WrappedRSAKey*>(wrapped_rsa_key);
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// Pick a random context and IV for generating keys.
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if (!RAND_bytes(wrapped->context, sizeof(wrapped->context))) {
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if (RAND_bytes(wrapped->context, sizeof(wrapped->context)) != 1) {
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LOGE("[_RewrapDeviceRSAKey30(): RAND_bytes failed.");
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
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}
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if (!RAND_bytes(wrapped->iv, sizeof(wrapped->iv))) {
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if (RAND_bytes(wrapped->iv, sizeof(wrapped->iv)) != 1) {
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LOGE("[_RewrapDeviceRSAKey30(): RAND_bytes failed.");
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
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}
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@@ -1045,10 +1066,10 @@ static OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_RewrapDeviceRSAKey(
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// Now we generate a wrapped keybox.
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WrappedRSAKey* wrapped = reinterpret_cast<WrappedRSAKey*>(wrapped_rsa_key);
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// Pick a random context and IV for generating keys.
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if (!RAND_bytes(wrapped->context, sizeof(wrapped->context))) {
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if (RAND_bytes(wrapped->context, sizeof(wrapped->context)) != 1) {
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
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}
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if (!RAND_bytes(wrapped->iv, sizeof(wrapped->iv))) {
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if (RAND_bytes(wrapped->iv, sizeof(wrapped->iv)) != 1) {
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
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}
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const std::vector<uint8_t> context(
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@@ -1111,6 +1132,11 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_LoadProvisioning(
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LOGE("ODK Error %d", result);
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return result;
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}
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if (parsed_response.enc_private_key_iv.length != wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE) {
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LOGE("Encrypted private key iv has invalid length: %zu",
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parsed_response.enc_private_key_iv.length);
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT;
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}
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// For the reference implementation, the wrapped key and the encrypted
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// key are the same size -- just encrypted with different keys.
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@@ -1178,6 +1204,10 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_LoadDRMPrivateKey(
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return OEMCrypto_SUCCESS;
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}
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}
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if (wrapped_rsa_key_length < sizeof(WrappedRSAKey)) {
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LOGE("RSA Key has wrong size.");
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_RSA_KEY;
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}
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const WrappedRSAKey* wrapped =
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reinterpret_cast<const WrappedRSAKey*>(wrapped_rsa_key);
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if (!crypto_engine->ValidRootOfTrust()) {
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@@ -1393,8 +1423,8 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_GetNumberOfOpenSessions(size_t* count) {
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return OEMCrypto_SUCCESS;
|
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}
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OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_GetMaxNumberOfSessions(
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size_t* maximum) {
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OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult
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OEMCrypto_GetMaxNumberOfSessions(size_t* maximum) {
|
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if (crypto_engine == nullptr) {
|
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LOGE("OEMCrypto_GetMaxNumberOfSessions: OEMCrypto Not Initialized.");
|
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
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@@ -1444,6 +1474,11 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_Generic_Encrypt(
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LOGE("[OEMCrypto_Generic_Encrypt(): OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT]");
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT;
|
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}
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if (buffer_length > kMaxInputMessageBuferLength) {
|
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LOGE("[OEMCrypto_Generic_Encrypt(): ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE]");
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE;
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}
|
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|
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OEMCryptoResult sts = session_ctx->Generic_Encrypt(in_buffer, buffer_length,
|
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iv, algorithm, out_buffer);
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return sts;
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@@ -1470,15 +1505,19 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_Generic_Decrypt(
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LOGE("[OEMCrypto_Generic_Decrypt(): OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT]");
|
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT;
|
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}
|
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if (buffer_length > kMaxInputMessageBuferLength) {
|
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LOGE("[OEMCrypto_Generic_Encrypt(): ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE]");
|
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE;
|
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}
|
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OEMCryptoResult sts = session_ctx->Generic_Decrypt(in_buffer, buffer_length,
|
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iv, algorithm, out_buffer);
|
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return sts;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
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OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_Generic_Sign(
|
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OEMCrypto_SESSION session, const uint8_t* in_buffer, size_t buffer_length,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_Algorithm algorithm, uint8_t* signature,
|
||||
size_t* signature_length) {
|
||||
OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult
|
||||
OEMCrypto_Generic_Sign(OEMCrypto_SESSION session, const uint8_t* in_buffer,
|
||||
size_t buffer_length, OEMCrypto_Algorithm algorithm,
|
||||
uint8_t* signature, size_t* signature_length) {
|
||||
if (crypto_engine == nullptr) {
|
||||
LOGE("OEMCrypto_Generic_Sign: OEMCrypto Not Initialized.");
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
||||
@@ -1500,15 +1539,19 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_Generic_Sign(
|
||||
LOGE("[OEMCrypto_Generic_Sign(): OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT]");
|
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return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (buffer_length > kMaxInputMessageBuferLength) {
|
||||
LOGE("[OEMCrypto_Generic_Sign(): ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE]");
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
OEMCryptoResult sts = session_ctx->Generic_Sign(
|
||||
in_buffer, buffer_length, algorithm, signature, signature_length);
|
||||
return sts;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_Generic_Verify(
|
||||
OEMCrypto_SESSION session, const uint8_t* in_buffer, size_t buffer_length,
|
||||
OEMCrypto_Algorithm algorithm, const uint8_t* signature,
|
||||
size_t signature_length) {
|
||||
OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult
|
||||
OEMCrypto_Generic_Verify(OEMCrypto_SESSION session, const uint8_t* in_buffer,
|
||||
size_t buffer_length, OEMCrypto_Algorithm algorithm,
|
||||
const uint8_t* signature, size_t signature_length) {
|
||||
if (crypto_engine == nullptr) {
|
||||
LOGE("OEMCrypto_Generic_Verify: OEMCrypto Not Initialized.");
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
||||
@@ -1525,10 +1568,15 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_Generic_Verify(
|
||||
if (signature_length != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (in_buffer == nullptr || buffer_length == 0 || signature == nullptr) {
|
||||
if (in_buffer == nullptr || buffer_length == 0 || signature == nullptr ||
|
||||
signature_length > kMaxInputSignatureLength) {
|
||||
LOGE("[OEMCrypto_Generic_Verify(): OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT]");
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (buffer_length > kMaxInputMessageBuferLength) {
|
||||
LOGE("[OEMCrypto_Generic_Verify(): ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE]");
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return session_ctx->Generic_Verify(in_buffer, buffer_length, algorithm,
|
||||
signature, signature_length);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1585,8 +1633,8 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API bool OEMCrypto_IsSRMUpdateSupported() {
|
||||
return result;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_GetCurrentSRMVersion(
|
||||
uint16_t* version) {
|
||||
OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult
|
||||
OEMCrypto_GetCurrentSRMVersion(uint16_t* version) {
|
||||
if (crypto_engine == nullptr) {
|
||||
LOGE("OEMCrypto_GetCurrentSRMVersion: OEMCrypto Not Initialized.");
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
||||
@@ -1629,8 +1677,8 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_CreateUsageTableHeader(
|
||||
header_buffer, header_buffer_length);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_LoadUsageTableHeader(
|
||||
const uint8_t* buffer, size_t buffer_length) {
|
||||
OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult
|
||||
OEMCrypto_LoadUsageTableHeader(const uint8_t* buffer, size_t buffer_length) {
|
||||
if (crypto_engine == nullptr) {
|
||||
LOGE("OEMCrypto_LoadUsageTableHeader: OEMCrypto Not Initialized.");
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
||||
@@ -1667,9 +1715,9 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_CreateNewUsageEntry(
|
||||
return sts;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_LoadUsageEntry(
|
||||
OEMCrypto_SESSION session, uint32_t index, const uint8_t* buffer,
|
||||
size_t buffer_size) {
|
||||
OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult
|
||||
OEMCrypto_LoadUsageEntry(OEMCrypto_SESSION session, uint32_t index,
|
||||
const uint8_t* buffer, size_t buffer_size) {
|
||||
if (crypto_engine == nullptr) {
|
||||
LOGE("OEMCrypto_LoadUsageEntry: OEMCrypto Not Initialized.");
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
||||
@@ -1690,10 +1738,10 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_LoadUsageEntry(
|
||||
return session_ctx->LoadUsageEntry(index, bufferv);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_UpdateUsageEntry(
|
||||
OEMCrypto_SESSION session, uint8_t* header_buffer,
|
||||
size_t* header_buffer_length, uint8_t* entry_buffer,
|
||||
size_t* entry_buffer_length) {
|
||||
OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult
|
||||
OEMCrypto_UpdateUsageEntry(OEMCrypto_SESSION session, uint8_t* header_buffer,
|
||||
size_t* header_buffer_length, uint8_t* entry_buffer,
|
||||
size_t* entry_buffer_length) {
|
||||
if (crypto_engine == nullptr) {
|
||||
LOGE("OEMCrypto_UpdateUsageEntry: OEMCrypto Not Initialized.");
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
||||
@@ -1748,9 +1796,9 @@ OEMCRYPTO_API uint32_t OEMCrypto_SupportsDecryptHash() {
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_CRC_Clear_Buffer;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult OEMCrypto_SetDecryptHash(
|
||||
OEMCrypto_SESSION session, uint32_t frame_number, const uint8_t* hash,
|
||||
size_t hash_length) {
|
||||
OEMCRYPTO_API OEMCryptoResult
|
||||
OEMCrypto_SetDecryptHash(OEMCrypto_SESSION session, uint32_t frame_number,
|
||||
const uint8_t* hash, size_t hash_length) {
|
||||
if (crypto_engine == nullptr) {
|
||||
LOGE("OEMCrypto_SetDecryptHash: OEMCrypto Not Initialized.");
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -303,9 +303,12 @@ bool SessionContext::RSADeriveKeys(
|
||||
LOGE("[RSADeriveKeys(): no RSA key set]");
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (enc_session_key.size() != static_cast<size_t>(RSA_size(rsa_key()))) {
|
||||
LOGE("[RSADeriveKeys(): encrypted session key wrong size:%zu, expected %d]",
|
||||
enc_session_key.size(), RSA_size(rsa_key()));
|
||||
const size_t actual_key_size = static_cast<size_t>(RSA_size(rsa_key()));
|
||||
if (enc_session_key.size() != actual_key_size) {
|
||||
LOGE(
|
||||
"[RSADeriveKeys(): encrypted session key wrong size: %zu, expected "
|
||||
"%zu]",
|
||||
enc_session_key.size(), actual_key_size);
|
||||
dump_boringssl_error();
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -806,8 +809,8 @@ OEMCryptoResult SessionContext::LoadKeysNoSignature(
|
||||
LOGW("[LoadKeys: SRM Version is too small %u, required: %u",
|
||||
current_version, minimum_version);
|
||||
srm_requirements_status_ = InvalidSRMVersion;
|
||||
} else if (ce_->srm_blacklisted_device_attached()) {
|
||||
LOGW("[LoadKeys: SRM blacklisted device attached]");
|
||||
} else if (ce_->srm_forbidden_device_attached()) {
|
||||
LOGW("[LoadKeys: SRM forbidden device attached]");
|
||||
srm_requirements_status_ = InvalidSRMVersion;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
LOGI("[LoadKeys: SRM Versions is %u, required: %u]", current_version,
|
||||
@@ -1193,6 +1196,36 @@ OEMCryptoResult SessionContext::CheckKeyUse(const std::string& log_string,
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_DECRYPT_FAILED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!ce_->config_local_display_only()) {
|
||||
// Only look at HDCP restrictions if the display can be non-local.
|
||||
if (control.control_bits() & wvoec::kControlHDCPRequired) {
|
||||
uint8_t required_hdcp =
|
||||
(control.control_bits() & wvoec::kControlHDCPVersionMask) >>
|
||||
wvoec::kControlHDCPVersionShift;
|
||||
if (ce_->srm_forbidden_device_attached()) {
|
||||
required_hdcp = HDCP_NO_DIGITAL_OUTPUT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// For reference implementation, we pretend we can handle the current
|
||||
// HDCP version.
|
||||
if (required_hdcp > ce_->config_current_hdcp_capability() ||
|
||||
ce_->config_current_hdcp_capability() == 0) {
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_HDCP;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Return an error if analog displays should be disabled.
|
||||
if ((control.control_bits() & wvoec::kControlDisableAnalogOutput) &&
|
||||
ce_->analog_display_active()) {
|
||||
LOGE("[%s(): control bit says disable analog", log_string.c_str());
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_ANALOG_OUTPUT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Check if CGMS is required.
|
||||
if (control.control_bits() & wvoec::kControlCGMSMask) {
|
||||
if (ce_->analog_display_active() && !ce_->cgms_a_active()) {
|
||||
LOGE("[%s(): control bit says CGMS required", log_string.c_str());
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_ANALOG_OUTPUT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!decrypt_started_) {
|
||||
// The reference implementation does not have a hardware timer.
|
||||
uint64_t* timer_expiration = nullptr;
|
||||
@@ -1207,44 +1240,6 @@ OEMCryptoResult SessionContext::CheckKeyUse(const std::string& log_string,
|
||||
if (result == ODK_TIMER_EXPIRED) return OEMCrypto_ERROR_KEY_EXPIRED;
|
||||
if (usage_entry_ != nullptr) usage_entry_->set_recent_decrypt(true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!ce_->config_local_display_only()) {
|
||||
// Only look at HDCP restrictions if the display can be non-local.
|
||||
if (control.control_bits() & wvoec::kControlHDCPRequired) {
|
||||
uint8_t required_hdcp =
|
||||
(control.control_bits() & wvoec::kControlHDCPVersionMask) >>
|
||||
wvoec::kControlHDCPVersionShift;
|
||||
if (ce_->srm_blacklisted_device_attached()) {
|
||||
required_hdcp = HDCP_NO_DIGITAL_OUTPUT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// For reference implementation, we pretend we can handle the current
|
||||
// HDCP version.
|
||||
if (required_hdcp > ce_->config_current_hdcp_capability() ||
|
||||
ce_->config_current_hdcp_capability() == 0) {
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_HDCP;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// If the output buffer is clear, then we cannot control whether the output is
|
||||
// an active analog display. In that case, return an error if analog displays
|
||||
// should be disabled.
|
||||
if ((control.control_bits() & wvoec::kControlDisableAnalogOutput) &&
|
||||
(ce_->analog_display_active() ||
|
||||
(buffer_type == OEMCrypto_BufferType_Clear))) {
|
||||
LOGE("[%s(): control bit says disable analog", log_string.c_str());
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_ANALOG_OUTPUT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Check if CGMS is required.
|
||||
if (control.control_bits() & wvoec::kControlCGMSMask) {
|
||||
// We can't control CGMS for a clear buffer.
|
||||
if (buffer_type == OEMCrypto_BufferType_Clear) {
|
||||
LOGE("[%s(): CGMS required, but buffer is clear", log_string.c_str());
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_ANALOG_OUTPUT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (ce_->analog_display_active() && !ce_->cgms_a_active()) {
|
||||
LOGE("[%s(): control bit says CGMS required", log_string.c_str());
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_ANALOG_OUTPUT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
decrypt_started_ = true; // First playback for session.
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_SUCCESS;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1761,6 +1756,8 @@ OEMCryptoResult SessionContext::DecryptCTR(const uint8_t* key_u8,
|
||||
const uint8_t* cipher_data,
|
||||
size_t cipher_data_length,
|
||||
uint8_t* clear_data) {
|
||||
if (block_offset >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_CONTEXT;
|
||||
|
||||
// Local copy (will be modified).
|
||||
// Allocated as 64-bit ints to enforce 64-bit alignment for later access as a
|
||||
// 64-bit value.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -209,7 +209,10 @@ OEMCryptoResult UsageTableEntry::SaveData(CryptoEngine* ce,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Encrypt the entry.
|
||||
RAND_bytes(encrypted->iv, wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE);
|
||||
if (RAND_bytes(encrypted->iv, wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE) != 1) {
|
||||
LOGE("SaveUsageEntry: Could not generate iv.");
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
uint8_t iv_buffer[wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE]; // working iv buffer.
|
||||
memcpy(iv_buffer, encrypted->iv, wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE);
|
||||
AES_KEY aes_key;
|
||||
@@ -292,7 +295,7 @@ OEMCryptoResult UsageTableEntry::LoadData(CryptoEngine* ce, uint32_t index,
|
||||
|
||||
// Check that the index is correct.
|
||||
if (index != clear->data.index) {
|
||||
LOGE("LoadUsageEntry: entry says index is %d, not %d", clear->data.index,
|
||||
LOGE("LoadUsageEntry: entry says index is %u, not %u", clear->data.index,
|
||||
index);
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_SESSION;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -386,7 +389,7 @@ OEMCryptoResult UsageTable::LoadUsageEntry(
|
||||
if (index >= generation_numbers_.size())
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
||||
if (sessions_[index]) {
|
||||
LOGE("LoadUsageEntry: index %d used by other session.", index);
|
||||
LOGE("LoadUsageEntry: index %u used by other session.", index);
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_INVALID_SESSION;
|
||||
}
|
||||
const size_t max = ce_->max_usage_table_size();
|
||||
@@ -479,7 +482,10 @@ OEMCryptoResult UsageTable::SaveUsageTableHeader(uint8_t* signed_buffer,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Encrypt the entry.
|
||||
RAND_bytes(encrypted->iv, wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE);
|
||||
if (RAND_bytes(encrypted->iv, wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE) != 1) {
|
||||
LOGE("SaveUsageHeader: Could not generate iv entry.");
|
||||
return OEMCrypto_ERROR_UNKNOWN_FAILURE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
uint8_t iv_buffer[wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE]; // working iv buffer.
|
||||
memcpy(iv_buffer, encrypted->iv, wvoec::KEY_IV_SIZE);
|
||||
AES_KEY aes_key;
|
||||
@@ -667,9 +673,8 @@ bool UsageTable::LoadGenerationNumber(bool or_make_new_one) {
|
||||
auto file = file_system->Open(filename, wvcdm::FileSystem::kReadOnly);
|
||||
if (!file) {
|
||||
if (or_make_new_one) {
|
||||
RAND_bytes(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&master_generation_number_),
|
||||
sizeof(int64_t));
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
return RAND_bytes(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&master_generation_number_),
|
||||
sizeof(int64_t)) == 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
LOGE("UsageTable: File open failed: %s (clearing table)", path.c_str());
|
||||
master_generation_number_ = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user